795.00/8–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 15—8:56 a. m.]
393. 1. In view remarks made to me by Bajpai, Secretary General MEA on August 12 re GOI thinking in matter of peace moves (Embtel 376, August 12, paragraph 31) I took liberty of outlining to him during conversation August 14 eight numbered points made by Gross in his conversation on August 11 with Rau (Deptel 235, August 122). I explained background of conversation of Gross with Rau and told him that without instructions I was reporting these [Page 580] points to him because I thought it might be useful for him to know how some of our officials in Lake Success were thinking. I emphasized that I was not undertaking give fixed views of Department.
2. Bajpai said information was helpful. He would make no secret that India was still looking for possible avenues in direction of peace as was also UK. Acting UK High Commissioner had appointment with him in few minutes to exchange views re possible solution Korean problem.
3. Bajpai said he wished put question which was bothering GOI. Suppose it should become evident that UN Forces would either be driven out of Korea or be tied down in small sector for many months while US and other countries were preparing forces to invade country on appropriate scale. Would it be advantageous for cause of peace during this period of strain for SC to refuse to have any conversation or negotiations with North Koreans unless North Koreans would withdraw or agree unconditionally to withdraw? GOI considered that unfortunate unconditional surrender formula in World War II was partially responsible for present condition of world. Might it not be mistake for SC to adopt similar inflexible attitude at this time? He did not wish to be misunderstood; GOI was not planning to rush in with some suggestion which would embarrass those members UN opposing aggression. It had not as yet been able to determine what might or could be done. Nevertheless, it hoped that a formula would not be adopted at this time which would firmly close the door to discussion; with North Koreans to remain in undisturbed possession of Korea from six to eight months while forces were being mobilized to oust them might be more disastrous for cause of peace than for talks to take place. During those months Communists could eliminate all persons and groups who might have ability and energy to oppose them. If talks should take place they should, of course, be in certain framework in order that impression might not be obtained that determination UN was weakening in face military adverses [reverses?]. There could, of course, be no peace except on condition that North Korean forces be withdrawn and steps taken to ascertain real desires Korean people. He was merely thinking aloud.
4. I told Bajpai, although I appreciated his sharing of thoughts with me I could not reciprocate because my thinking had not as yet gone so far. We might pursue this matter again later.
5. Bajpai read excerpts from telegram which he had received over week-end from Rau. Latter reported that he had told Malik that he would vote against resolution inviting North Koreans to appear before SC. Malik had expressed regret at decision which seemed to him unfair and partial. Rau added he was in somewhat difficult position. [Page 581] Both groups were clearly anxious for India’s moral support and were treating him with so much courtesy and consideration that he sometimes found it unpleasant to take sides.
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Paragraph 3 of telegram 376 (not printed) read as follows:
“Although GOI policies re peace moves not formulated GOI thinking at present along following lines: ceasefire with understanding North Korean troops be withdrawn from ROK. In view unpopularity Rhee in ROK it might be better for Government ROK to be taken over by UN and eventually UN take over government all Korea in order for nationwide plebiscite. GOI would not be happy at idea of merely status quo being restored. Efforts should be made to set up for all Korea kind of government agreeable to Korean people.” (795.00/8–1250)
↩ - Not printed; but see telegram 265 from New York, received at 10:08 p. m. on August 11, p. 561.↩