Office of the Historian

795.00/8–2150

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret
[Washington,] August 21, 1950.1

Proposed Terms for a Settlement of the Korean Conflict Prior to the Assumption of the Offensive by UN Forces

The following terms are devised to meet only one particular contingency: an indication from the Soviet side, before the tide of battle has turned, that Moscow and/or Peiping are prepared to negotiate a settlement involving the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38 parallel.

1.
The invading forces would obey a Security Council order for a cease-fire.
2.
An UNCOK, revised to meet its new responsibilities, should forthwith dispatch by air teams to key positions along the 38 parallel to observe the North Korean withdrawal to positions determined by [Page 616] UNCOK, to inhibit removal of South Korean persons and property and to report twice daily to UNCOK on the withdrawal.
3.
UN Forces, other than ROK, should remain south of the 36 parallel.
4.
ROK forces should follow the North Korean withdrawal up to but not beyond 38 parallel. The ROK Government would, of course, return to the capital and resume governing authority over the ROK.
5.
When ROK forces take up positions on the 38 parallel, UNCOK teams should proceed into North Korea to prepare the groundwork for forthcoming UN action, set forth below.
6.
The North Korean forces should be demobilized and their arms placed under the custody of UNCOK pending the completion of the elections discussed in the following paragraph, at which time UNCOK would turn over the weapons to the new national government. Meanwhile the North Korean civil authorities should be held responsible for the maintenance of law and order.
7.
UNCOK should supervise an election in North Korea which would provide for representation from that half of the country in the Government of the Republic. As requested by UNCOK, ROK constabulary units should enter North Korea to assist in conducting the elections and to assume, under the control of UNCOK, responsibility for the maintenance of order.
8.
Meanwhile, having no disposition to retain armed forces on Korean soil, the United States would welcome the replacement of its troops south of the 36 parallel by units of other UN member nations which have supported the United Nations resolutions on Korea, particularly Asian members.
9.
With the establishment of an all-Korean Government UN forces should promptly be withdrawn, unless the Korean Government requests and the UN agrees that they should be retained.2
  1. A covering note, dated August 22, from Philip Watts of the Policy Planning Staff to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, indicated that this document was the second draft of a memorandum which had been discussed at a meeting on August 21 involving Messrs. Rusk, Hickerson, Bonbright, and, presumably, Nitze and Davies of the Policy Planning Staff.↩

  2. On August 22, Mr. Emmerson sent the following memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Rusk with regard to this draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff:

    “John Davies suggests—and I agree—that this be telegraphed to Loy Henderson with the suggestion that it be conveyed in confidence to Bajpai. Having this reach Peiping’s ears would irritate the Russians, promote the cleavage, and might possibly intrigue the Chinese Communists. What do you think?” (795.00/8–2250)

    For Mr. Rusk’s reply, see his memorandum dated September 8, p. 708.

    ↩