Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/8–2150

Draft Memorandum by Messrs. John M. Allison and John K. Emmerson of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

top secret

[Washington,] August 21, 1950.¹

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea

the problem

1. To determine what policies the United States should pursue in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

analysis

Military Factors

2. The present military objective of the U.N. Command is to “repel the armed attack” of the Korean Communists and restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council Resolutions in pursuance of which action is being taken, call for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces beyond the 38th parallel but do not specifically limit military ground operations of the U.N. Command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

3. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is of such a high degree that the USSR would probably take extreme measures—excepting possibly those it deemed likely to bring on general war—to prevent the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it did not believe it could ultimately dominate or control.

4. Such Soviet measures might take the form of committing Soviet or Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea or at least occupying Korea north of the 38th parallel by such troops.

5. However, it is believed that when the tide of battle begins to turn, the Soviet Union will not wait for U.N. Forces to reach the 38th Parallel before taking action. Such action may be expected when U.N. forces begin to have military successes and may consist of entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort at U.N. settlement, or a combination of these.

6. The strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the U.S. is not such as to make desirable the commitment of large U.S. forces there. In fact in case of a global conflict, it would be a serious disadvantage to have U.S. forces so committed. However, a Kremlin-dominated Korean peninsula would be a threat to U.S. security interests in Japan.

Political Factors

7. After 45 years of either colonialism or division, the people of Korea have an irrepressible urge for the unification of their country and its recognition as an equal and respected member of the family of nations.

8. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel is an entirely artificial barrier violating the natural integrity of the nation. This division was never meant to be permanent and for five years the U.S. has endeavored to eliminate it by all possible peaceful measures, first through bilateral negotiation with the Soviets and later through initiating action through the United Nations machinery.

9. Since November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations has by overwhelming majorities passed three Resolutions looking toward achieving the objective of a free, independent and unified Korea. A U.N. Commission on Korea was established and has been and still is charged with seeking Korea’s unification by pacific settlement. In its Resolution of October 21, 1949, the General Assembly reaffirmed its aims in Korea and called upon all member states “to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution.” While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means. Neither has the United States taken the specific decision to include the use of military force among the means by which it would seek to bring about the establishment of a unified and independent Korea.

10. The Government of the Republic of Korea has been established in accordance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly, has been declared by the U.N. to be the only lawful government in Korea and has been recognized by 32 nations.

11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea demonstrated, despite many weaknesses, a growing capacity to govern. In its report of June 26, 1950, UNCOK pointed out that “there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country.” Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate and non-Government elements thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of “police state.”

12. The leaders of the Republic of Korea have stressed that the aggression from the North provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. President Rhee has insisted on the special position of his government and has formally notified the President of the U.S. that the Republic of Korea will not recognize the validity of any decision reached about the future of Korea in the making of which the Republic of Korea has not participated.

13. There is a growing sentiment in the United States favoring a “final” settlement of the Korean problem as opposed to any settlement which smacks of compromise or a “deal”, although this sentiment has not taken the explicit form of using United States forces to bring about Korean unification after the North Koreans have been driven back.

14. On the other hand there are significant groups who believe further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution. Should a peace offer be made or the aggressor retire or be forced back to the 38th parallel there would doubtless be strong efforts made by large sections of the public and the Congress to stop the fighting and return to a peace basis.

15. There is evidence that the UNCOK which is operating in the field will make recommendations of a far-reaching character designed to bring about the unification of Korea under U.N. auspices. (See USUN’s 266, Aug. 11. Copy attached.²) The U.S. will have to take a stand on these recommendations.

16. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

17. A quick and crushing North Korean victory over South Korea would have gained for the USSR its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a “cordon sovietaire” from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. The aggression in South Korea, if defeated in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions, may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

18. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-Communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

19. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria’s resources and could also provide non-Communist contact with the people there and in North China.

20. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

21. The above reasons, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will exert vigorous efforts to block any settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union may not yet be ready to risk general war in order to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOK or by some other United Nations body and if it could be demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the proposed settlement was truly a U.N. and not a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

22. The U.S. has pledged its support of a unified and independent Korea. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to carry forward Security Council decisions to block a breach of the peace is fixed. We have a moral obligation as well to support previous General Assembly recommendations on Korea.

23. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2, approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

• “a. To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.
• “b. To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.
• “c. To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives.”

24. The political value for the United States and to the United Nations of showing to the world the determination that aggression shall be repelled, and that the expressed will of the United Nations shall be respected, justifies our current military effort in Korea.

conclusions

25. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:

a. Although the United States national interests are involved in the Korean situation, the problem of Korea is primarily a United Nations problem and its final solution must be one which is carried out under the authority of the United Nations and is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

b. The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections throughout Korea on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

c. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

d. The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations, United States objectives, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

e. The tremendous problems of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic State and the United States should therefore urge that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and that their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration.

f. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

26. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification, of the country, the following steps should be taken:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW’s, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW’s now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

27. The following limiting factors on action which should be recommended by the United States must be kept in mind:

a. The fact that up until the present the Security Council has not expressly authorized the use of force to effect the unification of Korea once the aggression has been repulsed.

b. The probability that any attempt either by force or through U.N. action to establish a unified and independent Korea would cause the Soviet Union to commit either its own forces or those of Communist China or both with the consequent danger of global war.

c. The fact that the military strength of the United States now is inadequate to assure the attainment of the objectives fixed by our national interests.

d. Possible reluctance of other members of the United Nations to agree to action necessary to effect the unification of Korea if it appears it would lead to the outbreak of a general conflict with the USSR or the breaking up of the United Nations.

28. In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps once the aggression has been brought to an end:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nation support of necessary action in Korea.

b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

d. Recommend to the United Nations that, after the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea and the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above named United Nations body, that body should advise as to the size and character of military forces and of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.

e. The United States should express its view that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a U.N. military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment, and that such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States would make it clear that its forces would be available to participate in enforcing a U.N. guarantee against unprovoked aggression; but would recommend that its contingents in the U.N. force referred to should be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

f. Recommend that the members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

g. Should the United Nations Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines set forth in USUN telegram 266 of August 11, the United States should strongly support the general character of those recommendations reserving the right to suggest changes in certain sections as may appear desirable.

h. Press forward urgently with measures to build up the military, political and economic strength of the United States and other non-communist nations.

1. This memorandum was forwarded on August 22 to Ambassador Jessup with a covering note from Mr. Emmerson indicating that it represented a revised version of the earlier draft paper by Mr. Allison dated August 12 (p. 567), revisions having been made on the basis of comments received from recipients of the earlier draft.

   The memorandum was then forwarded without change on August 23 to the NSC for NSC Staff Consideration Only as a Department of State Draft Paper on “U.S. Courses of Action in Korea”.

2. Ante, p. 564.