The attached document has been cleared within the Department of State for use
in the preliminary tripartite talks.
The document recommends that the U.S. seek support by the United Nations of
the following position:
[Annex]
Draft Position Paper for Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in September
korea
Problem:
To determine (1) the course of action to be recommended to the United
Nations for pursuance when United Nations forces approach the 38th
parallel, and (2) the policies to be recommended to the United Nations
in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and
security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an
end, either by the defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of
an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north
of the 38th parallel.
Background:
United Nations responsibility in Korea has been affirmed by the General
Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and
October 21, 1949. These form part of the United Nations effort, strongly
supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence
and unity of Korea. The present military action in Korea responds to the
Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions
of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.
The United Nations Security Council in its resolution of June 25, 1950
determined that the armed attack by North Korean forces constituted a
breach of peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and
withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and called upon
members of the United Nations to render assistance in the execution of
the resolution and to refrain from aid to the North Korean authorities.
In its resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council noted that its
resolution of June 25 had not been complied with by North Korean
authorities, that urgent military measures were required, and further
recommended that U.N. members furnish assistance not only to repel the
armed attack but also to “restore international peace and security in
the area”.
Action by the United Nations therefore divides itself into two phases:
(a) the present enforcement action to repel
North Korean [Page 655] aggression, and
(b) the long-term effort to bring about
unity, independence, and the establishment of peace and security in the
area.
Reversal of the military situation in Korea, with assumption of the
offensive by U.N. military forces, will undoubtedly impel the Kremlin to
take a decision as to its future course of action. The strategic
importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is such that the U.S.S.R. would
probably take extreme measures—excepting possibly those it deemed likely
to bring on general war—to prevent the establishment of a regime in
North Korea which it did not believe it could control. Furthermore it
seems likely that the Soviet Union would not wait until U.N. forces
reached the 38th parallel to take action. Such action might be expected
when U.N. forces begin to have military successes and might consist of
the entry of Soviet forces, the entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new
effort toward a United Nations settlement, or a combination of these.
While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel, the Kremlin
might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or
with Chinese Communist forces.
Should the U.S.S.R. announce the reoccupation of North Korea to the 38th
parallel by Soviet troops, it is unlikely that there would be sentiment
among U.N. members for taking action which would precipitate a direct
clash with Russian forces.
While U.N. military forces are now engaged in air and naval action north
of the 38th parallel, the use has not yet been made of amphibious
landings and ground operations in North Korea. Such operations may be
highly desirable as part of the strategy to defeat North Korean forces.
The necessity for advance planning and preparation for such operations
emphasizes the importance of decisions authorizing them or restricting
their location for political reasons. For example, in order not to
provoke unnecessarily the USSR and Communist China, the unified command
might be instructed to refrain from amphibious and ground operations
within a specified area adjoining the Manchurian and Soviet borders.
When North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th
parallel, continued military action to bring about the unification and
independence of Korea will depend upon prior decision by the United
Nations. Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the
Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum
guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean
people and Government are already insisting that the aggression from the
north provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify
all of Korea under United Nations auspices. Certainly the decisive
defeat of the North Korean aggression and the successful unification of
Korea would represent a victory of the United [Page 656] States and of the participating
non-Communist nations of incalculable importance in Asia and throughout
the world. The Japanese would be keenly impressed by the demonstrated
check on Soviet expansion and any latent or active differences between
Peiping and Moscow would be considerably stimulated. Soviet satellites
in Europe would not be immune to the effect of such an event.
These considerations, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to
the USSR, make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will exert
vigorous efforts to block any settlement resulting in a Korean
Government which it cannot control. However, notwithstanding its
considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union
may not yet be ready to risk general war in order to prevent a
determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This
possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large
majority a program recommended by UNCOK or by some other United Nations body and if it could
be demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the proposed settlement was
truly a U.N. and not a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed
against legitimate Soviet interests. At any rate, the existence of the
possibility justifies a plan of action by the United Nations to achieve
a unified Korea.
United Nations support for any program for action in Korea is essential.
Therefore it will be necessary to reach general agreement with the
British and French Governments and with the other members of the United
Nations, to the future course of action to be taken in the Security
Council and in the General Assembly.
Recommendations:
That discussion of the Korean problem with the British and French Foreign
Ministers proceed on the basis of the considerations set forth above and
that an effort be made to seek support by the U.N. of the general
position outlined below:
- 1.
- Course of action to be pursued as United Nations forces
approach the 38th parallel:
-
a.
- Constant assessment of the situation should be made
and continued consultation held with U.N. members to
seek general agreement to the course of
operations.
-
b.
- Should Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th
parallel, U.N. forces should not proceed north of the
38th parallel unless so ordered by decision of the
United Nations.
-
c.
- Should major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units
engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging
in hostilities against U.N. forces, the question of
further U.N. action should be immediately referred to
the Security Council.
-
d.
- Excepting in the situations envisaged in a and c
above, the unified command should be authorized to
conduct military operations, [Page 657] including amphibious landings and
ground operations, without regard to the 38th parallel,
However, ground operations should be kept well away from
the Manchurian and USSR frontiers, and should not be
conducted in the mountainous areas north of the 39th
parallel except by special U.N. authorization.
-
e.
- Excepting in the situations envisaged in b and c
above and unless the U.N. should have taken a prior
decision to the contrary, U.N. forces, having arrived at
the 38th parallel, should continue their advance
northward in order to stabilize and unify as much of the
country as is feasible. The extent of their advance and
occupation would depend upon U.N. decision. Republic of
Korea forces should make up the large percentage of such
forces with U.S. participation minimized.
- 2.
- Policies directed towards the restoration of international
peace and security in the Korean area:
-
a.
- The final solution of the Korean problem must be
carried out under the authority of the United Nations
and must be consistent with the principles of the U.N.
Charter. Therefore United Nations support of action in
Korea must be assured and solidified.
-
b.
- Due consideration and support should be given in the
United Nations to the reports and recommendations of the
United Nations Commission on Korea.
-
c.
- There should be created an appropriate United Nations
body, with substantial Asian participation and
preferably under the chairmanship of the representative
of India, to study and make recommendations to the
General Assembly on the future of Korea. Such
recommendations should be in accordance with the
following principles:
- (1)
- The permanent unification of Korea can only be
fairly and correctly resolved with the
participation of representatives of the Korean
people chosen as the result of free elections
throughout Korea on the basis of adult suffrage
and by secret ballot held under the authority and
observation of the U.N.
- (2)
- The Government of the Republic of Korea should
continue to be recognized as the only lawful
government in Korea and should be consulted with
respect to any long-term solution of the Korean
problem.
- (3)
- The independence and unification of Korea
conform with Korean aspirations and the expressed
objectives of the United Nations.
- (4)
- The tremendous problems of an economic, social
and political nature attendant upon the
establishment of a unified Korea are of such a
magnitude as to require the assistance of the
United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic State and the
Asiatic members of the United Nations should play
a prominent role in the assistance that the United
Nations can give, and their views regarding a
solution of the problem should be given
sympathetic consideration.
-
d.
- The United Nations body referred to above, following
the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea,
should advise as to steps to be taken to liquidate the
effects of the war, and to neutralize the country, and
should recommend as to the size and character of such
military and internal security forces as may be needed
by the Republic of Korea.
-
e.
- The United Nations should retain in Korea, for as long
as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable,
unified, and independent Korea is established, a
military force to prevent renewed aggression or internal
strife during the natural period of adjustment. Such
force should include substantial contingents from
Asiatic countries. United States forces would be
available to participate in enforcing a UN guarantee
against unprovoked aggression but the United States
would recommend that its contingents be stationed south
of the 38th parallel.
-
f.
- Members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the
United Nations body mentioned above, should give such
political and economic aid to the Korean Government as
may be necessary after the conclusion of
hostilities.
-
g.
- The policies outlined herein should be announced in
the United Nations at an appropriate time and support
sought for a determined effort to seek a solution of the
Korean problem.
