Office of the Historian

693.95A/11–350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins)

secret
[Washington,] November 3, 1950.

Subject: Comments of Canadian Official in Nanking Re Possibility of Chinese Intervention in Korea

Participants: Mr. Peter G. R. Campbell, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Troy L. Perkins, CA

Mr. Campbell of the Canadian Embassy called by appointment today and handed me the attached summary of recent information which had been received by Mr. Ronning, Canadian Consul in Nanking. Mr. Campbell said that in reading this consideration would, of course, have to be given to the fact that Mr. Ronning had been in Nanking about 5 years, had been isolated for some time, and that his chief contacts were local Chinese. Mr. Ronning has spent most of his life in China.

In reply to my query Mr. Campbell said that the only other Canadian representatives in Communist China were George Patterson, Consul General, and his vice consul at Shanghai. He said that while the Canadians had code facilities, the amount of information sent in was not great. I took the occasion to tell Mr. Campbell that we were eager to receive any information which the Canadian Minister of External Affairs might receive on conditions in China and that we would be particularly interested in receiving spot information on Communist moves or activities which might be related to intervention [Page 1032] in Korea, this being a mutual service since, if the Chinese Communists are actually intervening in a large way, it is of mutual interest to all the UN allies participating in support of the ROK. Mr. Campbell agreed that it would be useful and that he would give us anything that would be of interest.

[Annex]

Summary of Telegram, October 25th, to Ottawa From Ronning in Nanking

Re: Possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea.

Opinion in local Chinese official circles is that possibility of China being involved in the Korean affair, is not yet past. (Reference to large number of troops on the border and recent declaration of Peking leaders.)

China actually has apprehensions about U.S. intentions due to

1)
support of Nationalists;
2)
talk of possibility of third group overthrowing present regime; and
3)
Formosa—MacArthur and Chiang talks.

There is also a feeling of frustration of loss of face over Formosa, and failure to be admitted to United Nations.

While there is now evidence of sour-grapes attitude with regard to U.N., prospect of admission to the U.N. would do much to off-set possibility of intervention.