795.00/8–1750
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
Telegram No. 95 of August 1st to USUN1 gives the text of a statement which Senator Austin should make in the Security Council in case Malik proposed the withdrawal of the UN forces concurrent with the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel. At the time this seemed to me a good statement, and it was cleared by a considerable number including Mr. Kennan and Mr. Butler for S/P. On rereading it in the light of the events which have transpired since [Page 594] and the present appreciation of the situation, it seems to me that we should consider a modification of it.2
It is true that the response stated in the telegram is not wholly negative in the sense that it poses three questions to the Soviet Union including acceptance of the General Assembly’s resolutions, free access of UNCOK to North Korea, and supervised elections. It seems to me as a result of various conversations around the Department recently that we should be ready to suggest a willingness to withdraw American troops provided a UN force composed of other contingents remained in Korea to assist the Korean Government to re-establish itself in the south and to assist UNCOK in conducting free elections. The withdrawal of American forces would be staged to coincide with their replacement by an adequate number of other forces. It is at least possible that for that kind of a mission Indian and Pakistani troops would be available. Obviously there are many complications, such as the command factor. What I suggest at this point is that the telegram of August 1st should be re-examined with a view to giving it somewhat more of an affirmative note than we gave it when it was written.
Not only with relation to the above situation but in general it seems to me of very pressing importance that the Department should arrive at a decision concerning the formulation of our program for the future of Korea. That matter will be discussed next week by the Senior Staff of the NSC, and it is important for the Department’s representative to have guidance. It seems to me it is also important that we should [Page 595] be able as soon as possible to make public our program for the future of Korea. It seems clear that we do not wish to remain in occupation. We do not wish on the other hand to have the Soviets in occupation or practical occupation even of the northern half. We wish to see the country united.
Could the following be taken as the core of our program?
- 1.
- A united, independent Korea.
- 2.
- This united Korea to remain at least for a time under United Nations auspices.
- 3.
- United Nations to supervise elections throughout Korea.
- 4.
- A United Nations force to remain within Korea for a brief period of time to assist in the establishment and maintenance of internal peace.
- 5.
- The United States will contribute troops to this United Nations force if requested by the Security Council or will gladly withdraw all of its troops and have the United Nations force constituted by troops of other countries.
I assume that a fundamental idea underlying our position is that we would be glad to extricate ourselves militarily from the Korean situation and that Korea does not have the strategic importance of, say Formosa, and therefore is free from the considerations which flow from those strategic considerations.
- Not printed.↩
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The thrust of the proposed statement for Ambassador Austin was contained in the following excerpts from telegram 95:
“… Our experience has … been broadened by the events of the past few weeks, and I submit that the [Soviet] proposal is a dishonest one. We know now that the North Korean regime is a murderous automaton. The representative of the USSR must know it too. He knows it was lavishly supplied with heavy weapons of destruction. He knows, too, that it has with every appearance of satisfaction launched a concerted, planned attack upon a nation and a people who are certified by a UN Commission to this Council as having offered no provocation save that of their weakness and their lack of preparation. Merely to replace this conscienceless instrument in its original position, ready for another run, is not a solution. It is not a basis on which the people of the Republic of Korea can be deprived of the shelter which they receive through the presence in their territory of UN forces.
“Accordingly, Mr. President, my Govt cannot accept the proposal made by the representative of the USSR. If we are to reach agreement here, something far more radical and stable will be required. The essential point in which 53 Members of the UN have agreed is that progress can be made toward a settlement of this problem only if the North Koreans should cease aggression and immediately evacuate the territory which they have seized in defiance of the UN. The future steps can then be taken to restore and maintain international peace and security in the area.
“As for these future steps, in contradistinction to the govt of the USSR my Govt considers that the future of Korea is not to be underwritten by one great power, but holds, with the SC and with the GA, that it is a matter for determination by the UN in consultation with the Korean people. My Govt considers that an essential element of any plan which may be adopted by the UN to determine Korea’s future shld be the elimination of the threat of renewed attack upon Koreans or upon the forces of the Members of the UN which are in the country pursuant to the action of this Council.” (795B.5/8–150)
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