Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/10–2650

Undated Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs¹

secret

[Washington ][, undated]

Answers to Questions Submitted by the Australian Government² Arising Out of the Statement of Principles Regarding a Japanese Treaty Prepared by the United States Government

1. “Parties.”³

(a) Would Nationalist China be a party to the Treaty?

The current preliminary discussions of a treaty are being conducted by the United States with the National Government of China. This follows from the fact that the National Government is the government which the United States recognizes and which continues to represent China on the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Whether the National Government or the Communist regime should be invited to sign the treaty for China is a question which the United States will wish to discuss with the Australian Government and other principally concerned governments.

(b) Would the United States proceed with a Treaty without the USSR?

This also is a matter upon which the United States will wish to obtain the views of other nations before arriving at a final position. The fact that the United States is again endeavoring to bring about a peace settlement with Japan without any indication that the USSR has altered the procedural views which caused the failure of the previous attempt stands in evidence, however, that the United States is prepared to proceed without the USSR if other interested nations are similarly minded.

(c) What procedures are envisaged for a peace conference?

It is not anticipated that firm procedural plans will be developed at least until the completion of the current informal discussions in New York. Conceivably the treaty negotiations might be conducted very largely through diplomatic discussions. The question of whether there will be a peace conference and, if so, when and where, has not yet been given more than the most preliminary consideration.

2. “United Nations.”

(a) Does the principle that “membership by Japan would be contemplated” imply a commitment on the part of the Allied Powers to sponsor or support Japan’s application for membership of the United Nations?

United States thinking has been that Japan would undertake in the treaty promptly to apply for membership in the United Nations and that the Allied and Associated Powers which are members of the United Nations would undertake to support its application.

3. “Territory.”

(a) More precise information concerning the disposition of former Japanese territories, e.g., the Paracel, Volcano and Marcus and Izu Islands, is requested.

It is thought that the islands of the Inland Sea, Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri, Rebun, Riishiri, Tsushima, Takeshima, the Goto Archipelago, the northernmost Ryukyus, and the Izus, all long recognized as Japanese, would be retained by Japan. The central and southern Ryukyus, the Bonins, including Rosario Island, the Volcanos, Parece Vela and Marcus would be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations with the United States as the administering authority. Because of the considerable population of the Ryukyus and the virtual certainty that strategic trusteeships would be vetoed by the Soviet Union, the United States would seek ordinary trusteeships for these islands. Japan would accept the United Nations Security Council action of April 2, 1947 extending the trusteeship system to the former Japanese Mandated Islands. The treaty would contain no reference to Pratas Reef and Island, over which China formally reasserted sovereignty in 1947, or to the Paracel Islands or Spratly Island, title to which has been disputed between France and China. While Japan also claimed Spratly Island before the war its claim to this uninhabited spot is not believed important enough to warrant mention in the treaty. The Japanese Government never claimed any territories in the Antarctic. It is not considered that Japan should be required in the treaty to renounce claims on behalf of Japan made by Japanese Antarctic expeditions.

4. “Security.”

(a) If this principle were included in the treaty would it commit all or any of the signatories to the treaty to guarantee Japan’s security?

No signatory nation would be committed under the treaty to guarantee Japan’s security. The United States and any other nations which maintained armed forces in Japan in the post-treaty period at Japan’s request would of course be committed in fact to employ those forces to the best of their ability, if need arose, for the defense of Japan.

(b) How precisely would the security principle be written into the treaty? For example, would detailed provisions for “continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. forces” [sic] be included in the treaty?

The treaty would establish the framework of Japanese-Allied cooperation for the peace and security of the Japan area. Provisions regarding the relationship of the security forces to the Japanese Government, sharing of costs and similar questions of the detailed implementation of the security arrangements would be contained in a supplementary bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan to come into effect simultaneously with the coming into effect of the treaty.

(c) What “other forces” are contemplated?⁴

The reference to “other forces” refers specifically to the possibility that other friendly FEC nations may be willing to station armed forces in Japan. Such forces would be under the overall direction of the commander of the U.S. forces.

(d) In view of past Japanese aggression, what provision would be made in the treaty for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Pacific areas as distinct from “the Japan area.”

The U.S. considers that the important military threat for the foreseeable future is not Japan, now that that country has been deprived of its empire, but the Soviet Union. It believes that the overriding security objective with respect to Japan is to ensure that it does not of its own choice or under Soviet pressure or attack fall under the control of the USSR and its industrial capacity and trained manpower become an instrument of Soviet aggression. To the extent that Japan may be considered a potential security threat in its own right, the U.S. forces retained in Japan after the treaty can be counted upon to restrain that threat. The U.S. will not remove those forces until alternative arrangements under the United Nations or otherwise have been established to provide effectively both for the security of Japan and security against a resurgence of Japanese aggression. In addition, the Australian Government is aware that the U.S. considers the security of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines among other Pacific nations essential to its own security, and would immediately come to the assistance of any of those nations should they be threatened by Japanese attack.

5. “Political and Commercial Arrangements.”

(a) Is it contemplated that most-favored-nation treatment would be reciprocal?

Yes. Japan would be permitted to withhold from any Allied and Associated Power the application of more favorable treatment than that Power, subject to the exceptions customarily included in its commercial agreements, was prepared to accord Japan in that respect.

6. “Claims.”

(a) In view of the use of the words “in general” in section 6(a), what types of Japanese property would not be retained by the Allied Powers?

The types of property not retained would be substantially the types exempted under paragraph 6 of Article 79 of the Italian Treaty.⁵ Examples are diplomatic and consular property, property of religious, charitable, cultural and educational institutions, and the property of Japanese nationals permitted to reside in the territory of one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

7. “Disputes.”

(a) What “other disputes” is it contemplated to refer for diplomatic settlement to the International Court of Justice?

It is contemplated that any dispute between an Allied and Associated Power and Japan concerning the interpretation or execution of the treaty, except disputes pertaining to security or claims matters, which is not settled through diplomatic channels would be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. Claims disputes would be settled by an Arbitral Tribunal whose members would be designated by the President of the International Court of Justice. Disputes between Japan and any government maintaining armed force in Japan concerning the interpretation or execution of the security provisions of the treaty would be settled by the governments concerned through diplomatic channels.

Supplementary Questions

(a) What is the United States view concerning the disposition of the Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan?

It is of course contemplated that the Far Eastern Commission, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the Allied Council for Japan would cease to act on the coming into force of the peace treaty. If it is possible at that time to secure the agreement of a majority of the representatives on the Far Eastern Commission, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China, to a decision that the Commission shall cease to function and the Office of the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council shall be dissolved, such a decision would be desirable. Presumably it will be possible to arrive at this decision if the four veto members of the FEC are parties to the treaty. If the agreement of the necessary Powers to such a decision cannot be obtained it is believed that the FEC, SCAP and the ACJ should simply be permitted to disappear after the treaty by common consent of the signatories.

(b) What is the United States view concerning the inclusion in the treaty of a Human Eights clause?

The United States is inclined to favor the inclusion of a human rights clause modelled on that in the Italian and Axis satellite Treaties. It considers, however, that the clause should be in the form of a declaration of intention rather than of an enforceable treaty commitment.

(c) What is the United States interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Renunciation of War)?

The United States respects this provision as an expression of the popular will in Japan embodied in Japan’s fundamental law. Interpretation of the provision as it bears on Japan’s right to defend itself from unprovoked attack, and to prepare for defense against attack, is a matter of Japanese concern under procedures set forth in the Constitution. Should the requisite majorities of the Diet and the people desire to amend the provision that too would lie within their power.

(d) What is the United States view regarding Japan’s continuing adherence to policy decisions adopted by the Far Eastern Commission, and to directives and orders issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers?

It is considered that the peace treaty will be the sole expression of Allied views binding on Japan after the treaty comes into effect. While it is to be hoped that Japan will continue to observe FEC decisions and SCAP directives of lasting value even though those decisions and directives are not specifically confirmed in the treaty, this would be a matter for the Japanese to decide.

1. Undated, but attached to a memorandum of October 26, not printed, from Mr. Fearey to Mr. Allison (694.001/10–2650).
2. It is not known when these questions were submitted. A copy of them, not printed, was found attached to Mr. Fearey’s memorandum of conversation, p. 1323. Evidence of when the present document was transmitted to Australian representatives has not been found in State Department files.
3. The questions are keyed to, and all quotations are taken from, the seven-point memorandum of September 11, p. 1296.

4. In the memorandum cited in footnote 1 above, Mr. Fearey said in part:

   “The most ticklish Australian question, though I am not sure they realized it, seems to me to be 4(c): ‘What “other force’s” are contemplated?’ As I understand it, we have considered that the “other forces” could be Japanese, and that one of the “satisfactory alternative security arrangements” which would permit us to withdraw our forces could be the existence of adequate Japanese defense forces. If Australia had asked what the ‘satisfactory alternative security arrangements’ (beside ‘UN assumption of effective responsibility’) which we have in mind are, we would probably have to tell them that this is one of the possibilities. As it is, I think the answer I have suggested is accurate and complete, with the inclusion of the word ‘specifically’ without going into the matter of possible Japanese forces. It may well be, however, that you and Mr. Dulles will wish to give the Australians our complete thinking on the matter, perhaps stating that it is our expectation that any Japanese defense force maintained in Japan after we withdraw out forces would be UN forces or would be integrated with other Pacific forces in the manner proposed for Germany.”

5. For text of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed at Paris, February 10, 1947, see TIAS 1648 or 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1245.