795B.00/7–2050: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 21—6:53 a. m.]
159. 1. At Rajagopalacliari’s suggestion (new Minister without Portfolio) I had long talk with him early July 19 re Korean situation. He said he wished to talk to me before meeting of special Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs called by Nehru to consider replies to Prime Minister’s message to Stalin and Secretary of State.
2. Rajagopalachari initiated our substantive conversation by saying he supposed US Government and perhaps I were personally annoyed at approaches by Prime Minister at this time to Moscow and Washington, particularly at injection of Chinese representation SC into problem of Korean aggression. I replied “not at all”. I understood and I was confident my government understood motives which had prompted Nehru to send his messages to Washington and Moscow. We appreciated international and domestic position of Prime Minister and could see he must convince Indians and other nations looking to him for leadership that he was leaving no stone unturned in bringing about termination hostilities in Korea without weakening effectiveness of UN. It was unfortunate that Stalin, instead of responding to Nehru in like spirit of sincerity, had with some success, given twist to exchange of messages which had served purpose Soviet and Communist propaganda. We could not blame Nehru for Stalin’s trickiness.
3. At Rajagopalacliari’s request I explained to him at length developments in Korea and Far East and our attitude with respect thereto as I understood them. While I was pointing out to him necessity of our sending armed assistance to ROK even before SC had passed second resolution, he interrupted and said it was not necessary for me to enlarge on that point. It was clear that if US had failed to give immediate armed assistance to ROK, some free countries and many persons throughout world who were now making critical remarks re US policies would have been among first to criticize US for talking much and doing little. They would have said that although US for years had been stating its determination to resist aggression and that it was only power with forces close at hand sufficiently strong to stand up against the aggression, it had shown indecisiveness and hesitation until it was too late to be of any real assistance. There could be no question in his mind that US had no choice other than to send armed [Page 440] forces to Korea just as soon as SC had resolved that breach of peace had taken place. What concerned him was US attitude re Chinese representation in SC. Nehru claimed that if US had not prevented Communist China from being admitted into UN”, aggression in Korea would not have taken place.
4. I said I was frankly astonished at advancement such theory. I did not believe that it could be supported by evidence or logic. I could see no connection between Chinese representation in SC and attack on Korea, unless I should try to argue that Russia deliberately encouraged Communist China to conduct itself so that it would be refused admittance to SC thus giving Russia excuse not to be in SC at time aggression was being launched. I would not try, however, to support this thesis because I could not prove it. Aggression in Korea, however, not well planned and undoubtedly was merely one manifestation of aggressive designs on part international Communists which point in many directions. It seemed to me unfair to attempt to place blame for aggression on US because its attitude re Chinese representation instead of where it belongs—on international Communists. I added that although it must be clear to every intelligent, informed person that Korean aggression had been planned and directed by Russia with cooperation Communist China, we thus gain our desire not to put Russia and Communist China into position from which they could not well retreat had not [we?] publicly accused them of connection with this aggression.
5. Rajagopalachari asked if we had evidence that Russian or Chinese nationals were engaged in actual fighting. I replied that I could not answer this question but there was no doubt that strategy was being planned by Russian officers and that many of those engaged in fighting had been trained in the Soviet Union as well as in North Korea by Russian instructors. Planes, tanks, ammunition, et cetera, had been furnished by Russia. We on our part had refused to supply heavy tanks, et cetera, to ROK in pursuance our general policy not to supply other countries with weapons which might be considered to be of aggressive character. Result this policy had, of course, been disastrous to ROK but we still believed that policy was right because results had made it clear that while we had refrained from giving ROK equipment which would permit it to engage in aggression, Russia had been preparing Northern Korea for aggression.
6. Rajagopalachari said that it seemed to him that main difference of opinion between US and India at present related to Chinese representation. I said it was difficult for me understand how anyone could seriously believe that at time when American lives were being sacrificed in supporting UN opposition to aggression, US Government [Page 441] would be expected to reverse position which it had taken in past and support admission into SC of regime that was lauding aggressor and condemning US and UN for opposing aggression. How could US change its attitude in such circumstances particularly when Peiping regime continued demonstrate all those qualities which had contributed to original US decision not to vote for its admission into SC? Rajagopalachari said he could well understand US attitude and appreciated my frankness in discussing matter with him. He hoped to keep in close touch with me during days to come.