357.AD/12–950: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 9—9:55 p. m.]
Delga 400. From Gross. Re Chinese Communist conversations with Rau and Menon. Confirming Hickerson–Gross telecon. At 6:15 p. m., December 9, I was called by Menon (Indian delegate) who asked whether I had received Department reactions to my talk with Rau earlier today (reported Delga 399 December 9). I said I had not been in touch with Department since, but that I had promptly transmitted report of conversation. Menon said they were “very anxious” to have our views, indicating that they were seeing Wu within the half-hour.
I said that under those circumstances it might be helpful to repeat what I had already told Rau. Our position is as follows: We are prepared to consider a cease-fire proposal on its merits but we are not taking the initiative in proposing one nor encouraging anyone else to do so. Therefore, it is extremely important for Rau, if he decides to continue discussions with Wu, to understand and to make it clear to Wu that he is doing so on his own initiative. Further, we would not be prepared to consider any cease-fire proposal so made unless (1) it assured the security of UN forces and (2) it neither contained nor implied any political conditions or questions of any sort whatever.
Subject to all the foregoing, we would be prepared to receive and consider any comments of the Peking regime.
I asked Menon whether he could explain what Rau meant when he referred to “negotiations” in his talk with me this morning (Delga 399 December 9 will indicate vagueness of Rau’s response to my question in this regard). I said it was quite obvious that the word might mean different things, depending on the premises one had in mind. If it related to military aspects of a cease-fire, obviously, it was necessary to “negotiate” such questions as fixing a cease-fire line, possibly fixing a no-man’s land, arranging for movement of detached or isolated [Page 1493] units and for feeding and medical assistance for troops, etc., we were, of course, prepared to negotiate these matters, on a military level.
If “negotiation” referred to political questions, that was another matter.
At this point, Menon asked me if we would negotiate with the Peking Government on “Korean questions” after a cease-fire. I replied that if satisfactory cease-fire arrangements were accomplished subject to the conditions I had described, we would be prepared to discuss Korean questions in or through the UN.
Menon asked if this meant we would negotiate with the Peking government. I replied that, of course, the Peking regime would be involved in such discussions, but that it must be clear this does not imply any change in our opposition to seating the Chinese Communists in the UN. Menon said that he understood this. I added that in my opinion the question of procedures for negotiations on Korean questions would be a matter for determination after a cease-fire arrangement had been put into effect. I felt that otherwise we would be, in reality, now discussing a political question as a condition of a cease-fire. However, we accepted in principle the idea of negotiating regarding Korean questions in or through the UN, and subject at all times to the maintenance of UN principles regarding Korea.
Menon said Rau might also have had in mind discussions relating to Formosa. I said this was outside the scope of issues we were now prepared to say we would discuss. I reminded Menon of my prior comments to Rau concerning our view that the Formosa question must be dealt with separately from the Korean question. (I believed it desirable to take this extreme a position in the light of Rau’s proclivity to ride hard any horse he finds saddled for him).
Menon said Rau would call me back at 7:30 p. m.
Trygve Lie, in whose study I received Menon’s call, heard my conversation.
At 7:45 p. m., I read the foregoing to Rusk and just as I finished, Rau phoned me. Rau said he had not received any word from Panikkar and did not expect to talk with Wu until sometime tomorrow. Rau asked me whether I had received any reactions from the Department to our conversation earlier in the day. I told him that I had talked about this with Menon earlier this evening but would like to take advantage of the fact that Rau was on the phone to recapitulate. I then read to Rau the substance of the foregoing telegram and then, for the sake of emphasis, summarized the most important points, particularly stressing the importance of Rau making clear to Wu that Rau is acting entirely on his own initiative, as well as the conditions precedent to our consideration of any cease-fire proposal resulting from Rau’s initiative.
[Page 1494]Rau said he thought he had our position clearly in mind. He asked me whether we would object to a single resolution which would mention the cease-fire, provide for cease-fire arrangements, and provide for the discussion of the Korean question after cease-fire arrangements had been effected.
I replied that subject to everything I had just mentioned to him I thought this would be an acceptable type of resolution.
Rau promised to keep in close touch with me tomorrow. He concluded by saying that he understood that my reference to negotiations in or through the UN re Korea meant that the Chinese Communists “would be included in such discussions”. I confirmed this understanding.
Immediately following my conversation with Rau, I advised Rusk of the substance of the foregoing and said that since this might be the last clear chance to make any corrections in the position I had outlined to Rau, I would appreciate comments.
Rusk replied that his only comment related to what I had said to Menon regarding Formosa. Rusk pointed out that we were not taking an adamant position that we would not discuss Formosa as indicated by the fact that we had put the matter in the UN. I said that I understood this but that I thought it might be better at this stage to let the Chinese or Indians come back with something on this later than to suggest it ourselves, on the theory that we were dealing with Orientals who had only taken off the 6th veil. However, this is a point I will keep in mind in subsequent discussions. At the same time, I assume Department will wish me to avoid being drawn into a situation implying a commitment to discuss Formosa question at this stage in light of Gadel 162, December 5.1 [Gross.]
- The text of this telegram is printed in vol. vi, p. 589. It set forth the Department’s position in favor of postponing General Assembly discussion of the Formosa question until the 6th session of the General Assembly in view of the current urgent discussion of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea (320/12–550).↩