795.00/8–1650
The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I am much concerned by the situation which we discussed before Cabinet meeting yesterday as outlined in my letter of August 14 on the bombing of Najin. You indicated to me that the action in question had been taken after prior approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself, and that the State Department should not be disturbed about the possible reactions.
As you will recall, the pertinent directive to General MacArthur was worked out in its final form at a meeting at the White House by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State Department and this final text was thereupon approved by the President, Secretary Acheson and yourself.1 That directive contained the clear statement [Page 589] that while bombing operations against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel were authorized, our planes engaged in the operations should stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. Najin is just 17 miles south of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers and its bombing does not, in the opinion of this Department, conform to the terms of the aforesaid directive.
We have a deep concern in this matter which in the view of this Department vitally affects the national security of the United States and our basic foreign policy objective to prevent the outbreak of a general war. I therefore feel that any modification of the above directive should be jointly considered with this Department for recommendation to or decision by the President.
The injunction to stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers in bombing operations in North Korea stemmed in our view from the extreme sensitivity of the Kremlin to any military action in this area which they consider to be of vital military importance to them and from the common State and Defense objective to avoid if possible direct Soviet participation in the conflict in Korea or elsewhere. It is the view of those in this Department most familiar with the Soviet Union and its policies that the bombing of Najin can only appear to the Soviet authorities as evidence of a deliberate decision to exploit the South Korean hostilities for the purpose of reducing Soviet strategic capabilities in the area. This belief on their part can only be strengthened by the article by Mr. Ansel Talbert in the New York Herald Tribune mentioned in my letter of August 14 and by similar statements appearing in the column of Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin in this morning’s New York Times. In our opinion, this action greatly increases the possibility of a Soviet military reentry into North Korea, and the possibility of placing strategic bombing planes nominally at North Korean disposal for operations against our forces or our bases in Japan. We also cannot exclude the possibility that this evidence, as it must appear to them, of a United States intent to damage their strategic interests under cover of the Korean war, even at the price of greater danger of serious complications, will affect their estimate of the possibility of avoiding major hostilities, of the likely timing of such hostilities, and of the relative advantages of a Soviet initiation of such hostilities as opposed to a waiting policy based on the continued hope of avoiding them altogether.
In the light of the foregoing, I consider it to be highly important that the Department of State be consulted in advance of any repetition of the bombing of Najin or any other place equally close to the Soviet or Manchurian frontiers.
Sincerely yours,