794A.00/7–1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador;
Secretary of State Acheson;
Assistant Secretary of State, George W. Perkins.

I asked Sir Oliver what he thought the reaction would be to the President’s message to Congress.1 He stated that he thought it would be taken the way we would like it to be taken. He also indicated that he sensed a growing feeling of realism in the messages that were coming through from London although there was nothing tangible to support this and attributed it partly to the return of General Slim to London from his trip to the East.2

Sir Oliver stated that he felt that the statement on Formosa should be of assistance. He said he was not sure as to the effect of leaving out all numbers in connection with the calling up of additional personnel. He also stated that he thought the letter to Nehru which we had just forwarded would be well received.3

Sir Oliver then showed me, without leaving copies, Stalin’s communication to Nehru,4 Nehru’s message to London on the Stalin message, and Attlee’s message to Nehru in reply, together with the comments of the U.K. High Commissioner in India on the situation. I told Sir Oliver that I thought Mr. Attlee’s message was admirable and most helpful.

Sir Oliver then said he had been asked to make the following remarks: The U.K. felt that an awkward situation had been created no matter how good the motives involved were. They had tried to make clear to Mr. Nehru the dangers arising from his course of action. There were other dangers which they wished to point out. India does not consider what they are suggesting as a bargain. Perhaps we must allow for this attitude on the part of the Indians as there is great danger in a cleavage between the East and West on the issue of seating Communist China in the UN and this could be disastrous. They were trying particularly hard to avoid direct collision between the U.S. and India. They felt that it would be best if nothing happened as a result of these communications, but they were not sure [Page 432] that that would be the outcome and felt that we should keep in close contact on the problem.

I indicated that I agreed and said that I thought it would be most unfortunate if it came up in the Security Council. If it had to come up at all it would be much better to have it come up in the General Assembly where the matter would be considered on a more leisurely basis, and a direct head-on collision would perhaps thereby be avoided.

I then asked Sir Oliver if he had heard of the French suggestions for consultations.5 He said that he had not heard of this from London but had been informed by Washington.

I told him that I thought the proposals were in good spirit and that we must, of course, be careful in setting up such consultations; we must always bear in mind the problems of communications.

I raised with him the question of how the U.S. could best approach the problem with the U.K. of the build-up of U.K. forces, always assuming that there was an established plan towards which we were working. There was not time to go deeply into this subject, and it was agreed that Sir Oliver would be kept in touch and informed.

Dean Acheson
  1. See supra.
  2. Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had recently returned from an extensive trip during June and July to the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Australasia, for defense discussions with Commonwealth Defense Ministers and Service Chiefs.
  3. See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, p. 412.
  4. See enclosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.
  5. See telegram 332 from Paris, received at 9:23 p. m. on July 18, p. 423.