Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 59D–95 (Wake Island Conference October 1950)

Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950

Wake Island, October 15, 1950

top secret

Compiled by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, From Notes Kept by the Conferees From Washington¹

The following were at the table:

The President

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Ambassador John Muccio

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace

Colonel A. L. Hamblen

Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Mr. W. Averell Harriman

The conference opened at 0736.

The President asked General MacArthur to state the rehabilitation situation with reference to Korea.

General. MacArthur: It cannot occur until the military operations have ended. I believe that formal resistance will end throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving. There is little resistance left in South Korea—only about 15,000 men—and those we do not destroy, the winter will. We now have about 60,000 prisoners in compounds.

In North Korea, unfortunately, they are pursuing a forlorn hope. They have about 100,000 men who were trained as replacements. They are poorly trained, led and equipped, but they are obstinate and it goes against my grain to have to destroy them. They are only fighting to save face. Orientals prefer to die rather than to lose face.

I am now driving with the First Cavalry Division up the line to Pyongyang. I am thinking of making up a tank and truck column and sending it up the road to take Pyongyang directly. It depends on the Intelligence we get in the next 48 hours. We have already taken Wonsan. I am landing the X Corps which will take Pyongyang in one week. The North Koreans are making the same mistake they have made before. They have not deployed in depth. When the gap is closed the same thing will happen in the north as happened in the south.

It is my hope to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas. That will leave the X Corps, which will be reconstituted, composed of the Second and Third Divisions and U.N. detachments. I hope the United Nations will hold elections by the first of the year. Nothing is gained by military occupation. All occupations are failures. (The President nodded agreement.) After elections are held I expect to pull out all occupying troops. Korea should have about ten divisions with our equipment, supplemented by a small but competent Air Force and also by a small but competent Navy. If we do that, it will not only secure Korea but it will be a tremendous deterrent to the Chinese Communists moving south. This is a threat that cannot be laughed off. Again I emphasize the fact that the military should get out the minute the guns stop shooting and civilians take over. Korea is a land of poverty. It has been knocked down for a long time and a little money goes a long way. Houses are made of mud and bamboo. When knocked down they can be put up in two weeks. An estimate was made by ECA of the cost of rehabilitation and it was estimated to be $900,000,000. Another estimate was made locally and it placed the cost at about 1½ billion dollars. I believe these estimates are far too high. I do not believe that you can absorb and spend in Korea much more than $150,000,000 a year. I believe three years of that will place Korea on its feet and not only make Korea self-sustaining but give a higher living standard. I believe that half a billion dollars spread over three to five years will more than make up the destruction.

Ambassador Muccio: The General has made an important point. Korea’s capacity to absorb is limited. This applies to the economic field and to other fields. We should emphasize the mental and psychological rehabilitation more than the economic. The northern area has been under complete domination for five years. This is the first time we have moved into an area that has been dominated by Communists. We have a challenging opportunity. I want to see more emphasis on the education and information field than in the material rehabilitation. The economy of Korea is basically a very simple one. I believe with the General that $150,000,000 a year is all she can absorb. (Turning to General MacArthur) Is the cost of the Armed Forces included in that estimate?

General MacArthur: No. Equipment and military forces are not included.

Secretary Pace: Is the directive The President sent sufficiently comprehensive?

General MacArthur: Yes.

Secretary Pace: What, generally, are the critical and over-all requirements of the Army during this period? We are in a critical financial situation. Our day of reckoning is going to come in the form of a supplemental in December.

General MacArthur: You gave us 40 days, 60 if necessary. We will have that estimate in 60 days. That will be about 30 days from now. This, you understand, is going to be some speculative guess work, but will be accurate to within 25%.

Secretary Pace: When the Army’s responsibility ends, could the Army provide aid in psychological rehabilitation? Should KMAG continue?

General MacArthur: The KMAG group has been wonderful. As far as the military mission is concerned, I think it should be continued indefinitely. I want to pay high tribute to that group. I believe that 500 officers and men should be continued indefinitely. At the start of rehabilitation the Army will have to continue until the civil rehabilitation is organized. It should be organized as rapidly as possible. The United Nations should take it over. You will have a hard job getting good men to serve in Korea. It is not a nice place.

Secretary Pace: In the period of rehabilitation General Walker can assess the leadership qualities of the ROK men to take over civilian leadership.

General MacArthur: Mr. Muccio knows more about this than I do and the Embassy has a thorough knowledge of the Koreans.

Ambassador Muccio: The Koreans are very obstinate. They have been pushed around so long they don’t like it. They are convinced that we do not want Korea. The Mission has done a great job training the young Koreans. They have pushed aside the old Chinese and Japanese trained Koreans. There is no hope in the old Koreans, but in the young ones there is great hope.

Mr. Rusk: Is it undesirable to turn KMAG into a U.N. operation? Would that spoil its effect?

General MacArthur: From a political point of view it would be O.K., but militarily there must be unity of doctrine. The others may have different doctrines than we have.

General Bradley: It didn’t work in Greece. We had to take it all over.

Mr. Rusk: We might be able to work it out by using small numbers of other Nationals or by getting the U.N. to ask the U.S. to take it on a contract basis. The other question I had was that we would like to see military responsibility for relief and rehabilitation end, and would also like to see the U.S. operation moved over to the U.N. On the other hand, the U.N. is trying to do something it has never done before. It is going to have some responsibilities never before undertaken on the same scale. It may be necessary for an organization like ECA to stand by and resume some of the responsibilities. Is it fair for us to assume that the basic installations of the country—railroads, water, etc.—will be in adequate use before the U.N. take over?

General MacArthur: I believe a good deal of that will be done. I believe lots will remain to be done to put them back in good condition. The Army, the minute it takes a city, gets them going but it is only temporary. ECA is continuing to do that. The President sent a letter last week to Mr. Foster² and told them to go ahead with the long-term rehabilitation. ECA should continue to function.

Ambassador Muccio: Heavy industries, railroads and utilities should be taken over by the Koreans and not wait for the United Nations to get in. The railroad from Pusan to Yongdungpo was put in operation within one week.

The President: What about utilities and railroads?

General MacArthur: It will undoubtedly take time to put utilities back in operation. The ECA is continuing to function.

Ambassador Muccio: The Army has done well opening railroads. ECA has helped. The Army has had the means and has done a great job with ECA, putting water and trains in operation. A group of transportation men who have been with the railroad company have been most helpful. Fortunately, we had an ECA man who had worked on new development for water works and within a short while he had water running in Seoul. A considerable number of new locomotives have been brought in.

Secretary Pace: Is there anything in terms of ECA and Army cooperation that we might do to help you?

General MacArthur: No commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have.

Ambassador Jessup: In regard to the figures which you suggested on the needs, does that include the cost of reconstructing industrial plants in the north?

General MacArthur: Yes, except munitions making. Those plants I would not include.

General Bradley: In regard to the reconstruction of the railroads, I had a lot of trouble in Europe, with pilots shooting up everything that moved and bombing the barracks that we were going to use later. Are you faced with the same thing?

General MacArthur: Me too (laughter).

Mr. Rusk: To what extent is the other side stripping plants?

General MacArthur: They have to some extent. In Inchon I saw at least 20 flat cars which were loaded up with orated factory gadgets which they had not been able to get out. The North Koreans were not in the south long enough to do more than ordinary looting. I believe, however, that industry has not been seriously damaged in North Korea.

Mr. Harriman: Could we hear more about psychological rehabilitation?

Ambassador Muccio: Bring in the Koreans more. They know their own people better than we do. We should provide them with radios and text books and also scientific guidance. We could set up a very effective system with a radio or loudspeaker in every school and village center. I had sound trucks which were very, very effective. With no newspapers and radio service, we sent them out to rural districts and village centers.

The President: I believe in sound trucks. I won two elections with them. (Laughter)

Mr. Harriman: What about the psychological differences between North and South Koreans?

Ambassador Muccio: Koreans are Koreans. There is no basic difference between them. 80% of them are farmers, anyway. There is no basic schism between North and South Koreans except for a few politicos and intellectuals.

Mr. Harriman: What about the 2,000,000 who came down south?

Ambassador Muccio: They were, generally, people of some means. They will be going back to North Korea and will be very helpful to us.

General Bradley: What can you do with the 60,000 prisoners you now have?

General MacArthur: They are the happiest Koreans in all Korea. For the first time they are well fed and clean. They have been de-loused and have good jobs for which they are being paid under the Geneva Convention. I believe there is no real split, but their attitude is due only to the banner that flies over them. There is no difference in ideology and there are no North and South Korean blocs.

The President: How will Syngman Rhee take the idea of the election?

General MacArthur: He won’t like it.

Ambassador Muccio: The last election was an honest election, about as honest as any ever held in the Far East. How are you going to ignore that? I hope the new Commission will not interpret that as requiring a nationwide election. How you are going to ignore members of the National Assembly is a major problem. The resolution was so worded that it could be interpreted in different ways. There have never been local elections or elections for provincial governors. These could be held.

Mr. Rusk: We must not undermine the present Korean government. I think it may be possible to have your local and by-elections in the south and elections in the north, and then it will be almost time for the 1952 elections throughout the country. I think it will require a good deal of patience.

Mr. Harriman: How about the interim period between elections?

General MacArthur: North Korea will be under military control. The U.N. resolution calls for the maintenance of local governments wherever possible. This will not be possible. We expect them to either flee or be killed. Local government will be maintained by appointing local officials recommended by ROK officials.

Ambassador Muccio: There is also the problem of currency to use and what land reform laws to retain in North Korea.

General MacArthur: In the interim the military will freeze land tenure, banks and currency. I will keep the North Korean currency in effect in North Korea without setting a rate to the dollar or ROK won until the civilian government can take over.

The President: What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?

General MacArthur: Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get clown to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.

With the Russians it is a little different. They have an Air Force in Siberia and a fairly good one, with excellent pilots equipped with some jets and B–25 and B–29 planes. They can put 1,000 planes in the air with some 2/300 more from the Fifth and Seventh Soviet Fleets. They are probably no match for our Air Force. The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. They would have difficulty in putting troops into the field. It would take six weeks to get a division across and six weeks brings the winter. The only other combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops. Russian air is deployed in a semicircle through Mukden and Harbin, but the coordination between the Russian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our Marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as the Marines but they are effective. Between untrained Air and Ground Forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training. I believe it just wouldn’t work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air. We are the best.

Mr. Harriman: What about war criminals?

General MacArthur: Don’t touch the war criminals. It doesn’t work. The Nurnberg trials and Tokyo trials were no deterrent. In my own right I can handle those who have committed atrocities and, if we catch them, I intend to try them immediately by military commission.

The President: Another subject—What is your idea about a Japanese peace treaty³ without including Russia and Communist China?

General MacArthur: I would call a conference at once and invite them. If they don’t come in, go ahead. After the treaty is drawn up, submit to them a draft of the treaty and if they don’t sign, go ahead with the treaty. The Japanese deserve a treaty.

The President: What would the effect on Japanese security be when our troops leave?

General MacArthur: Under the name of Police Reserve, we are organizing four divisions of Japanese troops to secure Japan. The present draft of the treaty by the State Department is very good. After friction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff it has been polished until it shines like a diamond. It will call for the security of Japan to be secured by the United Nations with the United States acting as the agency of the U.N. until the U.N. is in a position to do it itself.

The President: Would we have to maintain three or four divisions in Japan until the Japanese can secure themselves?

General MacArthur: I should say that they would have to be maintained there for several years. At the present time the Japanese, in accordance with the laws of war, furnish a great many things for those troops. They put up $300,000,000 a year. This includes barracks, lights, etc. When this treaty of peace is made I believe this should be changed. The troops should pay their way. We should pay rental, etc. The Japs would not object if they didn’t have to pay the bill for the support of these divisions.

General Bradley: Will the Japanese who have kept the faith while our troops were gone expect to receive different treatment from the troops when they return from Korea?

General MacArthur: Omar, there is complete camaraderie between the troops and the Japanese. The Japanese like our troops. I think that the presence of the troops means prosperity. They spend money and bring in so much. The Eighth Army was pulled out of occupation in January. When they come back they will have nothing to do with occupation.

General Bradley: The Eighth Army is returning to Japan soon. We have the problem of getting additional troops to Europe. As it now stands it will be April before we can get a division into Europe. Could the Second or the Third Division be made available to be sent over to Europe by January?

General MacArthur: Yes, I will make one available by January. I would recommend that the Second Division be selected, as it is a veteran division, better trained, and would make a better impression.

Secretary Pace: Would GARIOA end with the peace treaty?

General MacArthur: Yes, Japan will be self-sufficient in 1952, treaty or no treaty.

Secretary Pace: Should SCAP continue after the treaty of peace?

General MacArthur: SCAP should completely cease. I think these troops should be directly controlled by the Department of Defense, just like troops in the United States, and their relationship with the Japanese should be the same as garrisons in America. I don’t think they should have anything to do with political aspects. SCAP should discontinue entirely. I told Mr. Dulles I believe I could sell that to the Japanese. Understand, if you skin them alive as Carlos Romulo, and some of the other boys want to, you won’t be able to get anything from them. I think the text drawn up by the State Department is a very fine treaty.

Mr. Rusk: In connection with those troops moving back from Korea to Japan, ideally, we should have a peace treaty before military occupations in Korea wind up, but your operations in Korea are going faster than the diplomats can go in getting a treaty.

General MacArthur: I hope to get the Eighth Army back by Christmas.

Mr. Rusk: We cannot meet that. Should you let the Japs know we are going to have a peace treaty and make a statement to the Japs about the treaty to facilitate the return of the troops?

General MacArthur: Your thought is a good one. Last January I made some statement along those lines. This January I will scratch their backs again somehow.

Mr. Harriman: Should we begin to pay some of the expenses of occupation on return from Korea?

General MacArthur: Averell, that is what we should do. If we do this we can stop the GARIOA. We are taking more out than we are putting in. It is not the Japs’ fault that we do not have a treaty. It is an iniquitous thing that we are taking more out than we are putting in. It is a breach among the allies which prevents a treaty. Three years ago they did everything we asked and we have a moral obligation to them. If we pay our way in Japan for part of the cost of the troops in lieu of GARIOA funds, this might be a satisfactory arrangement if it can be worked out;

Secretary Pace: I certainly think it merits consideration and no doubt it would have great psychological benefits. We have both internal problems in the Department of Defense and also with the Appropriations Committees of Congress. This isn’t a final view, but my personal opinion is that it should be given consideration.

General MacArthur: I am sure that you are right. Congress will not like it. All Congressional groups who came over wanted to swallow up more from the Japanese economy.

The President: You and State get together and work it out and bring it to me for approval.

Secretary Pace: Or disapproval. (Laughter)

The President: I would like to hear your views, General, on a possible Pacific pact⁴ or some other arrangements similar to that in the Atlantic.

General MacArthur: A Pacific pact would be tremendous, but due to the lack of homogeneity of the Pacific nations, it would be very difficult to put into effect. If the President would make an announcement like the Truman Doctrine, which would be a warning to the predatory nations, it would have a great effect. It is not possible to get a pact, since they are so nonhomogeneous. They have no military forces. Only the United States has the forces. All they want is the assurance of security from the United States. The President should follow up this conference with a ringing pronouncement. I believe that at this time, after the military successes and the President’s trip, it would have more success than a Pacific pact.

Admiral Radford: I was in Manila last May during the conference Quirino called.⁵ I didn’t attend the meetings but I spoke to a number of delegates. There was generally the same feeling that General MacArthur brought out. They didn’t feel they could get together but they would like to know in advance of any announcement. I am sure they would heartily agree but would like to be consulted. I believe such a pronouncement could be included in the U.N. speech and if they could be consulted, they would feel they were in on the ground floor. The peace will be upset again in six months if you do not take steps to stop it. We just have to face the facts of life. We must continue the policy followed in Korea to maintain the peace. The situation in Indo-China is the most puzzling of all as to what we can do or what we should do.

Mr. Harriman: When you speak of the Truman Doctrine, do you mean direct external aggression or do you mean the type of thing that has been going on in Indo-China and has previously occurred in Greece to which the Truman Doctrine was directed?

General MacArthur: I am referring to direct aggression. The situation in Indo-China is puzzling.⁶ The French have 150,000 of their best troops there with an officer of the highest reputation in command. Their forces are twice what we had in the perimeter and they are opposed by half of what the North Koreans had. I cannot understand why they do not clean it up. They should be able to do so in four months yet we have recently seen a debacle. This brings up a question of far deeper concern. What is the capacity and caliber of the French Army? In the first world war they were excellent. In the second world war they were poor. The present French soldier is doubtful. If the French won’t fight we are up against it because the defense of Europe hinges on them. They have the flower of the French Army in Indo-China and they are not fighting. If this is so, no matter what supplies we pour in they may be of no use. The loss of territory in itself is nothing, but the French failure is broader than this. I cannot understand it.

The President: I cannot understand it either.

Admiral Radford: The French seem to have no popular backing from the local Indo-Chinese. The French must train native troops. The rest of Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam—is wide open if the Chinese Communists pursue a policy of aggression. We probably have more chance of assisting in Indo-China than anywhere else. We must stiff en the backbone of the French.

Mr. Harriman: The French hold a key position both in Europe and Asia. I have been told by officers who were there that the French fought well in Italy. This is a matter to which we must give close thought. The French must change their attitude relative to Indo-China.

The President: We have been working on the French in connection with Indo-China for years without success.

General Bradley: Some of the French fought well during the last war. I had under my command the Second French Armored Division and they fought very well, but they were selected people who had escaped from France to continue the fight. We cannot judge the fighting of all French troops by them.

The President: This is the most discouraging thing we face. Mr. Jessup and others have worked on the French tooth and nail to try and persuade them to do what the Dutch had done in Indonesia but the French have not been willing to listen. If the French Prime Minister comes to see me, he is going to hear some very plain talk. I am going to talk cold turkey to him. If you don’t want him to hear that kind of talk, you had better keep him away from me.

Admiral Radford: Recently there were some French ships in Hawaii. I had the impression they were not anxious to go to Indo-China and were dragging their feet. They would have stayed in Pearl Harbor for six months if I had invited them.

The President: I have talked at some length with General MacArthur about the situation in the Philippines.⁷ The General suggested that Mr. Dodge⁸ would be able to help out on this situation. I think if we could get him down there the job would be done.

Secretary Pace: Could he be spared?

General MacArthur: He is doing a job now in Japan and about two or three months after he is through he could be spared.

The President: General MacArthur has suggested that I send for Quirino. Maybe I should send for him and tell him what we want done. I am not sure whether that is the right thing to do.

General MacArthur: If you are going to give him fifty million dollars, I think you should (laughter).

The President: General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa. There is no need to cover that subject again. The General and I are in complete agreement.

General Bradley: With regard to the offers of additional troops from the United Nations, are not some of them more trouble than they are worth militarily? Politically they are fine. Some of the offers are still in nebulous form. Some are due to arrive in Korea in February or March. In most cases it will be necessary for us to pay for their transportation, maintenance and training and inasmuch as General MacArthur expects to have concluded military operations by November, is it worthwhile to continue working on them or should we ask only for token forces?

General MacArthur: They are useless from the military point of view and probably would never see action. From the political point of view, they give a United Nations flavor. I think that the balance between these two considerations should be struck in Washington. I cannot do it.

General Bradley: Perhaps the United Nations flavor could be retained but the cost reduced by having only token units as, for example, from Canada, which had proposed to send a brigade to Okinawa for further training.

Ambassador Jessup: Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, has said that the Canadians would prefer not to send troops to Korea but were willing to put them into international service, possibly to earmark them for Europe.

Admiral Radford: The Canadians have some representation. They have three destroyers in Korea.

General MacArthur: Their services have been excellent.

Mr. Rusk: Not long ago Bajpai spoke to Henderson about a suggestion Nehru was turning over in his mind. This would be placing Indian and Pakistani troops along the Korean-Manchurian and Korean-Soviet frontier to act as a buffer between these countries and the U.S. Forces in Korea. While they were talking, Nehru sent for Bajpai who returned shortly thereafter saying that Nehru had dropped the whole idea. We might think this over in case Nehru comes up with it or something similar in the future. I wonder if General MacArthur thinks such a plan would be dangerous.

General MacArthur: It would be indefensible from a military point of view. I am going to put South Korean troops up there. They will be the buffer. The other troops will be pulled back south of a line from 20 miles north of Pyongyang to Hamhung. I want to take all non-Korean troops out of Korea as soon as possible. They ought to move out soon after the elections. The ROK troops can handle the situation. The greatest calamity in Asia would be if the Koreans should turn against us as a result of some UN opposition to the Rhee Government. They are quite capable of handling their own military affairs. It would be a pity if we turned them against us. I have been shaking in my boots ever since I saw the UN resolution which would treat them exactly on the same basis as the North Koreans. As Ambassador Muccio has said, the Koreans are a sensitive people and we might easily turn them against us. It would be bad to turn out of office a government which had stood up so well and taken such a beating, and to treat them just like the North Koreans. We have supported this government and suffered 27,000 casualties in doing so. They are a government duly elected under United Nations auspices and should not be let down.

The President: This cannot be done and should not be done. We must insist on supporting this government.

Mr. Rusk: We have been working and explaining our point of view in the United Nations but there has been an effective propaganda campaign against the Rhee Government which has infected some of the UN delegations.

The President: We must make it plain that we are supporting the Rhee Government and propaganda can “go to hell”.

No one who was not here would believe we have covered so much ground as we have been actually able to cover. We might break up to have luncheon at twelve o’clock and in the meantime a communiqué⁹ could be prepared and talks among the members of the staff can be carried on. Then I want to award a couple of medals to a couple of people and we can all leave after luncheon.

General MacArthur: If it’s all right, I am anxious to get back as soon as possible and would like to leave before luncheon if that is convenient.

The President: I believe this covers the main topics. Secretary Pace, did you have anything else to take up?

Secretary Pace: Yes, sir, but I can take them up separately with General MacArthur, and I imagine General Bradley has some also.

The President: The communiqué should be submitted as soon as it is ready and General MacArthur can return immediately. This has been a most satisfactory conference.

The formal conference ended at 0912, Wake Island time. Informal discussions continued for one and one-half hours between various members of the two groups.

1. The main portions of this document were issued as a committee print by the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, under the above title, in May 1951. In a letter of transmittal, dated May 2, 1951, to Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, General Bradley stated that the record was compiled on the return trip from Wake Island from the combined notes of General Bradley, Messrs. Harriman, Jessup, and Rusk, Col. A. L. Hamblen (Special Assistant for Occupied Areas, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army), Colonel Matthews (General Bradley’s executive officer), and Miss Vernice Anderson (Ambassador Jessup’s secretary). General Bradley indicated that in addition to those listed in the summary as present at the table were Colonel Matthews and General Whitney of General MacArthur’s staff. Five copies of this report, according to General Bradley, were sent to General MacArthur on October 19, 1950.

   For President Truman’s statement, issued on October 15, following his meeting with General MacArthur, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 672.

2. Not printed.
3. For documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 1109 ff.
4. For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.
5. See footnote 1 to the letter from Muccio to Rusk, May 25, p. 88.
6. For documentation on Indochina, see vol. vi, pp. 690 ff.
7. For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 1399 ff.
8. Joseph M. Dodge, Financial Adviser to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (Japan).
9. See footnote 1, p. 948.