Draft Memorandum by Mr. Robert G. Hooker of the Policy Planning Staff 1
Suggested Political Actions To Be Taken in the Event U.N. Troops Move North of the 38th Parallel
The necessity for offering terms for the restoration of peace and security in Korea in the near future, and for making an early decision on whether to move ground troops north of the 38th parallel, together [Page 784]with Malik’s statement to the Baltimore group noted in this morning’s papers,2 all create a situation in which we must move not only firmly and decisively, but in a manner calculated to convey all possible reassurance to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China as to our real intentions.
It is therefore suggested that, if the decision is made to send ground troops north of the 38th parallel, we should take the following steps concurrently or slightly in advance:
- Propose formally before the General Assembly that (a) Korea should be neutralized, but not be demilitarized, either permanently or for a period of several years, such neutralization to be embodied in a consortium to which the U.N. powers and Communist China should be parties; (b) propose formally before the General Assembly that pending the execution of such a consortium or the holding of elections in Korea, whichever shall occur later, U.N. forces, in which U.S. forces shall not be included, shall remain in Korea for the purpose of assuring the implementation of the U.N. resolutions.
- Make known in some appropriate manner that the U.S. will insist upon provisions in the Japanese peace treaty guaranteeing the participants in the war against Japan against any future aggression by Japan.
The above suggestions are based upon the conviction that it would be imprudent if not genuinely provocative, if U.N. ground forces go north of the 38th parallel, unless at the same time we go as far as we can to convey to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, in as substantive a manner as possible, assurance that the U.S. does not intend to use the Korean episode for purposes of aggression or to use Korea as a base to prepare later aggression.
- An unsigned manuscript note in source text read: “Not considered by Staff”.↩
- Mr. Malik had expressed the interest of his government in top level peace talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. A Department of State spokesman, commenting on this, called for deeds and not words to secure peace in Korea and elsewhere.↩