793.54/11–1050
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Action Respecting Korean-Manchurian Frontier
Because the whole Korean question is at the present time in the UN framework (note that the first substantive action on the question is scheduled for today) and presumably should remain there for exigent political reasons, it is believed that no military action should be carried over the frontier into Manchuria, whether “in hot pursuit” of enemy planes having their bases there or against AA installations which have fired upon our own planes in the Korean air, without UN sanction. Such action, even if proposed with UN sanction, had best be presented—again for political reasons—by an ultimatum directed to Peiping warning them of the consequences which would be visited upon such enemy planes or airfields or AA installations after a specified date in the event that such hostile action as has been experienced to date were to continue.
The above reasoning is based, I would note, on the following assumptions:
- 1.
- The destruction of bridges already accomplished in part is not in any event an adequate means of denying to the Chinese Communists the possibility of getting their troops across the Yalu, it remaining possible for them to use (a) pontoon bridges, (b) movement by boat at night, and (c) before long, traverse by ice.
- 2.
- The world political atmosphere is tense and the patent desire of friendly governments is that the present situation shall not be aggravated insofar as it is humanly possible to avoid such aggravation.
- 3.
- In those circumstances where the destruction of bridges is relatively inefficacious (and our troops by report stand in no immediate danger) and unilateral action might lose us some of the support now solidly behind us, it appears preferable by far temporarily to exercise restraint, if need be by again directing our aircraft to remain several miles from the frontier pending further developments. Those developments will probably come soon in the form of (a) renewed Chinese-Korean military action in the field, (b) the appearance (or non-appearance) of the Chinese Communist delegation scheduled to arrive at Lake Success on November 15, and (c) debate and action in the UN.
It seems preferable, in sum, to forego a relatively minor additional military advantage in order to avoid being placed in a position where we may be charged by the Chinese-Russian side with aggression against the air and soil of China. It is my theory, you will appreciate, that it may be part of the Moscow design to cause us to commit such military infringement of the Manchurian frontier to give them political basis for a planned further attack.