895B.00R/11–1350: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
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[Received November 13—11:22 a. m.]
2775. Embtel 2770, November 12.1 Responsive Foreign Minister’s request I called at Foreign Office this morning and reviewed more fully Department’s position re contributions Korean relief and rehabilitation.
I said our estimate of total contributions required would probably run to between 200 and 250 million dollars; that my government was prepared to increase its percentage to about 65 percent; that we feel, in accordance UNRRA precedent, UK might be willing increase its percentage to about 17 percent, which could be in form of supplies and services from UK and sterling area; and that although we recognized most commitments must be ratified by a Parliamentary body we hoped in interests of US and UK all other nations prepared to offer contributions should make their commitments as firm as possible in order that we would not be left holding the sack. I stressed fact what we do in Korea will influence future relations with China and that US, more than other nations, being unjustly accused of being aggressors in Korea we were prepared contribute more than our share to prove we do not wish dominate Korea but help it to recover.
Bevin expressed view from SEA point of view we should move fast in resolving this problem. Were we able to do so it would have tremendous effect on Asiatic mind. He felt total relief figure might be made somewhat higher and that UN percentages could then continue to be used as guide in Korean relief and the same results obtained. He wanted avoid situation where only large nations carry burden and certain other nations contribute only resolutions. Gaitskell2 thought best procedure would be to have special committee of UN deal with problems as in case of technical assistance fund. He said Younger well qualified represent British at Lake Success this matter. Bevin and Gaitskell both felt it highly important from point of view Soviet propaganda other UN countries contribute. They felt participation by Iron Curtain nations highly unlikely. Bevin particularly stressed desirability of getting substantial contribution from [Page 1138] India pointing out Nehru realizes he may soon be in difficulties and may wish seek protection UN umbrella. He hoped proper handling Korean relief problem might result in establishment of precedent for future cases where UN relief might be required. He said before he could make definite commitment UK contribution he would want full report from Younger on basis of which he could go to Cabinet. He thought he might do a little preliminary spade work in certain foreign capitals where it would do the most good.
In leaving I reviewed what I understood to be British position, in which Bevin concurred, about as follows: UK views with sympathy US position but cannot commit itself today. It believes proper place for negotiations is in UN. Important as many other countries as possible contribute. Especially important India and other Asiatic nations participate. In absence anticipated failure Soviet bloc contribute, other nations should increase percentage contributions. Above all necessity for early action realized.
- Not printed. It reported on a brief discussion between Bevin and Ambassador Douglas on the evening of November 12 wherein Mr. Bevin informed the Ambassador that the U.K. Government had the question of financial support for Korean relief under discussion but had reached no conclusions. (895B.00R/11–1250)↩
- Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell.↩