Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/7–150: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact

Belgrade, July 1, 1950—10 p. m.
[Received July 1—8:24 p. m.]

6. Tonight at Canadian reception Kardelj¹ made point seeking out Reams.² Mates,³ Prica, and Admiral Manola⁴ were in group. Kardelj began conversation by expressing hope that US would understand Yugoslavia’s position in SC on Korea. He continued that he wanted US to know that Yugoslavs fully understood and approved US action. He added conviction that US intervention would quickly restore situation in Korea and stated that the result would be greatest possible “blow for peace”. Kardelj went on to say that we should realize extent of prestige loss to Russians made it likely that Russians would attempt recoup elsewhere. He did not believe Russians were prepared to accept challenge in Korea.

Reams expressed appreciation for Kardelj’s statement of understanding and support.⁵

Department pass Moscow niact, repeated info Moscow 1.

Allen

1. Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Foreign Minister.
2. R. Borden Reams, Counselor of Embassy in Yugoslavia.
3. Leo Mates, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister.
4. Rear Adm. Srećko Manola, Chief of Staff, Naval Section of the Yugoslav General Staff.
5. Telegram 2, July 3, to Belgrade, not printed, expressed gratification at the Yugoslav indications of understanding and approval of the U.S. action on Korea and concluded: “We believe we shld be satisfied at this stage with benevolent neutrality on part Yugo and not press Yugo Govt for open manifestations of support.” (795.00/7–150)