795.00/8–1150
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations1
Subject: The Settlement of the Korean Question
| Participants: | Dr. Tsiang, SC Representative of China |
| Dr. Alvarez, SC Representative of Cuba | |
| Dr. Quevedo, SC Representative of Ecuador | |
| Fawzi Bey, SC Representative of Egypt | |
| Mr. Chauvel, SC Representative of France | |
| Sir B. N. Rau, SC Representative of India | |
| Mr. Sunde, SC Representative of Norway | |
| Sir G. Jebb, SC Representative of the U.K. | |
| Ambassador Gross, United States Mission | |
| Mr. James N. Hyde, United States Mission |
In the informal consultations among the Security Council members there has been some sentiment for stating now the basis on which the [Page 556] Korean case can be settled. This is on the theory that it is not enough to oppose the Russian peace plan by condemning the Soviet Union.
Specifically, at the consultation on August 9 Sir Benegal N. Rau read from a recent issue of the London Times its leading article. The substance of it was that the major powers could with advantage prepare and publish the proposition upon which they are agreed for Korean independence after a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops beyond the 38th parallel. Rau commented that this article had inspired him to suggest the consideration of this problem. He thought it could best be undertaken by a SC commission for the peaceful and honorable settlement of the Korean question. The commission would be made up of all the non-permanent members of the SC, and during its deliberations looking toward a formula the consideration of all other resolutions would be deferred. Rau commented that of course the proposals would be based upon the premise that North Korean troops must withdraw beyond the 38th parallel and that there be a cease-fire. Quevedo wanted to consider this idea further at a subsequent meeting.
It was agreed that this proposal be put aside for further consideration and that there be no discussion of it in the press.
At the end of the consultation with the nine SC members on August 10, Jebb detained Gross and read a paragraph or two of the speech he had prepared to be made in the Council on August 11. He stated that the speech had several “purple passages” condemnatory of Soviet tactics and policy, and he added that the Foreign Office had directed him to balance these passages with some constructive language. This language suggested that the time would come for a political settlement of this problem when the North Koreans had returned “whence they had come” and after a cease-fire. Gross commented that he was somewhat concerned about mention of a cease-fire at this stage. This had military implications because it might be that we would want to advance well beyond the 38th parallel and not have our hands tied in any way by a commitment made at such an early stage. In the light of this comment Jebb stated that he would at once call London and suggest that no mention of a cease-fire be made. Gross read the last paragraph of our instructions contained in the Department’s No. 95 of August 1, Control 1812, and pointed out that we were using more general language.2
- The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1390 and the date August 11, 1950.↩
- Telegram 95 not printed; the pertinent portion of the paragraph under reference read in part as follows: “… progress can be made toward a settlement of this problem only if the North Koreans should cease aggression and immediately evacuate the territory which they have seized in defiance of the UN. It is only thereafter that future steps can be taken to restore and maintain international peace and security in the area.” (795B.5/8–150)↩