Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

IO Files

Minutes of the Thirty-sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret

New York, November 9, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of those present (48).]

1. ECOSOC resolution on Korean relief and reconstruction.¹

Mr. Lubin explained that one main issue in connection with the Korean relief program which had had to be solved by the Economic and Social Council was whether the Unification Commission or some other agency was to run the relief and rehabilitation program. Australia, with the aid of Chile and Pakistan (all three members of the Unification Commission) wanted the Commission to run the show. State Department preference was to operate the program under the direction of an Agent-General with broad powers, who should be guided only in certain political matters by the Unification Commission. After extensive private negotiations with the Australians, Mr. Acheson had conferred with the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Spender, and had told him that Congress would not give money to the program if it were to be directed by a commission of this character. Agreement was then reached upon the appointment of an Agent-General to administer the relief program.

Mr. Lubin briefly summarized the responsibilities of both the Agent-General and the Unification Commission, which would guide the Agent-General on three particular political issues. Mr. Lubin explained that, in addition, in order to ensure even further control over the Agent-General, provision was made for an Advisory Committee of five governments—probably to be composed of the five largest contributors—to assist the Agent-General. The resolution provided that the Economic and Social Council should have only the function of reviewing the reports of the Agent-General and the comments of the Unification Commission and should report to the General Assembly on the way the program was proceeding. (Some members of the Council had favored a greater delegation of authority to the Council.) The Council had also agreed upon a set of general principles, making clear that the operation was for relief and rehabilitation only and did not include economic development.

Mr. Lubin explained that the method of financing the program was still an unsolved issue. The Department believed that individual countries should be assessed for their individual shares. However, opposition to this proposal was very great. Australia, France, Pakistan, India and the United Kingdom were absolutely opposed, wishing to see Korean relief financed in the same way as technical assistance. This would mean that a conference would be called, the United States would make a statement as to the amount it would be willing to contribute, and other countries would follow with their statements.

Mr. Lubin noted that there was also pressure to reduce the estimated cost of the Korean relief operation. He observed that the Unified Command had estimated the cost at $350,000,000, but about $100,000,000 of that would be spent by January 1. For this reason, we had agreed on an estimate of $250,000,000 for 1951. The pressure to cut that estimate was great. The British and Australians insisted that this estimate would scare away contributors. However, the actual decision as to how much money would be raised had been left in the hands of the Assembly. The Council had not decided the question, even though there had been pressure for it to take this decision. Mr. Lubin believed the $250,000,000 estimate would be cut by the General Assembly to about $200,000,000. Other members hoped that the United States would give a major share of that amount. Our problem was to get individual countries to give more than token contributions. For example, France had indicated it could only promise a token amount, and Belgium had said it would give 20% of the French contribution.

Speaking as one who knew Congress very well, Ambassador Austin believed it would be of great importance if we could go to the Congress—especially since the last election—with a statement of what other countries were contributing, even though some contributions were only token amounts. This would encourage Congress to appropriate the money for the United States contribution. He wondered whether there should not be some effort to promote that idea before the United States was required to state what contribution it was prepared to make. Mr. Lubin said there had been some talk along that line. The British, in particular, were softening their position in this regard. He hoped that the British would make a fairly substantial contribution because this would have some bearing on the amounts other states would be willing to contribute. He felt it important that various governments should appreciate our Congressional situation. Perhaps our Embassies abroad could bring this matter to the attention of the appropriate governmental authorities, and thus indicate how important we considered the whole issue to be. This was the first time the United Nations had explicitly stated that a relief operation of this kind was its responsibility. For this reason, it was important to tie in the financing of the program with United Nations action in Korea.

Ambassador Austin repeated his question as to the possible strategy of having other countries first make their commitments for contributions. Mr. Lubin believed every country should give something. Ambassador Austin asked again whether it was intended that the United States should be the first to put its contribution on the dotted line. Mr. Lubin thought we should at least intimate first to other delegations how much we would ask Congress to appropriate. Otherwise he did not think other countries could be expected to do anything.

Mr. Hall² explained that the original proposal of the United States for an assessments scheme would have gone furthest in meeting the comments of Ambassador Austin, since a fixed scale of contributions would have been established. This plan, he noted, had been supported only by the Canadians, although other members of the British Commonwealth now appeared to be coming closer toward its acceptance. He thought it possible that the idea of dealing with the financing of this program in the Assembly might have to be abandoned. However, if a special conference were called, members could still be assessed on the basis of a fixed scale. There was growing support for proceeding in that manner.

Mr. Lubin raised the question whether the United States should insist that the Agent-General should be an American. We had discussed this subject with all the members of the Economic and Social Council. There was a general feeling that if an American were not chosen, the Agent-General should preferably be an Asian. The good political effect of such a choice would be obvious. The only Asian candidate appeared to be Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of India. However, no member had specifically objected to the choice of an American.

Mr. Hyde observed that the Republic of Korea had considerable interest in what happened in this regard. After all, it was the government with which the Unified Command and the Agent-General would have to deal. There was a strong feeling among representatives of the Republic of Korea that India was an unfriendly government. He believed the choice of an Indian as Agent-General would create prejudice and bad feelings at the start; this would be unfortunate for the success of the program.

Mr. Ross referred to the question of the nationality of the Agent-General. While he saw some political advantage in the choice of a non-American, he still considered such a choice less practical and did not believe that it would outweigh the advantages of an American Agent-General both with respect to getting appropriations from Congress and in obtaining contributions from other governments. Certainly the chances of larger financial contributions were greater with an American as Agent-General.

Ambassador Austin asked whether the Delegation was agreed that an American should be chosen as Agent-General, providing a suitable candidate could be found. Mr. Lubin added that the Indian Delegation had informed him that if more money could be gotten for the program by choice of an American as Agent-General, it would prefer an American. The only real Indian objection to an American was based upon the feeling that an American would be obliged to bolster the Rhee Government, which India did not trust.

Mr. Hickerson thought the views of Senators Lodge and Sparkman, and of Mr. Wilcox³ would be useful on this point. Senator Sparkman said that he had been under the impression that there was real opposition to the appointment of an American, and that resentment over the program might be aroused by such a choice. However, if the situation were what Mr. Lubin described it to be, he thought the choice of an American highly desirable. There could be no question that better results would be obtained from the Congress with an American in this post.

Senator Lodge thought the Department might face an entirely different psychology in the new Congress, which could certainly be expected to raise fundamental questions with respect to the whole foreign relief program. He believed our activities abroad would be considered de novo. In this particular matter, it would be impossible to go about the organization of Korean relief in any worse way than to label it a United Nations program, with only the United States and perhaps two or three other countries contributing funds, and an Indian as Agent-General. Such a move would encounter the roughest treatment in Congress. He even wondered whether it might not be better to have this an exclusively United States operation or perhaps to insist that only those states which contributed would get any credit for the Korean relief operation, and only their names would be associated with the program.

Mr. Wilcox thought that not only an American, but a Republican, would have the best chance in the new Congress. In this connection, he referred to the experience of Mr. Paul Hoffman with the 80th Congress and believed that Hoffman’s political orientation was perhaps one important reason for the continued support of ECA. If an American administrator could not be chosen, Mr. Wilcox suggested the choice of either an Australian or a Canadian. Senator Lodge agreed that the particular individual chosen was of the greatest importance. It would be desirable to find a man like Hoffman.

On the other hand, Mrs. Roosevelt believed that, if an American were not chosen, the Agent-General should be an Asian, not only because of political advantages, but also because an Asian might be able to carry on a program with a smaller budget. In her opinion, the only disadvantage in choosing an American was the fact that there were perhaps too many United Nations operations in which an American held the top post. It was necessary to keep some balance and to decide in each case, where it was most important to place an American in the top job. Certainly all top places could not be occupied by Americans. On the contributions question, Mrs. Roosevelt thought it vitally important that every country make some contribution, and, moreover, that other countries make their contributions before the United States.

Mr. Lubin pointed out the difficulty of getting contributions from the smaller states. He did not believe these countries would come through, even with token contributions, unless some word were sent to their government through our missions abroad that this government attached major importance to their part in the Korean relief operation. Senator Cooper asked whether this suggestion had been taken up in the Department. Mr. Hickerson said that he would undertake to see that the Department instructed our missions abroad to apply pressure in this regard. He agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt in the importance of every state making contributions. After all, this was a case where the dollar shortage was not involved. In this connection, he referred to the materials shipped, medicines, and other miscellaneous articles contributed by various members of the United Nations to the Korean military operation. He was sure the Department would be glad to use every ounce of diplomatic pressure which the United States had in the proper channels.

Ambassador Austin also thought it important that a number of countries should join in the relief effort, even though they made only token contributions. He did not believe we should give up too easily in our discussions with them. Tremendous work and effort would be involved, and he could only advise Mr. Lubin to tackle the problem again. Because of the trend of discussion in the Delegation, Ambassador Austin wondered whether it would not be sounder policy for the Delegation to take no definite decision on these matters at this time. Mr. Lubin indicated that it would be important to have further consultations with other delegations on the matter of contributions. Mr. Dulles wondered whether the Delegation could not at least decide that it wished to have an American as administrator of the program. Ambassador Austin saw no objection to that decision.

Mr. Cohen thought it was perhaps relevant in that case to decide whether provision should be made for an advisory committee. He did wish to lay down a caveat on increasing the number of bodies involved in Korean relief since this would certainly create administrative problems. There was no further discussion.

[Here follows a record of the discussion on the second agenda item: the Invitation to the Chinese Communists Extended by the Security Council (concerning which, see the editorial note, page 1240).]

1. The U.N. Economic and Social Council, in accordance with the request of the U.N. General Assembly contained in Resolution 376 (V), October 7, p. 904, had been considering the question of Korean relief and rehabilitation at its resumed 11th session from October 12 to November 7. On the latter date, it approved a comprehensive plan in Resolution 338 (XI), which was forwarded to the General Assembly. Concerning the legislative history of this resolution in ECOSOC, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, pp. 270–276. Concerning U.N. General Assembly Resolution 410 (V), December 1, on this subject, see editorial note, p. 1297.
2. William O. Hall, Director of the Office of International Administration and Conferences, Department of State, and Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
3. Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.