320/12–1250: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priorty
[Received December 12—10:35 p. m.]
1459. 1. Basing myself on Depcirtel 256 December 9, 2 p. m., I outlined to Bajpai today what our thinking was as of December 9 re cease-fire, six-power resolution, possible additional resolution in GA in case Chinese Communists press attack below 38th parallel, etc I emphasized we had been asking for cessation hostilities or encouraging others initiate move for cease-fire. I stressed how important it was that all nations of free world give full support to six-power resolution at once in case cease-fire is not arranged and explained why in our opinion UN should brand Chinese Communists as aggressors in case they press their attack below 38th Parallel.
2. Bajpai said that if efforts for cease-fire should fail and six-power resolution should come before GA without amendments of character which would make it fully acceptable to India, India would probably not participate in voting. If resolution should be presented to UN branding Chinese Communists as aggressors following crossing of Chinese Communists into South Korea might possibly also not participate in voting. Much would depend upon flow of events between now and time such measures should come to vote, upon contents of resolution [Page 1535] and upon what UN might contemplate in form of sanctions, etc., following passage such resolution.
3. Bajpai said GOI received telegram from Panikkar December 11 giving Panikkar’s understanding of what present Communist Chinese attitude was re cease-fire and had telegraphed immediately substance Panikkar’s telegram to Rau in Lake Success. Panikkar seemed to be under impression that Communist China might be willing agree ceasefire and withdrawal Chinese forces from Korea provided: (a) North Koreans could remain in control area north 38th parallel during conversation following a cease-fire; (b) it was understood that all UN forces would withdraw from Korea following termination conversations subsequent to cease-fire; (c) conversations to cease fire would include not only question of Korea but that of Formosa and withdrawal US Fleet which had been protecting Formosa. I have perhaps made conditions upon which Panikkar thought Chinese Communists would insist for cease-fire somewhat more clear-cut than outlined to me by Bajpai. Nevertheless I believe I have stated correctly their substance. I asked Bajpai if Panikkar had not mentioned admittance into UN, recognition, or other Far East problems in their conditions and Bajpai replied in negative.
4. Bajpai said GOI had understood US would not agree to discussion such questions as Formosa and entry Communist Chinese into UN during conversations following cease-fire whereas Communist China continued insist that at least question Formosa be discussed. GOI therefore on December 10 had instructed Rau support no resolution for cease-fire in UN unless he had strong reason believe in advance such resolution would be agreeable both to US and to Communist China. GOI did not wish its delegation in Lake Success to place either US or Communist China in difficult position by presenting resolution for cease-fire containing terms which one of them could not accept. Bajpai asked that I particularly stress GOI did not wish to make any move in UN which might give appearance before world that US was primarily responsible for failure achievement cease-fire.
5. Bajpai also asked me inform my government that idea of 13 Asian powers getting together in effort effect cease-fire did not originate in Delhi and was acted upon without authorization from Delhi. GOI had however given subsequent approval. GOI had also given Rau free hand to maneuver for some kind cease-fire arrangement and to support such arrangement in form resolution provided he was sure in advance arrangement would be acceptable both to US and Communist China.