330/8–1550: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

283. For Hickerson, UNA.

1. Immediately following our telephone conversation, and before my staff had brought in the dispatch which I have promised to send you, I confirm the telephone statement to this effect:

I am not in favor of assenting to a resolution which would buy cessation of debate in the SC for the remainder of August at the price of turning over to a special committee under Article 28, consisting of non-permanent members of SC, responsibility of the SC regarding “complaint of aggression upon the ROK”.

I favor attempting to guide our colleagues on the SC by informal consultations toward a SC resolution establishing principles for a peaceful solution without any committee. This is a UN effort (not the allegation by India that it is a US effort).

I favor a constructive effort at pacific methods through the UN to achieve:

1.
Liberation of the Korean people from captivity;
2.
Restoration of freedom and opportunity to govern themselves, and enjoy security, throughout the whole peninsula;
3.
Arrest of aggression anywhere and everywhere (this being regarded as an aggression upon the UN and upon the world).

Details, such as you mention, could also be talked out informally:

1.
Entire peninsula;
2.
Democratic government guaranteed by UN;
3.
Demobilization;
4.
High-powered UN Commission;
5.
Election.

Please refer mytel 265, August 11, page 2, for possible points for consideration.

[Page 586]

2. Staff thinks this statement supplements my personal previous statement I agree.

1.
We feel that Rau’s proposal, including the method of its introduction, is very damaging to our interests and that we should make certain that it is not adopted.
2.
We are most anxious that the United States should avoid responsibility before the world for killing an Indian initiative identified with peace in Korea.
3.
It seems unlikely that the Russian delegate will accept this proposal. We doubt that the other delegations will be enthusiastic in support of it.
4.
Our suggested tactic, therefore, for the immediate future would be to avoid taking a definitely negative attitude toward Rau’s suggestion. Instead, we would propose to speak privately with the various delegations about the substance of what our peace aims in Korea should be and the importance of maintaining a solidarity among those members who are fighting together in Korea. We would hope to engender in the Security Council a substantive debate of these affirmative principles on the theory that the terms of reference of such a committee could not possibly be framed except in the light of consideration of these important principles. We would expect that by the time a number of friendly delegates had spelled out their own peace aims in public speeches in the SC, the uselessness and impracticability of Rau’s suggestion would become apparent to all.
Austin