Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

IO Files

Minutes of the Forty-seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret

New York, December 1, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of those present (44).]

Chinese Communist Aggression Against the United Nations in Korea.

Colonel Hasbrouck briefed the Delegation on the present military situation in Korea and described future developments which might be anticipated.

Ambassador Gross reviewed the present situation in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Referring to the resolution of the Security Council of June 25, he explained that although the resolution was not specifically stated to be such, the action taken by the Council had been under Chapter VII of the Charter. He reviewed the terms of this resolution and recalled that as the first step it did not include a finding by the Council that there had been an act of aggression or a breach of the peace. However, on June 27 the Security Council had adopted a second resolution in the face of the continued North Korean defiance of the resolution of June 25. This resolution fell even more definitely under Chapter VII and included the determination that the armed attack against the Republic of Korea had constituted a breach of the peace. This resolution furnished the basis for subsequent action taken by the Council, including the establishment of the Unified Command.

Ambassador Gross noted that the item on the Security Council agenda, “Complaint of Aggression against the Republic of Korea,” was the heading under which the present crisis in Korea resulting from Chinese Communist intervention had been discussed. Yesterday the Soviet Union had vetoed a resolution on the immediate situation roughly comparable to that of June 25 on the original Korean situation. He reviewed the terms of this resolution and pointed out that it did not call upon United Nations members to assist in the execution of the resolution or to give such assistance to the United Nations as might be necessary to repel the armed attack. In the Council, it had been explained that this resolution was designed to express the policy of localization of the conflict and to give reassurance to the Chinese Communists that their legitimate interests in the area were not threatened. Now that this resolution had been vetoed, the problem arose as to the next appropriate step.

Ambassador Gross explained that both the Department and the Mission were firmly convinced that the type of action necessary fell within the principles and concepts of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution adopted by the General Assembly earlier in the session, since this was clearly a case where action had been frustrated by the exercise of the veto in the Security Council. The important questions now involved were those of the timing of the presentation of a resolution in the General Assembly and procedures before this step in the Security Council in order to remove this particular aspect of the problem from the Council’s agenda. In addition, we would have to work out the terms of the resolution to be introduced in the General Assembly.

As regards the problem of timing, Ambassador Gross believed that we ought to move as quickly as orderly and prudent consultation with our allies would permit. He then turned to the procedures which would resolve the difficulties arising out of the provisions of Article 12 respecting Council and Assembly jurisdiction. If the Council were called upon to remove this part of the item from the agenda, a question might arise as to the means by which to keep alive the July 7 resolution establishing the Unified Command and setting up its relationship to the Security Council. In order to preserve this relationship, the question was not one of transferring to the Assembly the whole matter, but rather how to transfer the particular problem at hand which arose directly out of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The Department had not yet made up its own mind as to the most appropriate procedure to be followed.

During consultations yesterday with the British and French, Ambassador Gross reported that Ambassador Chauvel had suggested it might be desirable and practical for the Security Council to transmit to the General Assembly the vetoed resolution in its present form with the recommendation that the Assembly consider the matter and make recommendations on the subject of that resolution. It was important, however, in the Security Council, to avoid the creation of any situation or to propose any procedure to which the veto might apply. In this connection, he noted that the simple act of removing an item from the agenda of the Council was a procedural step. One question arising in connection with Ambassador Chauvel’s suggestion was whether a request by the Security Council for action by the Assembly was a procedural or substantive question.

Ambassador Gross thought that by far the most important question was the kind of action which we would want the General Assembly to take, as rapidly as consultations would require and permit. The view of the Department had been that time and events had overtaken the six-power resolution which had been vetoed yesterday in the Security Council, and it was considering an alternative text which would contain at least the following three elements: a finding of aggression against the United Nations, a call upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw their forces from North Korea, and a call upon members of the United Nations to furnish assistance in repelling the aggression against the Republic of Korea and the efforts of the Unified Command to restore international peace and security in the area. Such a resolution was now being drafted in the Department. In addition, the Department was considering on a tentative basis the possible inclusion of an additional paragraph which would request the Collective Measures Committee to make recommendations concerning collective measures which might be taken by members to bring about the desired result in Korea. Such action would relate to sanctions and would not rule out armed force procedures. Mr. Dulles noted that the intent of such a paragraph would be not to have the Collective Measures Committee engage in any activities interfering with the Unified Command. Ambassador Gross concurred, pointing out that we would not want the Assembly to get into the problem of relationships between the Unified Command and the Security Council. He went on to say that the Department was also discussing a possible paragraph calling upon members to sever all relations with the Chinese Communists and thus to brand and treat them as outlaws. He cautioned, however, that this suggestion was also highly tentative.

Ambassador Gross said that in weighing the various alternatives for action, the Department also wished to obtain the reaction of our principal allies. To this end, he had talked with Jebb and Chauvel of the United Kingdom and France, respectively, and had reported the results of these conversations in detail to the Department in a telegram which was available to the delegates. Both the French and British appeared to react violently against the introduction of a resolution into the General Assembly along the lines favored by the Department. Instead, they would prefer a two-phased operation in which the first step would be the introduction in the Assembly of substantially the vetoed Security Council resolution. Their instructions covered this step, but they were not authorized to support any resolution containing a finding of aggression on the part of the Chinese Communists. This position related to their fears that we might run the risk of committing the relatively small collective defense strength of the Atlantic Powers to the Far Eastern operation under almost impossible strategic conditions.

Turning to the second step envisaged by the French and British, Ambasssador Gross explained that after defiance of the resolution, they considered that the Assembly could take follow-up action by adopting a resolution along the lines of the resolution now preferred by the Department. They reacted strongly against an initial resolution which would include a finding of aggression, and which would call upon members of the United Nations to assist in repelling aggression in Korea. Jebb had indicated that the British regarded the situation as impossible from their point of view. It had been the British understanding that Western European defenses would be strengthened as rapidly as possible to a point consistent with fighting off Soviet invasion of Western Europe. This defense effort had not moved as rapidly as had been hoped. If a resolution were adopted containing a finding of aggression and calling upon members to assist the United Nations, that would constitute the clearest kind of commitment of United Nations forces to reconquer and liberate Northern Korean areas now occupied by China. In the British view, such a call could be interpreted as nothing else. In response to a question, Ambassador Gross indicated that the Department had not yet reacted to these British views.

Mr. Dulles did not think that the Department would agree with the British, rather, it considered that the situation should be characterized as what it was, namely, virtually a state of war between China and the United Nations, but the Department did not agree that this would commit countries in the sense suggested by the British. It would be reckless, on the other hand, to treat the incident as an isolated war. The Department wished to create legal freedom for action from the United Nations point of view but did not agree that we would be committed to exert all the strength we could muster in order to accomplish certain objectives.

Senator Lodge asked what would be accomplished by a statement on the part of the United Nations that a state of war existed between China and the United Nations when everyone really knew the Soviets were behind the whole thing. Mr. Dulles replied that it would then be far easier for us and there would be much greater unity. Moreover, we would be free to carry out diversionary activities in China. In this connection, he referred to the fact that our intelligence indicated considerable subversive activity was now going on in South China. Such a resolution might also permit the use of Chinese Nationalist troops now on Formosa. We could also stir up subversive activities in China from Hong Kong. In his view it was important to have sufficient United Nations authority to take such measures if they proved expedient.

Mr. Cohen asked whether it was true that the form of resolution was really an effort to localize the war. He asked whether that decision had been made or whether our real purpose was simply freedom of action. He indicated that in his view the resolution described might set in force forces on the other side which would compel action and end what hope might possibly remain for the negotiation of some arrangement on the Korean peninsula looking toward peaceful settlement of the situation. He thought the proposed resolution did raise a number of broad questions.

Mrs. Roosevelt inquired about the reaction of the Korean people to recent events. She recalled that she had read that Korea divisions had caved in immediately when the Chinese offensive had begun and asked whether that was because they were not happy under their government or whether this reflected a real division now, even in South Korea, as to what the people actually wanted. Mr. Dulles doubted that this was a factor in the present situation. Mrs. Roosevelt inquired whether we could count on Korean support. Mr. Dulles said if he were asked that question he would have to answer that we were on the way out in Korea. Colonel Hasbrouck noted that it should be remembered that the South Korean forces had taken a terrible slapping around. Fifty percent of the South Korean Army had been decimated in the first five days of the war. He cautioned that the Delegation should expect a lot of bad news within the next week. Actually, we did not have much choice, since we had known all along that the Soviets had the capability of kicking us out of Korea whenever they wanted. He went on to observe th they could repeat this performance in a number of other places any time within the next five years and pick their own time. Mrs. Roosevelt said that if this were so, she did not quite understand why we had started operations in Korea. It seemed to her to put us in a worse position. Colonel Hasbrouck thought that the question was whether we would give up everything without a fight. Mrs. Roosevelt believed we were now in a position where negotiations had to be undertaken since there was nothing else we could do. Colonel Hasbrouck suggested that surrender might be a better word in this connection; Mr. Dulles agreed.

Ambassador Gross reported that the British attitude was that the United Nations mission in Korea has been substantially accomplished when South Korea had been liberated and the status quo restored. Once that had been done, the United Nations had accomplished its mission. In reviewing the present crisis, Jebb expressed the view that the United Nations Charter at San Francisco had not been considered suitable for handling problems of war among the major powers. Irrespective of the recognition situation, the actual fact was that war with a major power was involved, and that was a matter in his view with which the United Nations was not competent to deal. He distinguished this situation from that of June 25 in just those terms. In Ambassador Gross’s opinion, it was hard to tell whether this British attitude was a cynical or practical one. He noted, however, that toward the end of his discussion, Jebb did say that if the two-phased procedure in the Assembly were adopted and the Chinese Communists continued in defiance, under circumstances of outright defiance, the issue would indeed be one of war and peace, and he could see no way out other than to follow suit to the logical conclusion. The problem was really not one of cutting and running completely. He noted that conversations with the Norwegian, Belgian and Dutch delegations had indicated some desire to cut our losses in Korea by the establishment of a strategic frontier on which a line could be stablized, and then the next steps could be considered. With this approach there would be no commitment to reconquer lost areas.

Senator Cooper referred to the remarks of Colonel Hasbrouck to the effect that we had known all along the difficulties which would be encountered if the Chinese Communists entered the fighting in Korea. He thought consideration should be given to whether commitments could be made sufficient to meet all contingencies. He asked Ambassador Gross whether the suggested resolution gave us anything which we did not already have, except for the fact that China was definitely named as the aggressor. Ambassador Gross believed that the distinction was of a political, rather than a legal nature because an argument could be made that the June 27 resolution covered the present situation. There were two new steps. In the first instance, the United Nations was undertaking a commitment to take such reasonable, practical and honorable steps as were necessary to repel the Chinese Communist aggression, accepting fully that members could never undertake any particular tactical commitment in this regard. What would be involved was rather a commitment to take honorable steps to vindicate the authority of the United Nations. How the details would be filled in would be left to subsequent negotiations. He noted that the resolution in the form favored by the Department would definitely involve implicitly the authority to carry military operations into and over China.

Ambassador Austin remarked that an important factor in this situation was the views of other delegations and called upon Mr. Ross for observations in this connection. Mr. Ross indicated that there was not much point in discussing this in detail at the present time because the views of other delegations were still far too amorphous. In general, other countries were anxious to support the United States, but there was some feeling that we might want to go beyond a point at which the United Nations could effectively sustain action. For the most part, other delegations were waiting for an indication from us of our definite position. Ambassador Gross noted that the British and French probably correctly represented the views of the Western European states. Mr. Ross observed that there were also hopeful signs of support from the Arab states, who were obviously disappointed and disillusioned by the Chinese Communists.

Mr. McKeever observed that this was perhaps the most critical time the Delegation would meet and asked that members of the Delegation should be very cautious in their dealings with the press in order to make sure that all members of the Delegation were telling the same story.