691.93/12–150: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 1—11:47 a. m.]
921. For Hickerson from Gross. At Bebler’s Security Council dinner last night Rau took me aside to tell me that the initiative for his [Page 1289] meeting this morning with Wu “this time came from them”. Rau said Wu sent him a message at the Security Council table yesterday afternoon suggesting they meet at 10:30 Friday a. m. Because of Rau’s tendency to leap out of the water at flies, I undertook to sound some warnings. I expressed view that on basis Wu’s performance in Security Council it was clear he had a long way to go before showing up at Tito’s headquarters. Rau nodded agreement.
Following this up, I asked Rau if he would forgive a tactless question and when he replied that I should feel free to ask him anything, I said suddenly “what is your appraisal of Panikkar?” Rau was startled by the question, and after a slight pause, he grinned and said “you have something of an answer in my delay in formulating a reply”. Rau then proceeded with the frank comment that Panikkar was a fine person and great scholar, but that “the people in Delhi know how to evaluate him and give the proper discount”. I then explained that I had asked the question because several months ago Rau had told me of Panikkar’s conviction that Communist China was pursuing its own course, that it was not a Soviet satellite, and that it was more Chinese than Communist. I said we had always been skeptical of this appraisal, and that Wu’s performance appeared to me to show up Panikkar’s analysis.
I thought it was difficult to say how much of Wu’s manner was due to political immaturity and how much to planned terror tactics. In any event, it seemed to me important to avoid entrapment in a situation which would affect momentum in UN and especially important to prevent the fact of his meeting with Wu creating false hopes among UN members.
I reminded Rau that Soviets had often tried to obstruct and divert free world efforts to concert their policies by propaganda trick of pretending to want “discussions”. I expressed hope Rau would be wary of efforts on part of Wu to build up a climate of so-called discussions and that in any statement Rau might make after the meeting he would avoid falling into this familiar trap. Rau listened intently and throughout nodded his agreement. Referring to earlier discussions relating to our willingness to talk with Wu, I said Rau would forgive me if I again stressed that while we were not eager to talk with Wu, and indeed had nothing to offer him or to suggest to him, that if Wu had anything on his mind we were prepared to listen. Rau professed understanding.
He said he would like to see me this afternoon, to tell me of his talk with Wu and also to discuss our notions of what happens next.
Rau referred to news of Attlee’s visit to Washington. He said it had occurred to him after hearing this news that it might be a good idea for Nehru to come for a talk with the President, if Nehru could arrange to do so. Rau stressed this was his own idea, just born, and [Page 1290] he did not know if it was practical. He thought I might pass it on the Department as Rau’s personal and tentative idea.
Reverting to conversation earlier in day in which I had urged him not to launch in Security Council his plan to suggest including in resolution an offer to withdraw 7th fleet from Formosa Straits in return for Chinese withdrawal from Korea, I thanked him for acceding to my request. I explained in some detail the political and military dangers implicit in such a proposal, net effect of which might be to put UN and us under a commitment which we would honor but Communists would disregard at will and which moreover might well result in merely shifting the offensive to Formosa with Chinese troops released from their Korean adventure. Rau did not press his idea and acceded to my request that he talk with me before doing anything more with the plan. [Gross.]