795.00/7–1350: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13—11:32 a. m.]
111. Department pass New Delhi, London; repeated info New Delhi 10, London 41, In friendly conversation late afternoon 12 July at Indian Embassy our position, on matters contained mytels 83 and 84 July 10, as detailed in Deptel 28, July 11 was explained to Radhakrishnan who reacted along following line: (a) his endeavors would now cease as they were his own idea although approved by Nehru; (b) his sole approach to Foreign Minister had been on 1 July when he saw Zorin; (c) he responded favorably to my suggestion that British be informed of his efforts and without hesitation said he would undertake to advise British Ambassador promptly; (d) while accepting my views as conclusive for the present yet he expressed hope we would eventually recognize Communist China.
[Page 371]Our talk ranged over many aspects current situation in Far East and UN and I was able to hold him to point that North Korean aggression must first be stopped and without appeasement but he still insists we should recognize Peking Government saying this would open way to break between Mao and Kremlin. Throughout conversation I emphasized that we were not going to pay a “price” for the unprovoked North Korean aggression.
I feel he is very uneasy over Formosa and while realizing general nature threat Communist action in SEA and even wider including his own country, yet an idealistic streak pervades his thinking when urgent immediate problems arise. He takes considerable pride in his own recommendations to Nehru on 26 June which he feels contributed greatly to GOI action in SC. But I believe that we must face up to probability that GOI will not support us in matters concerning Formosa.
Radhakrishnan is currently informed on Pannikar’s reporting from Peking which is discounted somewhat by my colleague here. Still he feels there is serious risk Chinese will go all out against Formosa and is persuaded Soviets must honor assurances to Mao of military support.