Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–1050: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

top secret
niact

Washington, July 10, 1950—5 p. m.

182. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Request you deliver fol message to Mr. Bevin from the Sec:

“I was glad to receive through Sir Oliver Franks your views on the possible relationship of Formosa to the Korean matter and appreciate the frankness with which you presented them. I believe it will contribute to a full understanding between us if I am equally frank.

I consider it vital before dealing with the specific points raised in your message that we clearly understand certain fundamental aspects of the US position in this matter which to us are completely controlling:

1. We have faced squarely a calculated act of aggression and in so doing we are profoundly convinced that we are acting for the protection of the entire free world. The future peace of the world in our view hangs directly upon the success we expect to achieve in defeating this first overt act of aggression since the end of the war.

2. I must tell you that we have no intention of retreating from the position taken by the Pres in his statement of June 27. We are convinced that any sign of retreat from those positions would have disastrous consequences that might easily place in jeopardy the entire venture of resistance to aggression. We believe the tragic history of the 30’s demonstrates beyond any doubt that the sole hope of preserving the peace of the world is to halt before they spread initial acts of aggression of this character. We believe that the overwhelming support from the free nations of the world is precisely due to their recognition that the whole future of the free world is at stake. We value this support very greatly indeed and particularly appreciate the support which Great Britain is giving both in the battle and in the debate, but we think you should understand that while we will make every effort on our part to safeguard and preserve this world-wide support, the objective of all must be to do what has to be done to defeat the present aggression in Korea and to forestall its possible outbreak elsewhere in the Far East.

We recognize that the Soviets have placed themselves in a difficult position by their provocative and uncompromising public declarations but believe that, nevertheless, if over-riding factors dictate, they will find means of extricating themselves. Experience has shown that they can make sharp reversals even when publicly committed and we feel they have been careful in the present instance to leave the door open for such reversal. UN firmness and unity are most conducive to such a reversal, whereas any indication that we are prepared to pay a substantial price for termination of Soviet aggression in Korea might well encourage the Soviets to drag out the Korean war or even start similar ventures elsewhere.

There is no question but that a well-planned and unprovoked aggression is now in progress against the Rep of Korea. The deep resentment of the Amer people toward this cynical attack is multiplied because of the cruel strains upon our resources imposed by our attempt to meet it. Neither of us has any doubt but that this aggression was ordered by the Kremlin and is being actively directed by key Sov personnel in increasingly large numbers in Korea. Further, there is some evidence which shows Chi Communists may be participating in the fighting not only in Korea but in other parts of Asia, with obvious and serious implications for the special positions of the UK in Hong Kong and Malaya. We shall do what we can to prevent an extension of the Korean conflict, but as the fiction of no Sov or Chi involvement wears thin, questions will be raised of the gravest importance to us all.

If we are to prevent the recurrence of such conduct on the part of the Sov Union, it seems imperative that (a) the aggressor not be militarily successful and (b) the Soviets not be paid any price whatever for calling off an attack which they should never have started. The effect on the free world, on the UN and on the Soviets themselves would be disastrous if the Sov Union can now establish the proposition that aggression can be a profitable transaction. I am certain that neither the US nor the UK wish to contribute in any way to such a result.

For the above reasons it seems to us that the Korean matter must be dealt with by the UN and its Members on principle as a ease of aggression and that if the UN should permit the aggressor to inject other issues and extort concessions for desisting from unlawful conduct, the ability of the UN and the free world to prevent aggression would be totally lost.

For similar reasons, we do not believe it possible to accede to the Sov view that in some way the UN itself and the US in particular have made it impossible for the Sov Union to participate in the UN. This is sheer unadulterated blackmail on their part which has no support in the Charter or in reason or conscience. I am certain we both agree that we cannot repeatedly pay appeasement prices to get the Sov Union to take their seat in the UN nor permit them to establish by indirection a veto in organs of the UN where no veto was ever intended. You will recall that I spoke strongly about this point of coercion at our last meeting.¹ I did so and do so now because I am deeply convinced that the UN would suffer a severe reverse if it should bow to such tactics. There might be some temporary satisfaction in having all the seats filled again, but if at the price of submission, the satisfaction would be more than offset by the wrecking tactics of the Sov Union in the UN during the present crisis and by the disillusionment and contempt the peoples of the free world, certainly the people of the US, would feel toward the UN and those responsible for the surrender. The UN could not improve its position if it brought back the Russians on terms which would lose for it the support of the US.

The question of Chi representation is affected by the considerations suggested above and is greatly complicated by the gap between our respective policies toward Chi. In all frankness, I do not see any likelihood of harmonizing our policies toward Chi by any significant change in the basic attitudes on which US policy is founded. We have not recognized Peiping because (1) there was little indication that Peiping genuinely desired the establishment of normal relations with others, (2) the Peiping regime singled out US citizens and Amer interests for specially hostile treatment, (3) it has made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the international obligations of Chi, (4) it has recognized Ho Chih Minh and is actively interfering in the situation in Indo-China, (5) it is lending encouragement and support to Communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, (6) it is cooperating with a degree of Sov penetration of Chi which can only lead to de facto dismemberment in violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of Chi, respect for which has been recently reaffirmed by the UNGA, (7) its support by and control over Chi is still incomplete, and (8) now, the Peiping regime is openly defying the UN with respect to Korea, is mobilizing political support in Asia on behalf of the aggressors, and is apparently furnishing manpower for aggression in Asia.

For these reasons we have also opposed seating Chi Communists in the UN. This latter question in our view must be considered against the background of general policy and the situation in the Far East. There can be little doubt but that Communism, with Chi as one spearhead, has now embarked upon an assault against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, the Philippines and Malaya and with medium-range objectives in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Siam, India and Japan. We doubt that they will be deflected from their purpose by temporary accommodation, particularly if this accommodation is obtained by them at a time when their own conduct is aggressive and in violation of the Charter.

We do not believe that the question of the Chi UN seat should be dealt with until the aggression against Korea is resolved. We do not have a closed mind on the question of Chi representation in the UN, but we do feel strongly that the question should be taken up by the UN on its merits and dealt with as the UN decides it should deal with the question of competing claimant Govts for a UN seat. We do not believe the UN can deal with the matter on its merits under the coercion of (a) Communist aggression against Korea or (b) Russian absence, with Peiping seating as the price of return. If the coercion were removed, the UN could set about the matter of seating in a normal fashion, perhaps seating no Chi representative pending full consideration of the unprecedented problem of competing claimant Govts.

In regard to Formosa, there is a short-range mil problem and a longer-range political problem. On June 25–26 it became apparent that the attack in Korea was an all-out act of aggression against the Rep of Korea, set in motion by the Sov Union. It was not and still is not possible to say with certainty what Sov mil intentions are in the Far East and elsewhere. Mr. Attlee and the Pres have agreed on the need for further talks between us on this broader question raised by the events in Korea. We felt that it was essential from both a political and mil point of view to try to stabilize the situation with respect to the Far East until we could get a clearer picture of the drastically new situation created by Sov aggression in Korea and learn what other orders it had given to its lackeys in the area. As a simple matter of mil prudence, we took the mil precaution of trying to eliminate or reduce the risk of hostilities between Formosa and the mainland and the risk of Communist occupation and mil exploitation of this strategically located island. The step taken by the Pres on June 27 was mil in character and did not purport to deal with the many complicated political questions involved.

I believe it important that we consult with each other and with certain other Govts as soon as practicable about the political aspects of the Formosa problem. So far as our attitude is concerned, it is essentially very simple and clear. It has been made plain that a carefully planned aggression has occurred in the Far East, that it has been well mounted and most capably led. We cannot accept that forces which are hostile, aggressive and capable should seize Formosa and exploit it as an air and naval base against us. Further, in the present situation in the Far East we do not wish to see hostilities erupt between Formosa and the mainland as a major distrubance to the peace of the Pacific. We have, therefore, taken mil measures to neutralize Formosa.

We are aware of the commitments of Cairo and Potsdam² concerning Formosa but existing conditions were clearly not envisaged at the time they were made. Commitments made by the Sov Union in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of the National Govt of Chi) have been flouted. We think it one thing to turn Formosa over to the then Rep of Chi and quite another to turn it over either to the Sov Union or to a Peiping regime which at the least is encouraging aggression against its neighbors in open cooperation with Moscow.

I believe it fair to summarize our view by stating that we have not taken our recent action with any intention of taking possession of Formosa, we believe the ultimate fate of Formosa should be settled by peaceful means either in connection with a Jap peace settlement or by the UN, but we are not willing to see it go involuntarily to Peiping in the present state of affairs in Asia.

These are grave matters which I have discussed in the frankest terms because of their importance not only to our own relations but to the position of the free world as a whole in dealing with the vital issues thrown at us by the fact of aggression. I recognize the many difficulties of your position and have tried to set forth some of ours.

If I should close with an indication of the steps ahead as we see them it would be (1) as early and complete a liquidation of the Korean aggression as is militarily possible and in any case without concessions which would whet Sov appetites and bring on other aggressions elsewhere, (2) consideration by the UN of the Chi seating problem on its merits and out from under the duress and blackmail now being employed, and (3) a peaceful disposition of the Formosa problem in the Jap peace settlement or the UN without the employment of force or the outbreak of hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific.

I should be glad to have your further views at your earliest convenience.”

Acheson

1. Reference is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the united Kingdom, and the united States, in London, May 11–14, documentation on which is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
2. Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1475.