795.00/10–1450
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Addendum to Notes on. Wake Conference October 141
Following the general meeting between the President and General MacArthur, Mr. Harriman and I had some further conversation with General MacArthur. The following points may be useful in supplementing the notes of the principal meeting.
1. French Problem in Indochina
During his discussion with the President, General MacArthur had made several references to General Carpentier2 as an officer who “enjoyed the highest reputation”. Privately, we asked General MacArthur what he thought the essence of the problem was in Indochina. He replied, “They need to get an aggressive General”. It was clear that General MacArthur felt that an aggressive General could clean up the Viet-minh forces with French Union troops now available in Indochina. He contrasted the Indochinese situation sharply with Korea and left the impression that our problem in Korea was more difficult from a military point of view than the problem faced by the French Commander in Indochina.
2. Relation between Popular Support and Military Success in Indochina
I asked General MacArthur how seriously popular opinion should be weighed as a military factor in such operations as Indochina and Korea. I asked him whether a hostile Korean population would have made any substantial difference to his Inchon landing. He replied that a hostile population could have, of course, made the task more difficult but it would not have been a decisive factor. He said that “armed men passing through a village in Asia are treated with the highest respect”. He said the principal annoyance which comes from a hostile population is in the “logistic support which it gives to the enemy”. He referred to furnishing food, water, care of wounded and, particularly, intelligence.
3. War Criminals in Korea
I asked General MacArthur whether the view he had stated in the principal meeting (that we should limit our action against war [Page 962] criminals to those guilty of military war crimes) was based upon the fact that political leaders in North Korea were puppets and really directed from Moscow or whether on general grounds he objected to the trial of political war criminals. He said his view rested upon general grounds. He said that the responsibility given him to try major Japanese war criminals was the most repugnant task he had ever had to perform. He seemed to have in mind senior military war criminals because he said that “military commanders obey the orders of their governments and have no option about waging war”.
I asked him whether he had any information that Kim Il Sung had ordered military atrocities as a matter of policy. He said that, if that were the case and he could catch Kim Il Sung, he would try him and execute him by military commission but that he did not have evidence that that was the case. He said that the conduct of North Korean troops toward prisoners and civilians varied greatly from unit to unit and he therefore doubted that it was a matter of general policy.
4. Possible Chinese Declaration of War
I mentioned to General MacArthur the fact that the Chinese have threatened privately to enter the Korean war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. He said he did not fully understand why they had gone out on such a limb and that they must be greatly embarrassed by the predicament in which they now find themselves. I said that we assumed under great Russian pressure it might not be impossible (though improbable) that Red China might declare war on the United States. Such a declaration might cover merely a stepping-up of indirect support to North Korea. I asked General MacArthur whether he thought such a declaration should be treated with contempt or what he thinks our attitude should be. He said that he did not believe that Peiping would declare war on the United States without assurances of Russian support, that they would not declare war as a gesture, and that we should treat any such declaration with the “utmost seriousness”.
5. South Korean Military Performance
General MacArthur expressed the greatest admiration for the ability of the South Koreans to reorganize their forces into an effective combat force during the period of general retreat and discouragement in the opening weeks of the war. He said that KMAG should have the highest marks for their part in this operation. He said that, had the South Koreans not pulled themselves together and fought well, the war might have had quite a different result.