IO Files
Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
[Here follows a list of persons present (46).]
1. Korea (US/A/C.1/1902/Rev.2;1 US/A/C.1/19112)
Mr. Rusk reviewed the results of our consultations with other Delegations on the Korean resolution. He noted that the Indian reluctance to go along appeared to turn on its uncertainty as to what the Chinese attitude would be if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Certain drafting changes had been made in the resolution to take account of various comments. In response to a question from Ambassador Austin, Mr. Rusk indicated that Romulo’s several suggestions for revision of the resolution had been considered. The Delegation reviewed the text of the resolution in its present form.
Mrs. Roosevelt observed that the resolution appeared to provide for supervision of elections and then for the return of the Government to the Koreans. She wondered if a single election, held prematurely, to establish a new government might not result in a Communist victory. She hoped the plan would not permit anything of that nature to happen, since, in view of the American casualties in Korea, the American public would feel extremely bitter that so much had been lost in the interests of a democratic country which had been prematurely abandoned, to the advantage of the Soviets. She thought we should envisage supervision of elections by the United Nations for some time to come, until we were convinced that a truly democratic government was firmly established. Mr. Rusk replied that the wording of the resolution was intended to provide flexibility as regards elections. There would be special elections in South Korea to fill certain vacant seats in the legislature. In North Korea we might want a constituent election. Under the resolution any combination or pattern of elections could be held. Mrs. Roosevelt thought the time element would also be important and that individuals should not be elected for too long a period. She [Page 800] was glad to learn that the language of the resolution did not restrict us to a single election.
Referring to the language of the resolution, Mr. Dulles asked whether the language “all appropriate steps be taken” implied a mandate to send United Nations forces into all Korea for the purpose of establishing a unified Korean state. Possibly paragraph (b) qualified that objective, but he wondered who would make the final decision as to whether United Nations forces should move into the North and how far they should go. Mr. Rusk replied that if this resolution were passed, it would be permissive, but not mandatory for United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel. The United States would have to make its own decision and then consult with other governments, especially those on the commission, as to whether troops should go beyond the 38th parallel.
The Secretary noted that the phrase “all appropriate steps” had been substituted for “all necessary steps”. Mr. Rusk indicated this was an Australian suggestion which the British had taken because it gave greater flexibility to the resolution.
It seemed to Senator Lodge that the resolution authorized troops to Gross the 38th parallel. He inquired whether our military authorities had expressed any recent opinion on this matter. Mr. Rusk said that the military believed that, in the absence of Chinese Communist and Soviet forces in the area, we should move north of the 38th parallel to bring about a united Korea. Senator Lodge observed we would also forestall future attacks by this action. Mr. Rusk agreed that preservation of the 38th parallel might lead to future difficulties and make more difficult a lasting conclusion of hostilities.
Mr. Dulles expressed concern at the use of the explicit phrase “whole of Korea” in the resolution. He felt that in all probability a united whole Korea could never be attained, and that we would have to compromise on some basis. The extreme northern and eastern provinces certainly could never be united. There should therefore, he believed, be greater flexibility in the resolution, perhaps by substitution of the phrase “in Korea”. Even though military judgment favored crossing the parallel, he did not think we should necessarily go as far as the military suggested. In this connection, he referred to the military psychology of the preventive war. He believed this resolution gave too much authority to the military. Senator Sparkman3 suggested that “throughout Korea” might be another alternative phraseology. Senator Lodge observed that this resolution was not a mandate, but Mr. Dulles thought a recommendation of this kind for all practical purposes was a mandate. He believed the phrase “whole of Korea” would be interpreted [Page 801] by the Chinese and Russians as an attempt on our part to occupy all of Korea.
Ambassador Austin viewed the situation differently. He considered that the United States should do a complete job in Korea and not leave it half done. He did not interpret paragraph (a) as requiring that armed force be used to the end described, but as providing that the appropriate steps be taken. These steps might be quite different from garrisoning the northern provinces. He did not think the United Nations should flinch from its duties. Possibly stationing troops on the border would not be appropriate, but some other course of action would be. After all, Korea was involved and not China or Russia. He believed the resolution must cover all of Korea so that we would not find ourselves lacking authority to make decisions with respect to northern Korea. Mr. Rusk believed Mr. Dulles would be reassured by the position of the military people, who were very cautious about acting provocatively in North Korea. They believed that under no circumstances should United States forces be stationed in the two northern provinces, but that we should restrict our troops to certain key points while United Nations forces might take over in the extreme north.
Mr. Cohen thought the resolution would enable us to do or not to do whatever we thought best. What worried him was whether it would bring us United Nations support for what we might have to decide to do later. Possibly the resolution was too vague. He was also worried as to the way in which the Soviet would interpret our intentions. It was not so much a matter of the decision of going beyond the 38th parallel, but the situation involved a great many different factors. For example, what would happen if forces began to move on both sides of the parallel? Decisions would have to be made very promptly, and the resulting responsibility would be great and the decisions difficult. Mr. Rusk replied that this resolution represented only a part of the problem. We did not know the Soviet view, and among other things, the discussion of this resolution would clarify the Soviet attitude as to how to wind up the Korean situation.
The Secretary noted the need for swift action on Korea. Our resolution should authorize the taking of appropriate steps throughout all of Korea. Whatever we said, we actually meant throughout Korea. Mr. Dulles said he would not press his point in this regard although he would prefer to see the phrase in question omitted as it could be provocative. The Secretary noted that the present text used the phrase “of Korea” except in the one instance, and believed it would be very bad to start out with the phrase “whole of Korea” and then take it out later.
Mr. Cohen and Mr. Gross found some difficulty in the language in paragraph (d) which they suggested might be too artful. Possibly [Page 802] it could be restated simply to say “United Nations forces entering Korea would not remain, etc”. Ambassador Austin observed that two-thirds of the delegations had already seen the resolution in its present text.
Senator Lodge said that if this were the beginning, he would favor the language change proposed by Mr. Dulles, but he did not think it could be changed at this stage. He wanted to be sure the resolution permitted us to go where we desired. Ambassador Austin said he would prefer to see the present text unchanged, and the Delegation could consider the matter further if some specific proposals or objections were made. Mr. Cohen thought this problem could be met by making the change throughout the resolution, perhaps by saying “a unified Korea” in all three paragraphs. Such a change could be explained on the basis we thought it desirable to use the same language throughout the resolution. Mr. Allison considered this suggestion would be difficult to apply to paragraph (c) as it related to the position of the Republic of Korea, which did not desire elections throughout Korea.
Mr. Cohen wondered whether changes in paragraphs (a) and (b) only would be appropriate. Mr. Tate suggested the possibility of dropping the word “all” in paragraph (a) which would give greater latitude in determining what was appropriate. Mr. Rusk believed “all” was better language for the United States, since it would constitute a stronger commitment for the United Nations.
The Secretary suggested that we might say to the British that this language was all right with us as it stood, but that if it encountered trouble from other Delegations, the langauge might be made to read “throughout a unified Korea” in paragraphs (a) and (b). This would permit a change without receding from the original position. However, we should not ask the British to make this change. This was agreed.
The Secretary thought a change might be made in paragraph (d), keeping the sacred language of the British Attorney-General [Solicitor-General] but changing “would” to “should”. Ambassador Gross queried whether provision should not also be made for withdrawal of troops from South Korea. It might be better to say United Nations forces should not remain in Korea. The Secretary thought this was a good point. Mr. Rusk agreed that the resolution might be redrafted in terms of a general objective, providing that United Nations forces would not remain in Korea any longer than necessary. Mr. Thurston4 believed such a change would be very helpful in dealing with the Indians, [Page 803] as well as other delegations. Senator Lodge likewise thought this suggestion appealing. Mr. Dulles observed that the theory in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) called for a unified Korea, whereas paragraph (d) had the effect of re-establishing the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk did not entirely agree, and Ambassador Gross considered that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) were actually governing, and the provisions of paragraph (d) would have to be worked out jointly in the United Nations through the Assembly and the Korean Commission.
Mr. Bancroft said there was one unsettled aspect of the problem—hearing the Chinese Communists. The position paper recommended that, if the Chinese Communists requested a hearing, the United States should go along with a committee invitation to hear them. This recommendation was made on the basis that it would give the Chinese a chance to make their own position in respect to Korea clear, and it would also prevent the Indians from becoming the advocates for the Chinese. He inquired whether the Delegation wished to take a final decision on this point.
Ambassador Austin supposed the point was already settled. He reported that he had already told Tsiang yesterday that we were prepared to hear the Chinese Communists. Although Tsiang felt badly, he appreciated the situation. Ambassador Austin wondered if we would not also be confronted by an application for admission to the committee by the North Koreans. In this case should we take the same position of allowing a witness to be heard? The representatives of the Republic of Korea bitterly opposed such a step which they regarded as giving recognition to rebels, who where not a government at all.
The Secretary asked whether if the Chinese Communists were heard, they should be asked to accept the principles of the Charter. Mr. Bancroft recalled that Mr. Dulles had suggested that there might be some analogy to Article 35, but the staff would recommend that we not seek to impose any condition of this sort as the prerequisite of hearings. Such a condition would run contrary to the philosophy underlying the grant of a hearing. It might also mean a long controversy in committee.
Mr. Dulles referred to the point previously made by the Secretary to the effect that we should seek rapid action on Korea. He agreed with this, and believed it important in this case to demonstrate the capacity of the Assembly to function rapidly. If hearing the Chinese Communists and possibly discussing conditions for their participation would involve delay, he would be somewhat concerned since such delay might make the Assembly’s action academic in view of the swift movement of events in Korea.
The Secretary suggested we might be able to say we were not interposing objection to such hearings, but wanted to be sure that no delay [Page 804] would be involved. He inquired whether there were any Chinese Communist representatives who could arrive here within twenty-four hours. Mr. Rusk was doubtful, inasmuch as no visas had been issued; he thought several days would be required. As regards conditions, he thought Ambassador Austin might simply declare when the Chinese Communists appeared, that in our view they were accepting the obligations of the Charter. He observed that in the Security Council the Soviets had dropped their request to hear the Chinese Communists on the Korean case, although they had pressed such a hearing as regards Formosa. He believed our main problem would arise by a request for a hearing from North Korea. This would afford an opportunity for dilatory tactics. In his view it would be absurd in the North Korean case to insist that they could not appear until they accepted certain conditions inasmuch as they were engaged now in a war against the United Nations.
The Secretary wondered whether the two matters could not be separated. The North Korean request should clearly be refused on the ground that North Korea was not representative of anyone, had defied the United Nations, and was killing soldiers in the forces of the United Nations. Moreover, the proposed commission would be empowered to consult with appropriate representatives of the North Korean people. Mr. Allison observed that if North Korean representatives should be brought here, it might tie General MacArthur’s hands since he would need to have people on the spot with whom he could deal. The Delegation unanimously agreed that the United States should not yield an inch as regards any request for a hearing from North Korea; it should be denied. Mr. Rusk noted that this would be consistent with our policy respecting hearings for the North Koreans or the past three years.
Turning to the question of hearing the Chinese Communists, the Secretary suggested we proceed with the view that we are not going to interpose any difficulty to such hearing, but at the same time make clear that action on Korea must continue to go forward. He asked whether we might get into any other trap. Ambassador Austin inquired if this position might be construed as the admission or recognition of the Communists as the Government of China, particularly if the condition that the resulting decision would bind Communist China were attached. In other instances we had been extremely careful not to refer to the Chinese Communists as a government. Possibly it would be enough to state that the Chinese Communists were simply being heard as witnesses who had indicated they wished to be heard. Bancroft thought this was correct and believed it would be rather [Page 805] absurd to suggest that a private witness should accept Charter obligations.
Mr. Dulles asked on what theory the Chinese Communists would appear, since no direct charges, such as those in the alleged bombings, had been made. He could not see a similar capacity in this case, unless it was done on the theory that a neighbor of Korea was entitled to a voice. Mr. Rusk suggested such appearance would be comparable to that of the Arab Higher Committee or the Jewish Agency, as parties at interest. He believed it served a practical purpose to bring them to the Council table, since the Chinese Communists were the authority in China, and what happened here might have some effect on the policies of the Peiping regime.
The Secretary considered that the Chinese Communists had nothing to offer on the passage of the resolution. They could consult later with the commission. However, a hearing might reassure them with respect to our intentions in Korea. Mr. Cohen believed an additional reason in favor of a hearing was that a number of countries felt on the whole that it would make for better consideration of the question if the Chinese Communists were present. We would lose more by debating the hearing issue, which was confusing to the public, than we would gain by gracefully accepting hearings. Referring to the idea that the Chinese Communists should accept the obligations of the Charter, Mr. Cohen recalled that in the Greek case, Albania and Bulgaria had been asked to accept such obligations, but when they failed to do so, they were nevertheless allowed limited participation in the debate. This precedent seemed applicable in this case.
The Secretary expressed the hope that such a hearing would not hold up proceedings. Mr. Bancroft did not think this would happen; we could urge the necessity for prompt instructions to the Unified Command, although we might get into a debate on this point respecting the jurisdiction of the Security Council. He reviewed our present thinking on this point. Mr. Rusk thought we should not take the view that the Assembly was providing instructions to the United Nations commander in any case, but rather that we believed that the views of the General Assembly with respect to the outcome in Korea should be expressed as soon as possible. The Secretary suggested that Ambassador Austin might say that we’re not going to make any difficulty about hearing the Chinese Communists but also that we had to get on with the decision on Korea. The Committee5 would vote to let the Chinese Communists appear, Then, some delegate might raise the question [Page 806] whether action should not be postponed until the Chinese arrived; he wondered whether, if that situation arose, we would have enough votes to move right ahead. Mr. Rusk indicated other delegations supported prompt action.
Mr. Dulles wondered if it was likely that the Chinese Communists would come or whether they might not take the position that they would not come unless they were given the Chinese seat. Ambassador Austin observed that in the Security Council the Chinese Communists had demanded the Chinese seat. Ambassador Gross noted, however, that the Soviet motion on Formosa did not include that position; it seemed the Soviets were willing to have the Chinese come as witnesses, regardless of the fact that the Chinese letter had asked that they be permitted to join the Council.6
Senator Lodge asked why the question of hearing the Chinese Communists arose with respect to Korea. He thought it better to hear them on the charges of alleged American bombings and saw no reason why they had to be heard on Korea. The Secretary agreed that it was hard to find a logical reason for hearing them in this instance, although there was good reason for the proposed commission to hear them. It might be helpful, however, for us to be able to explain we were not fortifying the border and make clear our own intentions. We simply did not consider the issue worth fighting about since many other government, whose cooperation we needed, regarded the Chinese Communists as the Government of China, and if this issue were debated at length, we would lose more than we would gain. Obviously, we would not push for hearings, but if someone else proposed it, the Secretary favored our saying “yes”, providing it did not delay the proceedings.
The Secretary inquired about the language in paragraph (a) regarding the functions of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Mr. Rusk replied that it had been designed to state functions in general. On the relief and rehabilitation side, Mr. Lubin noted the language was intended to keep the Commission out of daily operational responsibilities. Mr. McKeever suggested that, so far as the public was concerned, it would be desirable to do away with the “jawbreaker” title. Mr. Rusk said this was one of Romulo’s suggestions which we had been able to accept, and he did not think the title should be changed.
[Here follows the record of discussion on the second agenda item: “Uniting for Peace”.]
[Page 807]- See the annex to this document, p. 807.↩
- Not printed. This paper, drafted by Mr. Allison, set forth a series of points entitled “Essential Elements of a Korean Solution”, which are embodied in telegram Delga 43 from New York received at 8:37 p. m. on September 28, p. 817. In addition to the 11 points in that telegram, document US/A/C.1/1911 had contained a 12th point reading as follows: “If the United Nations succeeds, the world can take hope that through collective action peace can be restored and a constructive program for world advancement be carried out. If we fail through the intransigence of any of our members—the world will despair—but will know where to place the blame.”↩
- John J. Sparkman, U.S. Senator from Alabama, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly.↩
- Ray L. Thurston, Counselor of Embassy in Moscow, was an adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.↩
- Reference is to the First Committee of the General Assembly to which the Korean question had been routinely delegated on September 26.↩
- For documentation on the Formosa question in the United Nations, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.↩