Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/10–2750

Memorandum of Conversation¹ by Colonel Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense

secret

[New York,] October 26–27, 1950.²

Subject: The Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants:	Mr. Malik, USSR Representative on Security Council
	Mr. Troyanovski, USSR translator
	Mr. Dulles
	Mr. Allison
	Colonel Babcock

1. Mr. Dulles opened the conversation by explaining that the United States attitude toward a treaty with Japan was based on the theory that the best way to assure Japan’s adherence to peaceful ways and her adherence to standards of good international conduct was to conclude with her a non-restrictive and liberal peace treaty. He explained that, in the view of the United States, we were faced with two alternatives: either to impose a harsh treaty which must be backed up by force over a long period of time, or to conclude a liberal peace. While we recognize that the second alternative offers no guarantee of attaining our objectives it seems to us to offer a better chance of success than the other course of action. He then handed Mr. Malik the Memorandum³ on the Japanese Peace Treaty which has been given to each of the nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission.

2. Mr. Dulles then pointed out (in connection with paragraph 3(c) of the memorandum dealing with territories) that it could be assumed that if the USSR were a party to the treaty, Japan would, by the treaty, cede South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union. As regards Formosa and the Pescadores, the United States feels it is appropriate for the United Nations to consider whether, and if so how, the purpose of the Cairo Declaration could be carried out consistently with the obligations of Article 73 of the UN Charter, which obligations have now been assumed by the nations which were allied against Japan. The United States proposal in this matter could be considered as a parallel to the action taken by the four major powers when they found that they were unable to agree in regard to the disposition of the Italian colonies and referred the problem to the United Nations.⁴

3. In reply, Mr. Malik stated that the Soviet Union had opposed the consideration of Formosa by the United Nations because the status of Formosa had been settled at Cairo and confirmed at Potsdam and that, therefore, the question of Formosa was an internal problem of China. He said that he failed to understand the “parallel” drawn between Formosa and the Italian colonies since in the case of the former there had been agreement during the war among the four major powers, whereas in the latter case there had been no such agreement.

4. Mr. Malik then pointed out that the memorandum provided for reference of the Formosa problem to the United Nations in the event that the four major powers failed to reach agreement within a year, but that the United States had failed to wait for the expiration of the suggested time period and already referred this matter to the United Nations.

5. Mr. Dulles said that our experience with the problem of the Italian colonies had led us to expect considerable delay before a solution in a matter of this kind could be reached by the United Nations. He also explained that the memorandum in question had been prepared on September 11th before the Formosan problem had been placed on the U.N. agenda, and if it had been prepared later, it might have been expressed somewhat differently, but that this memorandum in its present form had been handed to each of the other nations on the Far Eastern Commission and we felt that the Soviet Union should receive the same document without change.

6. Mr. Malik then asked for a fuller explanation of paragraph 4 of the memorandum which deals with security. Mr. Dulles explained that in the present troubled state of the world the United States felt that it would be unwise to have a Japan, prohibited by her constitution from rearming, in a totally defenseless state since the result might be detrimental to peace and security in the Pacific area. The United States, therefore, intended to retain in Japan sufficient strength to serve as a stabilizing force. He emphasized that the United States forces would not be of sufficient strength to constitute an offensive threat to the Soviet Union or any other Asiatic power.

7. Mr. Malik in reply merely stated that there was no difference between the United States proposal and the present situation since United States troops stationed in Japan after the treaty would be in effect the same as United States troops remaining in occupation.⁵

8. Mr. Malik then returned to the question of territories and said that since the Surrender Terms specified that the four main islands of Japan and “other small islands” as determined by the Allied Powers would remain under Japanese sovereignty he failed to understand the United States proposal with regard to a trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands since those islands were a part of the “other small islands’ referred to in the Terms of Surrender. There had been express agreement regarding the islands to be detached, i.e. Kuriles, Pescadores and Formosa. Mr. Dulles replied that our proposal was as set out in the memorandum.

9. Mr. Dulles said that it was our hope that the treaty would be signed by all the nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission but that if any failed to participate it was our intention to proceed anyway providing the Japanese were willing to negotiate a separate peace.

10. Mr. Malik evidently misunderstood the above statement and asked if the Japanese were to determine the procedure which would be adopted by the Allied Powers. Mr. Dulles said no, but that it was not our intention to coerce the Japanese into signing a treaty which would not be signed by all the nations on the Far Eastern Commission. He said that we had not yet made up our minds as to the procedure which should be adopted and that we would probably do that after we had gotten the reactions of the other nations to our initial proposals.

11. Mr. Malik asked if we had yet received any answers to our proposals and on being informed that we had not said that he too would have to wait until after he had given further consideration to our proposals.

12. Mr. Dulles then said that he hoped very much that we would be able to produce a treaty which the Soviet Union and the United States could both sign and that he felt that if the Soviet Union were really desirous of taking a step which would lead to a relaxation of the tensions between our two countries she would adopt a realistic view towards this treaty. We had been unable to agree on a treaty for Germany and Austria to date largely because each of the four powers was afraid that it would lose a position of strength in those areas which it now held. In Japan the Soviet Union had no such position and would lose nothing by adhering to the type of treaty suggested, and if it took a realistic attitude, it could make a real contribution towards the relaxation of tensions without sacrificing anything of importance.

13. Mr. Malik replied by saying that he understood Mr. Dulles but felt that the realistic approach should be mutual. Ever since the end of the war, United States military power had flowed in to areas while the war had left in a state of political or military vacuum until the Soviet Union was now surrounded by United States military bases. The United States had a base on Okinawa but the Soviet Union had none in the Caribbean. American propagandists incited their people constantly to a fear of the Soviet Union whereas there was, in fact, no intention on the Soviets’ part to attack the United States or do anything but live in peace and friendship. The United States, which was a believer in the “profit system” seemed, in its international relations, to be an exponent of more and more profits never satisfied with what it had attained.

14. Mr. Dulles said that, as regards American bases, sea and air power manifested themselves in a manner somewhat different from land power. He pointed out that if the cause of tension resulted from the natural expansion of two dynamic powers, we had probably attained a state of balance by now and there should be hope of a stabilization of the situation.

15. Mr. Dulles then said that he desired to make one more point. He felt that one of the causes of fear of the Soviet Union on the part of the United States was the fact that the former was using its great national power in support of a World-Wide Revolutionary idea that interfered in the internal affairs of other nations by force and other means. He felt that there were no serious problems between the Soviet Union as a nation and the United States as a nation and that neither had anything to fear from the other. He did feel, however, that we were justified in fearing the power of the Soviet Union in support of an international revolutionary movement.

16. Mr. Malik pointed out at great length that the Soviet Union had nothing but peaceful intentions and that Communism was not for export, but a doctrine for internal consumption only. At this point Mr. Dulles quoted, and Mr. Malik tried to explain, various passages from Stalin’s Problems of Leninism which seemed inconsistent with what Mr. Malik had said. Mr. Malik emphasized that the relations of the Soviet Union with its “friendly states” was on a basis of complete equality whereas the United States was forcing higher and higher taxes on the world by its insistence not only on its own rearmament but on the armament of most of the world.

17. Mr. Malik then asked if the “United States monopolies” would be willing to trade with the Soviet Union on the basis of a “fair profit” and not “excessive profits”. Mr. Dulles said “Yes.” Mr. Malik repeated the question and said: “This is very important”.

18. Mr. Malik concluded by saying that he wanted to emphasize that success in our endeavors could result only from a “realistic” approach on the part of both our countries.

1. In a memorandum of a conversation held with Mr. Malik on October 17, Mr. Dulles had stated: “Mr. Malik has told me that the Soviet Union would like to discuss with us the matter of a Japanese Peace Treaty and that he would like it understood that the initiative in arranging a talk now rests with us. I told Mr. Malik that we would be glad to talk shortly with him or Mr. Vishinsky or both and would doubtless be in touch with them in this connection within the next week or so.” (694.001/10–1750)
2. The conversation lasted from 10:30 p. m. to 12:30 a. m.
3. Of September 11, p. 1296.
4. For documentation regarding this decision, taken by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States and the Soviet Union in accordance with Annex xi of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 891 ff.

5. In an undated supplementary document, Mr. Dulles transcribed several purported direct quotations from this conversation. One of these read:

   “Mr. Malik: (With reference to Okinawa and U.S. garrisons in Japan) ‘It would seem that the U.S. proposed Japanese treaty would not change very much the position of the U.S. in Japan and its islands.’

   “Mr. Dulles: ‘No, it would not, at least at first.’”(694.001/10–2650)