330/7–1050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received July 10—7:57 p. m.]
40. Accompanied by Gross and Ross at 11 this morning, I attended meeting called by SYG Lie with SC president Sunde and Korean Ambassador Chang to discuss coordination offers of assistance for Korea. Cordier, Stabell, and secretary of Chang’s Embassy present.
Lie initiated discussion by reference to his responsibilities as SYG, indicating, however, that we had now reached stage where US had taken over responsibilities to act for UN. He said reason for calling meeting was that many delegates have been coming to him for advice about possible offers of assistance. He stressed importance maintaining UN aspect of whole operation. He said at this stage he was interested not only in votes but in tangible evidence of support of action in order to show aggressors that UN is behind ROK. He said delegates want to give to the UN not to the US nor to the ROK. He said he did not want to get UN secretariat involved in administration of anything; that he realized US must decide with ROK how to handle offers of assistance.
Lie stressed particularly two aspects of matter. First, current sufferings of Korean people and their need for short-term relief and long-term rehabilitation; second, the moral and political aspects of support in contrast with military aspects.
[Page 356]Lie ended his introductory statement by saying he wanted “help” to do a good job.
I told Lie we thought he was doing a fine job and emphasized that I thought present discussions must be exploratory until we know what is needed. I said we were dealing with essentially a military matter and that we must know what the unified command finds necessary. I said I thought we had not quite yet reached the time for decisions in this matter. Meanwhile, we felt the SYG should carry on as he has been as the chief administrative officer of the UN and representative, therefore, of the entire membership of UN. I said the machinery for dealing with the problem was being established in Washington and that I thought our present most important job was to provide smooth transmission through USUN.
I emphasized importance of security in dealing with strategic requirements.
Chang indicated general agreement with what I had said and added that he thought not only the commanding general but also the Korean Government should participate in determining needs. He said he was sure commanding general was in closest contact his government; he thought that he might, through his own channels, however, be helpful in determining Korean needs.
Appearing to agree generally with what I had said, Lie said he took a political view of the matter. He said the other side was very clever with their propaganda (e.g., international brigades from Iron Curtain countries) and that we must meet this propaganda politically. Emphasizing importance, as he saw it, of maintaining broad UN character of operation in defense of Korea, he said whole world must know that UN is behind suffering country.
He referred in passing to American political situation, saying that we must not lay ourselves open to charges that US is providing all the men and all the money to carry on Korean operation.
He said he thought we must get something definite and specific from others, at least on paper. He referred, for example, to availability of Norwegian and Swedish shipping paid for by those governments. He said that through material participation by other governments we would get and keep public of other countries on our side. In other words, he concluded, we must keep the snowball rolling and building up.
Sunde agreed with what I had said to the effect that our first task was to find out what was needed. He observed that, while he thought MacArthur would certainly know what he needs for military operations, “Washington” would know better what is available and from what sources, et cetera.
[Page 357]Cordier said he thought most important consideration was timing of requests, He agreed that first requirements were those of military urgency. At same time he felt we should not lose too much time in meeting ROK requests. He referred in this connection to his understanding that ROK already had a serious refugee problem. He said he thought we must at least begin to get supplies lined up and transport arranged to meet these needs as quickly as possible.
Chang agreed with what Cordier had said. He said he was very happy to learn of Thailand offer of rice. He said he would not hesitate a moment in accepting this offer, since military operations have come at worst time of year from viewpoint of Korean food supply. Medicines, he thought, were also urgently needed.
Chang said he thought there were three phases of requirements: first, strategic; second, relief; third, reconstruction. He said he thought first two should be dealt with in parallel.
Referring to propaganda problem, Chang said that, since his government had lost Seoul radio, it now had remaining only two very small transmitters. He said that facilities were urgently needed to give his people courage and hoped that more could be done very promptly in this regard.
No conclusions were reached at this discussion, there being general agreement that exchange of views had been helpful and that elements of problem were understood.
In course of meeting, Lie, Cordier, and Chang all spoke about weakness of UNCOK and necessity of strengthening it. Chang said that weakness of UNCOK was unfortunately well known to his people. Cordier pointed out that none of UNCOK members have had UN experience; that the commission seems to be virtually paralyzed and wholly lacking in leadership. He had just received indications that Salvadoran and Philippine representatives were going back home for instructions. The Australian (Jamieson) was described as a nice young man but inexperienced. Cordier said he thought that someone like Hasluck1 would be ideal to represent Australia. He thought that Col. Hodgson2 might be useful. Cordier has talked to Australians here and to Romulo about this problem. Lie expressed hope we could find some means of helping get commission strengthened. Lie, Cordier, and Chang all attached large importance to moral and political importance of UNCOK.
Lie expressed pleasure at report from Katzin of full cooperation by MacArthur headquarters.