795.00/11–3050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received November 30—9:26 p. m.]
916. For Hickerson from Gross: Korea and Formosa: UK, French, Indian, Brazilian views:
[Page 1273]Lengthy discussion with Jebb and Chauvel developed following views re Korean situation.
Jebb had received instructions from Bevin this morning to seek postponement of vote on 6-power resolution but obtained reversal of instructions. Basis of instruction apparently was that in 2 or 3 days situation might be clarified sufficiently so that Jebb could make a statement which would include a “last call for the use of reason”. Jebb summarized attitude UK Government in following manner:
UN Charter was not considered at San Francisco to be instrument suited to handling problem of war among major powers. Irrespective of who recognized what government in China, de facto situation which confronts world is prospect of precisely the kind of war with which UN is neither competent nor capable to deal. Regarding Korea itself, no one knew on June 25 whether victorious UN forces would proceed north of 38th parallel. In fact, original purpose and mission of UN action had been accomplished with “restoration of status quo” and restoring to power in South Korea of Syngman Rhee. Jebb added that for all practical purposes the Republic of Korea really meant South Korea.
A resolution which included a finding of aggression constituted undertaking to commit the already inadequate defense forces of free world to a campaign of re conquest and liberation of areas seized by Chinese Communists. This would be taking place at a time before the constitution of sufficient strength of western Europe “to make at least a pretense of defending itself against a Russian attack.”
Basic understanding of UK had been that such forces would be created in western Europe and that had not yet been accomplished. Launching a quite obvious barb at France, Jebb added that the slowness of developments in western Europe along these lines had not been the fault of the British Government or people.
In any event, Jebb continued, he was certain from his discussions with other western European delegations during the past 2 days that they shared with the UK the tremendous apprehension that US was committing western Europe to conduct of war in the Far East at an impossible time and under the most difficult possible strategic conditions. Jebb mentioned specifically discussions he had held with Belgium, Dutch and Norwegian representatives here.
Jebb strongly favored a 2 step process, involving the tabling of a resolution in the GA along the lines of the pending SC resolution and subsequently, if necessary, the introduction of a stronger resolution of the sort we were discussing. In this connection, Jebb said he was bound to make clear that UK Government had not yet decided that the matter should be taken into the GA at all at this stage and Jebb was awaiting instructions on this point. The 2-phased procedure he described as his personal view.
[Page 1274]Chauvel in general agreed with Jebb’s analysis, differing however in 1 or 2 important respects. Chauvel said French Government did not share view Jebb had expressed regarding 38th parallel. He felt French view to be more in the direction of considering that a military line could be stabilized, perhaps at the narrow waist of the peninsula. This could be regarded as a “strategic frontier” and consideration could then be given of the next steps with regard to portions of Korea north of the “strategic frontier”.
At this point, Jebb appeared to express personal agreement with Chauvel’s analysis, repeating that his earlier expressed view had been his own personal observation and he thought probably his government would agree with Chauvel’s analysis.
Chauvel’s instructions authorized him to support introducing into the GA resolution along lines pending SC resolution. However, Chauvel read to me a telegram received this morning from Paris in which Paris expressed view that a finding of aggression was “inopportune” at this time and repeating instructions to Chauvel not to support such action until matter had been discussed at an “inter-governmental level”.
Chauvel confirmed Jebb’s analysis of attitude other western European countries, adding that Dutch representative had come to him “with tears in his eyes” asking whether Chauvel saw any hope of avoiding the war which was rapidly being precipitated. Chauvel’s specific procedural suggestion was that SC transmit to GA vetoed resolution requesting GA to consider subject matter of resolution and make recommendations. Chauvel said such procedure would avoid problem of SC dis-seizing itself of whole Korean question and that the resolution could be amended in the GA.
Both Jebb and Chauvel urged that, assuming SC vote and veto today, we should allow several days for consultation before placing matter in GA.
Both Jebb and Chauvel expressed belief we would be in a much stronger position, particularly vis-à-vis western Europeans, if Chinese Communists defied a GA resolution along lines SC resolution. When I pressed Jebb to express his views concerning the second step in the light of what he had said earlier concerning the strategic implications of the situation, Jebb said that under circumstances of outright defiance of a request to withdraw forces, the issue “would then indeed be a question of war or peace”, and he could see no way other than to follow the matter through to its logical conclusion.
New subject: At beginning SC meeting this afternoon, Rau told me that he planned to refer to the Formosa question in his SC statement this afternoon. His idea (which he said he had not put up to [Page 1275] his government) was that the resolution might contain a paragraph in effect calling upon US to withdraw the 7th Fleet if Chinese Communists withdrew forces from Korea. Rau thought this would “offer something” to the Peiping regime, which the present resolution does not. He added this would do nothing more than give effect to President Truman’s statement of January 5. Rau said the gravity of the crisis, and the rapid movement toward war required everyone to search his conscience and present to the SC ideas which “might take root”.
I strongly urged Rau not to raise the Formosa question in this manner and expressed the hope he would give us opportunity to consult with him. He agreed with some apparent reluctance to delete these passages.
New subject. Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) asked to see me during SC meeting and showed me message from President Brazil instructing him to seek views of US and UK delegations concerning probable international developments which Brazil Cabinet wished to discuss tomorrow morning. In particular, Muniz asked concerning our plan for action after the Soviet veto of pending SC resolution. I assured Muniz we would allow sufficient time for consultation with such close friends as Brazil prior to circulating resolution in GA and might indeed request Brazil to co-sponsor resolution. In response to a question whether we planned to request the GA to charge Peiping regime with aggression, I told him that was still under consideration and would probably be matter we would wish to discuss with Brazil within the next day or two. He expressed hope we would not table the resolution before Monday or Tuesday1 at the earliest, and I assured him that we would allow time for consultation before circulating a resolution although we took it for granted that matter should be referred to the GA. Muniz agreed. [Gross.]
- December 4 and 5.↩