795.00/8–850
Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, United States Army
Conferees:
- Gen. MacArthur
- Mr. Harriman
- Gens. Norstad1
- Ridgway
- Almond
1. In a brilliant 2½ hour presentation, made with utmost earnestness, supported by every logical military argument of his rich experience, and delivered with all of his dramatic eloquence, General MacArthur stated his compelling need for additional combat ground forces by the following dead-lines:
15 Sept—3d Infantry Division (U.S.)
Rest of 1st Marine Division (U.S.)
15 Oct—2d Marine Division (U.S.)
2. Conclusions:
- a.
- Time works against us in the Korean situation.
- b.
- Early military victory is essential.
- c.
- Delay in achieving it increases the chance of direct military participation Chinese Communist or Soviet forces, or both.
- d.
- A maximum co-ordinated offensive effort of U.S. forces should be made at the earliest possible date that offers reasonable chance of decisive success.
- e.
- This effort should have as its objective the destruction of the main North Korean armed forces South Korea before the onset of next winter.
- f.
- The forces now scheduled to be operationally available in FECOM by 25 September are inadequate for the successful accomplishment of this mission.
- g.
- Decisive success—destruction of hostile main forces in South Korea—is reasonably attainable by early winter, if the offensive is launched by about 25 September, and if the forces now in or enroute to FECOM are augmented by the approximate equivalent of two U.S. infantry divisions and one U.S. airborne RCT.
- h.
- The diversion of these forces to this mission will still further seriously impair our mobilization base, and therefore entail acceptance of a substantial additional risk which the JCS must evaluate and proper authority decide.
- i.
- Once launched, this operation must be given every chance of success.
- j.
- To insure success, it must have reasonably adequate forces at the outset.
- k.
- The alternatives to furnishing the additional forces required, involve the certainty of a more difficult and costly operation later, of an incalculable loss of military prestige world-wide and consequently of political advantage, and the probability of greater non-battle casualties during a Korean winter, than of battle losses in the operation as planned.
- l.
- Present best intelligence estimates are that the Soviet will not intervene with armed forces during the next few months.
- m.
- The forces should be furnished by the dates indicated and the operation ordered executed as planned.
- n.
- Every effort should be made to secure the maximum of United Nations combat ground forces, particularly British, Canadian, Pakistani, Australian, Turkish, and perhaps French, and at the earliest possible date.
3. Concurrences:
Mr. Harriman [initialed] W.A.H.
Gen. Norstad [initialed] L.N.
Gen. Ridgway [initialed] M.B.R.
[Page 542][The following note in longhand:] Delivered to Mr. Harriman about 091145 Aug and returned by him to me by hand in Sec Louis Johnson’s office about noon same date. M.B.R.2
- Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Acting Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. Mr. Harriman on his visit to the Far East traveled in the company of Generals Ridgway and Norstad who were on a special mission. They returned to the United States after the discussions in Tokyo.↩
-
The following information is taken from Korean Conflict, based upon conversations held with Mr. Harriman by Messrs. Noble and Dougall of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, on March 2, 1951 and by Mr. Dougall on March 5, 1951:
“Immediately after his return to Washington, on August 9, Harriman reported to the President upon his conferences in Tokyo. The President requested the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give immediate consideration to General MacArthur’s proposals for a military offensive, and later in the morning Harriman conferred with Johnson, the Joint Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs.… The Joint Chiefs of Staff met at once to consider the military recommendations proposed by MacArthur as transmitted and concurred in by Ridgway, Norstad, and Harriman, and within twenty-four hours approval had been given to the plan discussed for an offensive in Korea.”
↩