795.00/11–1350
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks Dated 13th November, 1950.
Before receipt of your telegram we had been giving some consideration to a proposal on the lines mentioned by you. My colleagues and I feel that in view of Chinese intervention in Korea we should endeavour to find a solution to the Korean problem which will not result in the hostilities dragging on in Korea with the ever growing risk of extension beyond Korea.
2. What we have in mind is a fresh approach to the problem which might be embodied in a resolution in the Security Council on the following general lines:—
The Resolution
- (a)
- would recall previous resolutions and declare that with the destruction of the great bulk of the North Korean Armed Forces and the extinction of any threat from the North Korean Authorities the military campaign may in fact be regarded as at an end and that there need now be no delay in proceeding with the urgent task of political and economic rehabilitation;
- (b)
- would propose the establishment of a demilitarised area from which all foreign forces and combatants would be withdrawn. This area would extend from a United Nations line (running roughly from Hungnam in the East to Chogju in the West) to the existing Manehurian-Siberian-Korean frontier;
- (c)
- would declare that this demilitarised area is only to be set up for a temporary period pending the unification of the whole of Korea;
- (d)
- would reaffirm the objectives of the United Nations already declared in relevant United Nations resolutions and reassure the Central People’s Government of China that there is no intention to damage their interests.
3. The resolution would also have to provide for the assumption by an appropriate United Nations body of responsibilities in connexion with the demilitarised area and define those responsibilities. It would, in addition, provide for appropriate association of the Central People’s Government of China with this United Nations machinery.
4. One problem of particular difficulty would be the disposal of the North Korean Government and the remnants of the North Korean Forces in the proposed demilitarised area. The best solution would be for the North Korean Armed Forces to lay down their arms and for a suitable de facto temporary administration of the area to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations, though admittedly this solution may be difficult to achieve.
5. From the political point of view the suggestions outlined above may afford us a means not only of terminating the whole Korean campaign earlier and thus liquidating a costly military commitment, but also of satisfying the Chinese that the United Nations have no aggressive intent against Manchuria. The most important difference between our proposals and the suggestion made in your telegram is that we omit any reference to territory lying north of the Yalu. To include any such reference would, in my view, defeat the whole object we have in mind as it would be inevitably rejected by the Chinese.
6. It can be argued that these proposals involve a unilateral concession on the part of the United Nations. This is however not the case. They will also mean that the Chinese themselves will have to withdraw their considerable forces already disposed in the proposed demilitarised area, thus giving up positions of considerable military advantage to them. I feel that this aspect of the problem, together with the grave risks inherent in the present situation of an extension of hostilities beyond Korea needs special emphasis. Indeed, the successful conclusion of the campaign on hitherto accepted lines seems no longer possible without serious risk of the conflict spreading.
7. From the military point of view there are considerable advantages in the proposals outlined above:—
- (1)
- The United Nations line from Hungnam to Chongju is some 150 miles in length as compared with the North Korean frontier line which is some 400 miles long.
- (2)
- Whatever line is eventually held, the threat of frontier guerrilla activity will remain, but if United Nations Forces occupy up to the [Page 1140] Korean frontier, advantage of air power cannot be taken without violating Chinese territory.
- (3)
- It is doubtful whether, without striking at air targets in Manchuria, General MacArthur has sufficient forces to fight his way to the North Korean frontier and maintain himself there once he reaches it.
8. If the State Department are receptive to these suggestions, we shall work out a draft resolution on the basis of the first thoughts explained in paragraphs 2 to 4 above, and hope that the State Department will do so also so that the two drafts can be compared. Meanwhile, as you will have seen from my telegram to New York I have asked the United Kingdom Delegation to try to secure postponement of discussion of the resolution already tabled. If the United States Government like the proposal of a demilitarised area outlined above, it is important that there should be no further general advance by United Nations forces beyond their present positions.
9. Please consult Mr. Acheson and telegraph reply urgently. It is easy to see many objections to the course which we are proposing and no doubt detailed working out of the proposals may present difficulties. Moreover, it is possible that the Chinese would reject any such proposal. If they do so, their rejection can only mean that they are bent on making mischief.
Washington [, undated.]