Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/6–2650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret

[Washington,] June 26, 1950.

Subject: Korean Situation

Participants:	The President
	Secretary Acheson	Secretary Pace
	Secretary Johnson	Secretary Finletter
	Mr. Matthews } State Dept Mr. Rusk Mr. Hickerson Mr. Jessup	General Bradley
		Admiral Sherman
		General Vandenberg
		General Collins
		(Secretary Matthews1 arrived just after meeting adjourned)

The above group met with the President at Blair House at 9:00 PM.²

General Vandenberg reported that the First Yak plane had been shot down.

The President remarked that he hoped that it was not the last.

General Vandenberg read the text of the orders which had been issued to our Air Forces calling on them to take “aggressive action” against any planes interfering with their mission or operating in a manner unfriendly to the South Korean forces. He indicated, however, that they had been avoiding combat where the direct carrying-out of their mission was not involved.

Mr. Acheson suggested that an all-out order be issued to the Navy and Air Force to waive all restrictions on their operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces, attacking tanks, guns, columns, etc., of the North Korean forces in order to give a chance to the South Koreans to reform.

The President said he approved this.

Mr. Pace inquired whether this meant action only south of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Acheson said this was correct. He was making no suggestion for any action across the line.

General Vandenberg asked whether this meant also that they should not fly over the line.

Mr. Acheson said they should not.

The President said this was correct; that no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel. He added “not yet”.

Mr. Pace said that care should be used to avoid hitting friendly forces.

General Collins agreed but suggested that the orders themselves should not put restrictions on the operation.

Mr. Acheson said that if it was considered useful the orders could add that the purpose which the orders would implement is to support South Korean forces in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council.

Mr. Acheson said that the second point he wished to bring up was that orders should be issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa.

The President said he agreed.

Mr. Acheson continued that at the same time the National Government of China should be told to desist from operations against the mainland and that the Seventh Fleet should be ordered to see that those operations would cease.

Mr. Acheson said his third point was an increase in the United States military forces in the Philippines and an acceleration of aid to the Philippines in order that we might have a firm base there.

The President said he agreed.

Mr. Acheson said his fourth point was that aid to Indochina should be stepped up and that a strong military mission should be sent.

He suggested that on all these matters if orders were issued tonight it would be desirable for the President to make a statement tomorrow. He handed the President a rough draft³ of the type of statement which might be issued.

The President said he would work on the statement tonight. The President continued that he wished consideration given to taking Formosa back as part of Japan and putting it under MacArthur’s Command.

Mr. Acheson said that he had considered this move but had felt that it should be reserved for later and should not be announced at this time. It required further study.

The President said that he had a letter³ from the Generalissimo about one month (?)⁴ ago to the effect that the Generalissimo might step out of the situation if that would help. He said this was a private letter and he had kept it secret. He said that we might want to proceed along those lines in order to get Chinese forces helping us. He thought that the Generalissimo might step out if MacArthur were put in.

Mr. Acheson said that the Generalissimo was unpredictable and that it was possible that he might resist and “throw the ball game”. He said that it might be well to do this later.

The President said that was alright. He himself thought that it was the next step.

Mr. Johnson said that the proposals made by the Secretary of State pleased him very much. He thought that if we hold the line as indicated that that was alright.

Mr. Acheson added in regard to the Formosan situation that he thought it undesirable that we should get mixed up in the question of the Chinese administration of the Island.

The President said that we were not going to give the Chinese “a nickel” for any purpose whatever. He said that all the money we had given them is now invested in United States real estate.

Mr. Johnson added or in banks in the Philippine Islands.

Admiral Sherman said that the Command of the Seventh Fleet could be either under Admiral Kadford at Pearl Harbor⁵ or under General MacArthur. He said that under the orders issued yesterday the Seventh Fleet had been ordered to proceed to Japan and placed under General MacArthur’s Command. He said that the orders in regard to Formosa would be issued from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur so to employ the forces allocated by Admiral Radford to General MacArthur.

No objection was raised to this statement.

Mr. Acheson said that the Security Council would meet tomorrow afternoon and that the Department had prepared a further resolution for adoption. Our reports were that we would get full support. He noted that even the Swedes were now supporting us.

Mr. Hickerson. read the draft of the Security Council resolution recommending that. UN members render such assistance as was needed to Korea to repel the attack.⁶

The President said that was right. He said we wanted everyone in on this, including Hong Kong.

General Bradley reported that British Air Marshal Tedder⁷ had come in to see him, was generally in accord with our taking the firm position, and gave General Bradley a full report of the forces which the British have in that area.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that it was possible the Russians would come to the Security Council meeting and cast a veto. In that case we would still take the position that we could act in support of the Charter.

The President said that was right. He rather wished they would veto. Ne said we needed to lay a base for our action in Formosa. He said that he would work on the draft of his statement tonight and would talk to the Defense and State Departments in the morning regarding the final text.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that it was Mr. Kennan’s estimate that Formosa would be the next likely spot for a Communist move.

Secretary Johnson reported that SCAP’s guess was that the next move would be on Iran. He thought there should be a check on this.

General Collins said that SCAP did not have as much global information as they have in Washington. He and Mr. Pace stated that they have asked for full reports all over the world in regard to any developments, particularly of Soviet preparations.

Secretary Johnson suggested to Mr. Acheson that it would be advisable to have some talks with the UK regarding possible action in Iran.

Mr. Acheson said he would talk with both the British and French.

Mr. Acheson asked Admiral Sherman whether he desired that any action should be taken regarding the utilization of the Sakishimas, south of Okinawa.

Admiral Sherman said he would leave this to General MacArthur.

Mr. Acheson said it would be better to put any necessary supporting air forces on these Islands than to try to put them on Formosa itself.

Mr. Pace inquired whether the State Department would inform Ambassador Muccio concerning the orders which were being given.

Mr. Acheson said from latest reports it would probably be impossible for us to contact Ambassador Muccio.

General Collins reported that they were in contact with Seoul through a ham radio operator there.

Mr. Pace said that they could pass a message to Ambassador Muccio through General MacArthur.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the President might wish to get in Senator Connally and other members of the Senate and House and tell them what had been decided.

The President said that he had a meeting scheduled for 10:00 tomorrow morning with the Big Four and that he would get in any others that the Secretary thought should be added. He suggested that Secretaries Acheson and Johnson should also be there.

Mr. Johnson suggested that the majority and minority members of the two Armed Services Committees be included.

After the discussion it was agreed to set the meeting for 11:30.

The President then read the following list of persons to be included in the meeting:

The Big Four (Lucas, Rayburn, McCormack—the Vice President will be out of town),⁸ Senators Connally, Wiley, George, Alexander Smith, Thomas of Utah, Tydings and Bridges; Congressmen Kee, Eaton, Vinson and Short.

Mr. Johnson referred again to the draft statement for the President, said that it was very forthright, that he liked it very much and that the Joint Chiefs would consider it during the evening and make any suggestions in the morning.

General Collins stated that the military situation in Korea was bad. It was impossible to say how much our air can do. The Korean Chief of Staff has no fight left in him.

Mr. Acheson stated that it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.

Mr. Johnson said that even if we lose Korea this action would save the situation. He said this action “suits me”. He then asked whether any of the military representatives had any objection to the course of action which had been outlined. There was no objection.

General Vandenberg, in response to a question from Mr. Finletter, said that he bet a tank would be knocked out before dark.

The President said he had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation. Now the situation is here and we must do what we can to meet it. He had been wondering about the mobilization of the National Guard and asked General Bradley if that was necessary now. If it was he must go to Congress and ask for funds. He was merely putting the subject on the table for discussion. He repeated we must do everything we can for the Korean situation—“for the United Nations”.

General Bradley said that if we commit our ground forces in Korea we cannot at the same time carry out our other commitments without mobilization. He wondered if it was better to wait now on the question of mobilization of the National Guard. He thought it would be preferable to wait a few days.

The President said he wished the Joint Chiefs to think about this and to let him know in a few days time. He said “I don’t want to go to war”.

General Collins stated that if we were going to commit ground forces in Korea we must mobilize.

Mr. Acheson suggested that we should hold mobilization in reserve.

Mr. Johnson said he hoped these steps already authorized will settle the Korean question.

The President said the next question would be the mobilization of the Fleet Reserve.

Admiral Sherman said there must be a degree of balance.

The President noted that there is some pretty good air in the National Guard. He had never been in favor of this and thought it should be like the Naval Reserve.

General Vandenberg said he was very glad to hear the President say this.

Admiral Sherman asked whether MacArthur could anchor the fleet in Formosan ports if necessary.

The President asked Mr. Acheson what he thought about this.

Mr. Acheson said that they should go ahead and do it.

Admiral Sherman said this would be the best procedure.

General Collins remarked that if we had had standing orders we could have stopped this. We must consider this problem for the future.

The President said he agreed.

Mr. Johnson said that if there was danger of a Russian veto in the Security Council the President’s statement should be put out before the Security Council meets tomorrow.

Mr. Acheson agreed.

1. Reference is to Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews.
2. In his account of the June 26 meeting, President Truman quoted from General MacArthur’s “latest message,” which stated that North Korean tanks were entering the suburbs of Seoul and that the South Koreans were unable to resist the North Korean offensive (Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume Two, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 337).
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. The parenthetical question mark is in the source text.
5. Adm. Arthur W. Radford was Commander in Chief, Pacific.
6. The resolution was introduced at the 474th meeting of the U.N. Security Council on June 27 as document S/1508/Rev. 1; see editorial note, p. 207.
7. R.A.F. Air Marshal Lord Tedder was Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington.
8. The Big Four referred to here, in addition to Vice President Alben W. Barkley, are Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, and House Majority Leader John McCormack.