795.00/7–1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

214. Eyes only for the Secretary from Douglas re Deptels 131,1 132 and 133, July 10. In response to question Deptel 133, what possible advantage can Bevin see in the return of USSR to its chair in UN and to seating of Chinese Communists under critical international situation and before:

(a)
Soviets have learned that aggression does not pay,
(b)
The Security of the Pacific has been restored, and
(c)
The forces that have invaded Republic of Korea have withdrawn to 38th parallel, he probably will reply that India is the only country, which can exert real influence on the attitude of the vast populations of the Far East; and that India is important in maintaining common view among the members of the Commonwealth. India does not approve of US action in regard to Formosa, and our attitude toward the seating of the Chinese Communists in the Security Council and toward the People’s Republic of China. Accordingly, the US should modify its view and its position.

In reply I should like to be able to ask Bevin if he will not join and support us in attempting to explain our policy and point of view and position clearly and adequately to the GOI. I might ask HMG to take the line which we believe to be true and which was so clearly presented in your message, that complete change in international environment from that which existed at Cairo and Potsdam, the repudiation of Soviet commitments to support the Chinese Nationalist Government, the clear and identifiable efforts of the Soviets to use communism as an instrument of aggression in China, Indonesia-China, Malay, Burma, Tibet, the Philippines, and Korea present situation of great danger to India herself. To seat Chinese communists in Security Council, to recognize the Communist regime in China, et cetera, all under Soviet coercion would aggravate immeasurably the very great threat to independent states in the Orient, to the freedom of India, indeed to peace of world. In President’s statement of June 27 in regard to Formosa, US was moved only by very serious desire to prevent area of warfare from including Formosa and to restore security of Pacific so that the status of Formosa can be determined either under provisions of Japanese peace settlement or by decision of UN. We might ask HMG to emphasize that unless Communist aggression in Asia is stopped, there can be no security whatsoever for India.

[Page 359]

In other words, may I not say to Mr. Bevin that we agree that India’s leadership is important among the teeming millions of the Far East. It is because her leadership is so important that we ask HMG to join us in pointing out grave danger in view presently held by GOI. It will not restore the security of the world for us to yield to the Indian position when it is our clear conviction that it will produce nothing but further acts of aggression. It is far preferable that India be persuaded that our line is the only line which can restore security, that India’s influence therefore be exercised among peoples of the Orient in the only direction which can insure peace than for us to yield to India’s views for the purely nebulous gain of temporarily aligning ourselves with her leadership in the Orient and thereby to produce situation out of which only further and possibly vaster extension of the area of warfare will emerge.

I will telephone you. You can give me the answer yes or no. If yes I will follow the line indicated in this cable. If no, I will refrain.2

Douglas
  1. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks conveyed to the Department of State in the note from the British Embassy dated July 7, p. 329.
  2. A manuscript note on the source text by Bean Rusk indicated that the Secretary replied “yes”.