330/8–1850: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received August 18—2:44 p. m.]
309. Department may find useful up-to-minute (noon, 18 August) roundup on developments past 48 hours re Rau proposal for SC subcommittee on Korean question.
1. On evening 16 August, Gross outlined to Rau points made Deptel 147, August 15. After expressing view that we would give sympathetic consideration to any proposal likely to lead to compliance with outstanding SC resolutions, Gross said we were anxious to receive more specifics from Rau concerning objective and terms of reference of subcommittee. Rau replied he had not yet prepared a resolution; he would be glad to show it to us when he had drafted one.
Rau denied any assumption his part that Korean problem was a US–USSR matter. He said that his reference in his SC speech to UNCOK report simply designed to bring out fact that it was inability of US and USSR to reach agreement regarding Korea which lead to necessity for GA action and that all he intended to say was that the genesis of problem lay in US USSR inability to agree upon a solution. Gross pointed out that even in pre-GA phase US approach was not “unilateral” but reflected policies of Charter whereas USSR approach was designed to obstruct unification and free choice of democratic government.
[Page 606]Rau agreed subcommittee should not have any mediatory functions nor did he contemplate SC would surrender any of its responsibilities to subcommittee but that, on contrary, latter would aid SC in carrying out its responsibilities.
With regard to point that there was no need for subcommittee consideration of US resolution, which we felt should be put to vote in SC as soon as Parliamentary situation permitted Rau with some vehemence disagreed, saying that a great advantage of his subcommittee idea was that it could take up US resolution as well as others before the Council.
At this point Rau said that while he appreciated our “openmindedness” in not rejecting his proposal out of hand, he was equally convinced that it would be a good thing if we did not publicly support his resolution. He thought our support would inevitably bring a Soviet veto. Gross had impression Rau was pleased with our lukewarm reception of his idea, and that our reaction to some degree seemed to him to clothe his proposal with even greater virtue.
Rau insisted that this proposal could not contain explicit reference to earlier SC resolutions since this would also compel a Soviet veto, but on other hand Rau said he felt there should be no doubt in our minds that it was not his intention that subcommittee take any action which was not in furtherance of those resolutions. Rau indicated his clear intention to proceed with his proposal.
2. At SC meeting 17 August, Yugoslav delegate made public statement supporting Rau suggestion “in principle”.
3. During Council meeting Jebb showed us telegram from New Delhi reporting that Bajpai had sent Rau a message that Nehru considered this was not most opportune time in which to submit Rau proposal but that GOI did not wish to instruct Rau to refrain from doing so because of lack of knowledge in New Delhi concerning line-up of other delegates at Lake Success.
4. USUN has just learned of subsequent developments as follows:
5. Following SC meeting Jebb talked with Rau and ascertained Rau had received message from Bajpai referred to in paragraph (3) above. Rau nevertheless advised Jebb he intended to proceed to discuss his proposal with other members SC with view to possibly tabling a resolution at SC meeting Tuesday August 22.
6. Chauvel learned from Rau that resolution has been drafted and is in simplest possible form. Substance resolution, which has not yet been made available to USUN, merely provides for establishment of committee composed of six non-permanent members, requests committee to discuss all proposals put forward on Korean question, and instructs committee to report to SC.
[Page 607]Rau explained to Chauvel he wished to omit reference to prior SC resolutions in order to avoid a Soviet veto. Rau said he understood Washington and London had a “reserved point of view” and would probably abstain in a vote. Rau thought Malik might abstain if the resolution were vague enough and avoided reference to earlier SC resolutions.
7. Chauvel believes Tsiang is strongly in opposition and may vote against, thereby raising veto question. In talks with us up to this moment Tsiang has indicated he has not yet received final instructions from his government.
8. Rau has called a meeting of non-permanent members today. USUN will report results thereof as soon as possible. We are following matter very closely and will have further talks with Chauvel and Jebb during course of day.