795.00/8–1550
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Cabinet Meeting, Tuesday, August 15, 1950
The Cabinet meeting was quiet and nothing of concern to the Department was raised.
However, before the meeting of the Cabinet, Secretary Johnson took from his papers my letter regarding the bombing of Rashin, dated August 14, 1950. He stated that we should not be disturbed about the action taken; that it had been approved in advance by the joint Chiefs of Staff and the President; that there was a large chemical plant there in which munitions of war were being made for use in fighting, and that in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs it was essential to destroy it.1
I told him that our experts on Russia took a most serious view of this; that the Russians were undoubtedly now in the process of making important decisions; and that we were very concerned that such an action might precipitate the reoccupation of Korea down to the 38th Parallel or the introduction of the Chinese Communists into the war; that if that is the case, results of such action could not be overlooked. Secretary Johnson was adamant in his position and stated that, regardless of our view, it was essential to destroy this plant, and that they would go back time after time to destroy it. He seemed to think that as long as planes did not cross the Russian border the exact location of targets was of little significance. I explained to him that this was not the view of those who had had the most experience in dealing with the Russians, and I again expressed the hope that he would re-examine this whole matter and give more attention to the concern of the Department of State about the consequences of such actions in the proximity of the Russian border.
When I discussed this matter with the President yesterday he indicated some concern about it himself, but did not state that he had [Page 582] approved the action. I frankly doubt that he approved the action in advance, and therefore believe we should address another, and stronger, formal communication to the Secretary of Defense, stating in more detail the reasons for our concern and particularly requesting that consultations be held with the proper officials of the Department of State prior to making exceptions to the orders which have been issued by the President specifically directing that actions in the proximity of the Russian border be avoided.
- The Department of Defense has supplied information indicating that Secretary Johnson was in error regarding the nature of the target at Rashin, having apparently confused it with another location on the approved target list. See Secretary Johnson’s letter to the Secretary of State, August 21, 1950 (post, p. 613), in which he correctly identified the target as a petroleum storage plant.↩