795b.5/7–1950
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Aid from UN Members in Support of the Operation in Korea.
The Department is operating on the policy of seeking to encourage in all possible ways the maximum direct participation by all UN members in support of the UN effort in Korea. An offer of direct assistance, in military or non-military form, should be considered more valuable than an expression of moral support.
Our stated position is that in the area of military assistance we welcome all offers of naval, air and ground units, particularly the latter. As a practical matter it is recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur have to determine what particular military units offered by other UN members can in fact be integrated into the military effort in Korea without creating problems greater than their military contribution.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached tentative decisions as to the acceptability from a military point of view of contributions of ground [Page 433] units from particular countries. They also are in process of reaching a decision with respect to certain other countries, (See Tab “A” attached).1
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reaching a negative decision on a particular country, presumably base the decision on one of two grounds. Either the army of a particular country is already committed under other defense arrangements which they deem it unwise to weaken, or the quality of the troops or difficulties related to logistic support, standardization of weapons, language barrier, etc., would render particular national units unsuitable or a positive hindrance.
We are operating on the assumption that in the case of countries in units from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed a positive interest, the Department should by all means at its disposal urge, through diplomatic channels, the government in question to make a specific offer of ground forces. We are doing so in the case of Pakistan and the UK.
In the event that countries, ground units of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have specifically decided could not be used, offer through UN to contribute ground units, the procedure established is to publicly welcome the offer and then for the appropriate officials in the Department of Defense to discuss with the military representatives of the offering country the terms of the offer in detail and in protraction, with a view not to turning down the offer but temporizing on a basis which will not affront the offering government.
It should be noted at this point that a case or cases may arise where the political importance of having even a token detachment accepted and landed in Korea will override the military disadvantages on which the Joint Chiefs have reached their decision. The procedure in such cases would be for the Secretary to write the Secretary of Defense, pointing out the political considerations which it is believed should control and requesting the Secretary of Defense to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider in the light of such considerations.
In general, it is not believed that the Department should actively press another government to offer ground or other units when it is known in advance that on the military basis an offer would be unacceptable, unless it has been determined in advance that political considerations should control.
Non-Military Assistance
Tab “B” attached,2 shows by types of commodities and services offers of non-military assistance already made or discussed with us by other governments. Most of these fall into the area of civilian relief rather [Page 434] than military supplies or services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given a preliminary indication that they are interested in offers of merchant shipping and in offers of harbor and airport facilities even though the latter may not be in the Korean area and may, in fact, never be availed of. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are considering what, if any, commodities (including medicines) would possess for them a military interest. The answer is expected to be completely negative. The Joint Chiefs have also been asked to decide what interest, if any, they would have in offers of transport, aircraft and hospital units. The problem presumably, in the case of commodities and medicines, becomes one of integrating such offers into a civilian relief program. This requires coordination with ECA, whose Korean staff has been placed under General MacArthur, to provide all possible economic support of the military operation.
Procedures
A general procedure for channeling and dealing with offers of assistance on both a military and non-military basis to the UN has been worked put with the Secretary-General of the UN and the Department of Defense (see Circular Telegram of July 14, 7:00 p. m. [8 a. m.], Control 4174, attached as Tab “C”).3 The basic procedure for integrating offers of food, medicine, etc. for civilian relief into the ECA program is in process of final agreement, the comments of General MacArthur, Ambassador Muccio and ECA Chief in Korea Bunce having already been sought on a preliminary proposal.
Decision to be Made
1. In the case of what, if any, countries whose ground units the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not welcome on military grounds does the Department wish to press for acceptance?
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