357.AD/9–2850: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
top secret
niact
niact
New Delhi, September 28,
1950—1 p. m.
[Received September 28—9:52 a. m.]
[Received September 28—9:52 a. m.]
791. 1. I have just returned from lengthy conversation with Nye, UK HICOM, during which he informed me in detail re his conversations yesterday with Bajpai, SYG MEA, and Nehru, and re his exchange of telegrams with Bevin on proposed UK resolution to be presented in First Committee UNGA on Korea. He told me copies of his report were being sent Washington and that Department of State undoubtedly had already been fully informed. I shall, therefore, not undertake set forth herein substance of conversations or of report.
[Page 809]- 2.
- It seems that several days ago, under instructions his government, he presented Bajpai document containing decisions three Foreign Ministers re Korean situation. During my conversation with Bajpai yesterday he referred to this document and expressed surprise that I had not been also supplied with copy.1
- 3.
- Early yesterday morning Nye received telegraphic instructions from Bevin to acquaint GOI with contents proposed UK resolution and to obtain GOI views with respect thereto. Few minutes after my conversation with Bajpai yesterday morning (Embtel 788, September 27) Nye called upon him, presented to him message from Bevin enclosing draft of resolution. Bajpai expressed considerable concern, at passage in draft indicating UN forces might advance beyond 38th parallel and said two telegrams had just been received from Panikkar, Indian Ambassador Peiping; that Peiping angered at attitude displayed towards it by UN and at possible presence of US forces in near future in territory contiguous to China, was threatening to intervene in Korea; and that danger of Peiping intervention would be much greater if UN forces should enter North Korea. Bajpai said that intervention Communist China in Korean struggle would almost certainly lead to third world war and that GOI would therefore probably not support UN military action north of 38th parallel. There was considerable discussion between Nye and Bajpai and Bajpai promised submit matter to Nehru. Bajpai gave substance Panikkar’s telegrams to Nye who incorporated them in his telegraphic report.
- 4.
- In afternoon Nye had talk with Nehru who told him that GOI had definitely decided it would be unwise for UN forces to enter North Korea and that note on subject had already been agreed upon and would be handed to Nye later. GOI note immediately after receipt was telegraphed London and Washington. It is assumed that Department is acquainted with its contents.2 I shall not, therefore, emphasize that language in it was quite strong in opposing extension conflict into North Korea.
- 5.
- Nye was also informed that message had been sent to Panikkar asking him to urge “moderation and restraint” upon Peiping Government.
- 6.
- Nye told me that during his conversation with Bajpai and Nehru, basing himself on information received from London, he had done his utmost to present American position in most favorable light. Among other things he had indicated that US did not wish to have its forces contiguous to Chinese and USSR frontiers and that therefore [Page 810] forces of some other powers would probably move into the frontier areas; that it was not present intention for UN forces to go beyond 40th parallel; and that the present idea was that the occupation forces of North Korea so far as possible would be composed of South Koreans.
- 7.
- Nehru in his note opposing entry of UN forces into North Korea suggested that they stop at 38th parallel and that negotiations be opened with North Koreans for purpose of prevailing upon northern North Koreans to permit plebiscite under UN auspices for all Korea (see paragraphs 3 and 4 of section numbered 3 Embtel 788, September 27).
- 8.
- I expressed my appreciation to Nye for giving me this information and for presenting American point of view to GOI.
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