795.00/8–2550
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations1
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | Mr. Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General |
| Mr. A. H. Feller, Legal Office of the Assistant Secretary-General | |
| Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission |
Cordier expressed disappointment that, as he understood, we were not in a position to make any move today in the Security Council in [Page 264] implementation of the Council’s decision. He indicated that he thought there were three problems:
The first involved the problem of coordination of offers of assistance and the organization of a channel of communication between Lake Success and Korea. I asked him how he thought this problem should be solved. He said that he had had many expressions of opinion from various government Representatives with whom he had spoken in the last two or three days and mentioned in particular Foreign Minister Pearson.2 The general consensus seemed to be that it is important that there should be some official machinery with the United Nations label which could coordinate these offers of military assistance and take any other action in implementation of the Council’s decision. He thought the simplest device would be a Security Council Committee made up of a number of the Members of the Security Council. This Committee could meet in private. It would be able to consider offers of assistance and make arrangements to decide whether offers could be accepted. It could establish a channel of communications via the United States Mission to MacArthur’s command, and another channel of communications direct to the Government of Korea through a Representative of Korea. It would be an excellent umbrella for all activities in this field and would have important public relations aspects. In this respect he mentioned that its Reports to the Security Council would be useful. The Committee would also be in a position to meet with Representatives of States who were not Members of the Security Council and who had offered aid. I told Cordier I would let him know as soon as we got any reactions.
As to the second point, Cordier said that there had been a number of expressions of opinion, both from Representatives and the Press, in support of the designation in some way of a United Nations Commander in Chief. The title was not important but there was a strong feeling on the part of many Delegations that there should be some acknowledgment of the fact that the combined forces were acting on behalf of the United Nations; since in fact most nations who had offered substantial contributions had already made private arrangements to place these units under General MacArthur’s command, it was obvious that the easiest device would be to arrange for General MacArthur to be given some title. He thought this could be done in several ways. It could be handled through appointment being made by the Security Council. It could be made by the Government of South Korea, or could be made, formally or informally, by the States who were contributing and later acknowledged or confirmed in some way by the Security Council. We discussed some of the difficulties. Cordier [Page 265] seemed to favor the third alternative. He thought it would be quite adequate. I told him we had no instructions on this point as yet but were still discussing the matter with the Department. I told him I would let him know as soon as we got any reaction.
The third point: the United Nations Flag. Cordier said that they considered the question of the combined forces flying the United Nations Flag. Feller came up and indicated he had already given us a copy of a legal memorandum.3 His view is that it would be entirely legal for this to be done. I told them that Ambassador Austin’s reaction had been that it is wrong to fly a flag of peace over troops. Feller pointed out that the philosophy behind the regulations which the Secretary-General had already approved was based on a different principle, namely, that the United Nations flag should fly over all United Nations activities of whatever nature. He pointed out that our purpose in the present crisis is peace and that the Charter itself contemplated that peace could best be served by enforcing collective security.
Cordier indicated that the Secretad-General was enthusiastic about the idea. He thought it would have excellent public-relations value and that something of this kind was badly needed. If the United States was willing to accept this suggestion, he was quite certain that the Secretary-General would be prepared to contact the other Members of the Security Council, as well as all nations whose forces were fighting under MacArthur’s command, to determine whether they would agree to this proposal. If the consensus is favorable, he thought the Secretary-General would himself be prepared to propose to the Security Council that this be done.
Cordier suggested it might be done by a short resolution authorizing the combined forces to fly the United Nations Flag. It was conceivable that it might be done by the Secretary-General on his own responsibility if he had determined in advance that the nations primarily involved were agreeable.
Cordier urged that we move as rapidly as possible on these questions. He though that this coming long weekend provided an excellent opportunity to give the matter careful thought and to come up with a good solution by next Wednesday.4 He said he would be available Monday for any consultations.
In the meantime I told Cordier that if he had any problems, we should be very glad to work closely with him and act as a channel of communication between his office and our authorities in Washington. I thought such a channel would serve for the moment.
[Page 266]Egyptian Position on Korea
Cordier and Lie indicated they were very much upset about the Egyptian position. Cordier thought Egypt’s position with the Membership of the United Nations had suffered terribly. He commented that it was particularly bad in the light of the situation at the time of Egypt’s election two years ago.5
- The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1269 and the date June 30, 1950.↩
- Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.↩
- Not printed.↩
- July 5, 1950.↩
- Egypt was elected to a seat on the Security Council in 1948; for related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, part 1, pp. 98 ff.↩