795.00/11–450
The British Embassy to the Department of State 1
Message From Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks, Dated 3rd November
[Re:] Your telegram Chinese Intervention in Korea.2
I do not favour taking precipitate action to refer this question to the Security Council. This might make it more, rather than less, difficult for the Chinese to climb down and avoid open commitment. I would have thought that there was everything to be said for ignoring limited Chinese intervention.
[Page 1033]2. It is of great importance to establish the military significance of Chinese intervention. If the unified command are still confident that their plans can be executed despite aid from China to the North Koreans then there is everything to be said politically for not forcing the Chinese into a position from which they cannot withdraw. If, however, Chinese intervention gravely prejudices the success of the military campaign (whether this intervention takes the form of moving in substantial forces or of permitting the use of Manchurian airfields) then there would be no alternative to our taking the question to the Security Council. In that event we would also be in a much stronger position in doing so. Your telegram under reference indicates that we may soon reach this position and we are therefore working on a draft resolution as a possible basis for discussion in the first instance with the State Department.
3. The lines on which we are thinking are that the resolution whilst it condemns Chinese intervention and calls on them to withdraw at the same time should
- (a)
- Recall the terms of the General Assembly Resolution of October 7th on which United Nations policy has been made
- (b)
- Affirm the intention of the United Nations forces to limit operation to Korea itself
- (c)
- Affirm the intention of the United Nations that their forces will withdraw from Korea as soon as possible
- (d)
- Recognise Chinese interests in the ultimate settlement of Korea
- (e)
- Suggest that the United Nations Commission should take the views of China into consideration when considering the future of Korea in accordance with the Assembly Resolution of October 7th.
4. Such a resolution while calling on the Chinese to withdraw at the same time provides an outlet for the expression by the Chinese of their legitimate interest in the future of their neighbour Korea. We feel that it should be stern but objective, moderate and reasoned in character so as to command the maximum support.
5. You should speak to Rusk on these lines explaining that these are my preliminary recommendations and that I would welcome the comments of the State Department although a resolution on the above lines would presumably be vetoed by the Russians it might have some useful propaganda effect. There could of course be no guarantee that the Chinese would in fact cease their intervention and the direct effect on the military campaign might be negligible. The graver implications of measures to prevent effective Chinese intervention would then call for most serious consideration. The criterion however to my mind is the degree of military significance to be attached to Chinese intervention and on this in particular I would urgently welcome the views of the United States Administration. In the meantime our objective should be to continue to build up the United Nations forces so that they can deal effectively with any force that can be put against them.