795.00/8–850
Extracts of Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, With General MacArthur in Tokyo an August 6 and 8, 1950 1
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The reaction among the Japanese to our action in Korea was one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been aroused by “his” confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He could withdraw them all without danger of disorder in Japan.
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I had a 2½ hour talk with MacArthur in the morning;3 lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party, and then a further 2-hour talk from 5:30 to 7:30 in the afternoon.
[Page 543]On Tuesday morning,4 after my return from Korea, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.
The first 2½ hours included a military discussion at which Generals Ridgway and Norstad participated.5 General Almond also was present.
I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically, but largely by subjects.
Military (Korea). Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it.
I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, “absolutely none”. The President’s statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from Communist domination, and would be so recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.
MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the U.S.; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead.
(His military appraisal is dealt with in a separate memorandum, including the statement to the Joint Chiefs prepared by Ridgway, and signed by him, Norstad and myself.)
He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian [Page 544] officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.
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MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 30 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually, heavier artillery would be welcome, but the need is so great that he would take them with their small arms only. He feels the British should send a brigade from Hong Kong or Malaya, thinks it could be replaced from the United Kingdom. The French could send some forces from Indochina; a brigade from Pakistan and Turkey would be most welcome. Canada should send some troops. He was going to work on Menzies when he arrived the following week. He didn’t have a good word to say about the Siamese, although he recognized the value of Eastern troops. He wasn’t sure the Philippines could spare anything just now.
He has no doubts of the political outcome, once there is victory. Victory is a strong magnet in the East, and the Koreans want their freedom. When Syngman Rhee’s Government is reestablished in Seoul, the UN–supervised election can be held within two months, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-Communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-Communist Government when they are sure of no Russian or Communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-Communist movement in the East.
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[Here follows discussion of China and Formosa printed in volume VI, page 256.]
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The source text in the Department of States files, an unsigned typewritten document, bore the heading “Notes Dictated by Mr. Harriman on August 20 Concerning His Conversations With General MacArthur [Extracts]”. At the conclusion of the document, the following note was typed: [“Note: This copy (no carbons) was made from rough, largely unedited notes dictated by Mr. Harriman. Some liberties have consequently been taken with the format and the spelling of the original. The wording, however, is not changed, except that a few queries of clarifications have been inserted in brackets.]”
A fuller version of Mr. Harriman’s memorandum is printed in Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 349–353.
↩ - Ellipsis indicated in the source text.↩
- Ellipsis indicated in the source text.↩
- Of August 6.↩
- August 8.↩
- See supra. ↩
- Ellipsis indicated in the source text.↩
- Ellipsis indicated in the source text.↩