330/8–1850: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received August 18—3:48 p. m.]
419. 1. Bajpai SYG MEA asked to see me urgently this afternoon. He referred to conversation reported in Embtel 415, August 18 and said that GOI had received telegram this morning from Rau asking that he be permitted to explore his plan further; that reception was not entirely negative; that US and UK were merely abstaining; and that certain elements American press including “influential columnist Lippmann” were supporting him. Bajpai after discussing matter with Nehru had sent instructions to Rau along following lines:
- (a)
- No plan for restoration of peace could make progress with [without?] active support great powers. Negative attitude indicated his plan could not succeed.
- (b)
- It was suggested he discuss with great powers alternative plan for setting up “advisory committee” of nations including not only members SC but also those of UN and possibly some outside UN. One difficulty of committee chosen for SC was that India only Asian power. Wider choice would give opportunity to include such countries as Burma, Indonesia, Turkey, etc.
- (c)
- If attitude great powers should not be receptive plan should not be pushed since their cooperation necessary.
- (d)
- Advisory committee could have two-fold task: that of preparing an immediate plan for bringing about cessation of fighting and that of working out plan for future of Korea including ascertainment of desires of Korean people.
2. I said that I assumed that GOI desired Indonesia to be member advisory committee. He replied that in his opinion Indonesia might be extremely useful in work this kind.
3. Bajpai asked me what in my opinion was real attitude US re Rau’s original proposals. I stated I had no information other than that which I had given him during our conversation on August 17. I assumed that US had taken attitude of abstention partially because it did not wish to assume position which might indicate lack of confidence in non-permanent members of SC.
4. He asked me what in my opinion US attitude might be towards alternative scheme which he had just outlined. I replied there were too many factors involved for me to hazard an opinion at this distance from Washington. I was inclined believe, however, that my government would not be enthusiastic about any scheme which might permit conversations to take place between representatives of SC and North Koreans while latter were continuing to ignore resolution of SC or which would give North Koreans status of government while they continued to commit aggression in defiance of SC.
5. Bajpai said that matters this character were details which would necessarily be decided in Lake Success. In Delhi GOI must limit itself to suggesting framework possible peace plans. He hoped particularly that in conversation with Rau US representatives would say nothing which would give him impression that his government did not have full confidence in him or was going over his head direct to US Government.