357.AD/12–950: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 9—10:26 p. m.]
Delga 401. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist conversations with Lie. Following is a report of my conversation with Lie at 5:30 this evening.
[Page 1495]Lie had seen Wu and other members of Peiping Delegation at Lake Success at 3:00 p. m. today. Lie began conversation with Wu by reading aloud wire service story that Rau had told press he had talked with Wu and believed Peiping Government desired peaceful settlement, and cessation of hostilities, and that Rau might have further word by Monday. Rau characterized statement as “inaccurate one” without elaborating.
Wu repeated he was for peace and was agreeable to a cease-fire. The world situation was prepared for a cease-fire including as it did the Truman–Attlee conference (as to which Wu’s comment was that he found the communiqué “very interesting”), the fact that the threat of the atom bomb was “removed a little”, the issuance of the 13 nations Asiatic appeal, and other factors.
Wu kept stressing interest, however, in US and UN formula for a cease-fire. He indicated doubts that Jebb and Rau were really indicating “views of UN and of US.”
Lie said he agreed it would be helpful if Wu could learn to know UN and US formula for cease-fire and would try to find out. If Lie thought direct contact with US was desirable, would Wu prefer this or would he prefer to pursue discussions through Lie. Wu answered he would prefer latter for time being.
Lie told me he had feeling that if I had been there, matter might have been advanced.
Lie refrained from asking Wu his own views as to cease-fire, and did not think it appropriate to do so at the moment for fear of crossing lines with Rau. Wu did not mention Chinese representation or Formosa.
Lie told Wu he thought that they would have “better chance” on these questions once they stopped fighting and once a peaceful settlement for Korea had been worked out.
Wu said if 6 power resolution were adopted, it would be “an obstruction to understanding re a cease-fire”. Lie replied “then we have very few days to settle the question. Next few days would be very decisive for China and Korea.” Lie has impression Wu under instructions to prevent adoption of 6 power resolution and action which might follow.
Wu commented that none of 13 signers of Asia declaration had soldiers in Korea, mentioning specially India. Wu repeated he wondered about views of countries with soldiers in Korea, “especially UK and the US.”
When Wu left, he told Lie he hoped “to see him again very soon.” Lie indicated to me a real anxiety to “get into the act.” He said he did not intend to mention to anyone else the substance of his talk [Page 1496] with Wu and that he hoped for advice from us, if possible on Sunday, re Lie’s next steps. I said I thought it important to avoid confusion of channels and above all to avoid being trapped by a situation in which Wu had Rau and Lie bidding against each other. I therefore suggested, and Lie agreed, that he would do nothing until we had further developments from Peiping to Rau. I would talk with Lie again at that time. [Gross.]