Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/8–2250

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret

[Washington,] August 22, 1950.

Mr. Jessup: The Secretary of Defense gave me the attached memorandum from the JCS. He has given a copy to the President.

He believes that this memorandum is entirely in accord with the second memorandum of General MacArthur,¹ a copy of which Mr. Dulles brought home. If there are differences in it, he will discuss them with us and is prepared to act himself to bring us into accord. Will you please read this at the earliest opportunity and talk with me tomorrow morning. I have not yet had a chance to read the paper carefully.

D[ean] A[cheson]

[Attachment]

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Washington, August 22, 1950.

Subject: Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the draft of prospective articles on “International Peace and Security” relating to a treaty with Japan, enclosed with your memorandum dated 8 August 1950.² They have formulated the following views on both the general question of a Japanese peace treaty and on the subject paper.

2. As an approach to the general question of a Japanese peace treaty and the future status of Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential to the security of the United States that control of Japan be denied to the USSR, and, as a corollary, that the security of a Western-oriented Japan, for the time being, be assumed by the United States. It is inevitable, however, that the time will come when Japan must resume its status as a sovereign state, able and willing to exercise all of the privileges and to assume all of the responsibilities thereof. In the light of the world situation existing today we must realistically concede that these rights must include that of self-defense. No sovereign state can forever avoid its responsibilities for its own security by relying upon an aura of good will among others when peaceful conditions are so seriously threatened as they are today.

3. A military vacuum is a short-lived anomaly. The United States is not in a position, either under United Nations auspices or unilaterally, to continue indefinitely to meet over-all United States security requirements and at the same time fill such a vacuum as would otherwise exist in a neutral and unarmed Japan. On the contrary, the availability to the United States, in the event of a global war, of the war potential of Japan would be very important to United States strategy, and probably to the bringing of a global war to an ultimately successful conclusion. Equally important is the requirement, in the event of war, for the denial to the USSR or its allies, of the war potential of Japan.

4. In view of the factors set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The necessity of a Japan eventually adequately rearmed for effective self-defense must be faced;

b. All measures undertaken by the United States toward Japan should be interim steps leading to a rearmed and friendly sovereign Japan; and

c. If global war eventuates, the war potential of Japan should be available to the United States.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the present potentially dangerous security situation of Japan, owing primarily to the reduction in occupation forces below safe limits. Recent events in Korea have caused concern among the Japanese people over their security. The people are aware of the threat of communism; nevertheless, they apparently desire an early peace treaty. In this connection certain of their leaders have publicly recognized the need that Japan provide at least a measure of its own protection. In the light of the unstable situation in the Far East in general, the Western Powers would be seriously embarrassed if the USSR in the near future forced the issue of a peace conference with Japan or negotiated a separate peace at a time when the Western Powers were not prepared to accept the possible results of such action.

6. In the light of the present world situation and of the portentous events of the past two months, particularly in the Far East and in the United Nations, and in view of the insecurity of the United States military position in the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff withdraw their objection to the conclusions of a peace treaty with Japan without the USSR and the Chinese Communists as party signators to the document. In connection with the foregoing, it should be noted that under the terms of the treaty between the government of the USSR and the Central Peoples’ Government of the Chinese Peoples’ Republic,³ as made public on 15 February 1950, the parties agreed to undertake “jointly all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent any repetition of aggression and violation of peace. …”⁴ against a “state which directly or indirectly would unite with Japan in acts of aggression. …” The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that this provision of the treaty might legally be invoked against the United States were a peace treaty with Japan to be concluded without the USSR and the Chinese Communist government as party signators. On the other hand, the USSR has demonstrated that its decisions are based upon political expediency and military capabilities. The USSR has evidenced little regard for prior commitments, and has used legalistic justification primarily for argument for the benefit of the USSR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize that some risks are implied in the terms of the treaty between the USSR and the Chinese Peoples’ Republic but consider that such risks will be minimized if the Japanese treaty is not ratified until after favorable resolution of the present United States military involvement in Korea.

7. In point of time the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the evolution of Japan should be viewed generally as follows:

a. Distant future. The outline of the world situation in the distant future is clouded with uncertainty. A prerequisite to world peace and security will be the resolution of the present conflict between the United States and the USSR. Although the favorable resolution of the present conflict is one which must be considered to be within the capabilities of the free world, the United Nations has not demonstrated potentialities of becoming adequately effective on a world-wide scale. Indeed, the United Nations, as now constituted, is not intended to be capable of acting as a guarantor of peace and security in the face of a major threat. As has been pointed out above, neither can the United States forever guarantee Japan’s security, loss of which might otherwise result from such a major threat. In the distant future, therefore, Japan must be expected to join the family of sovereign nations as an independent state with attendant privileges and responsibilities, including those of self-defense.

b. Intermediate and foreseeable future. The intermediate and foreseeable future holds promise of a peace treaty for Japan embodying, under the Potsdam Declaration, some form of security reservation for the duration of such “irresponsible militarism” in the world as would be a threat to “peace, security and justice.” From the United States security point of view, such a security reservation must provide that initially Japan will be garrisoned by forces acceptable to the United States and under a United States military command. These garrisons are essential if Japan is to be denied to the USSR. As the exercise of the sovereignty of the Japanese government increases, Japanese security forces should be gradually increased and appropriately armed in anticipation of the assumption by the Japanese government of the full burden of its own security and defense. As effective increases are made, the garrison forces under the United States military commander should be gradually phased out in accordance with the world situation existing at the time. If global war eventuates during the intermediate and foreseeable future, the war potential of Japan should be available to the United States.

c. Immediate future. In view of the present situation in the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, at least for the immediate future, the existing arrangement of a Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), together with the controls exercised by him, and the military occupation must be continued. If political considerations are compelling, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, could accept the initiation of negotiations leading toward a Japanese peace treaty, provided that SCAP and his authority continue until the treaty comes into effect, and provided further that the negotiations are not brought to a conclusion until after the favorable outcome of United States involvement in Korea. In any event, if global war should eventuate, the war potential of Japan should be available to the United States.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, from the military point of view, that security requirements of the United States dictate the following with respect to any Japanese peace treaty:

a. It must not become effective until after favorable resolution of the present United States military situation in Korea;

b. It must assure that Japan is denied to the USSR;

c. It must provide that, initially, Japan will be garrisoned by forces acceptable to the United States under a United States military command;

d. It must provide that foreign forces unacceptable to the United States not be permitted in any of the Japanese islands to the southward of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands;

e. It must provide that the United States will eventually withdraw its garrison forces, the manner and method of phasing to be determined in accordance with United States estimates both of the nature and extent of threat to the peace and security of Japan and to the free world existing at the time, and of the extent to which Japan is able to assume the burden of defense against that threat.

f. It must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense in case of external attack, and to possess the means to exercise that right.

g. Its terms must provide that the garrison forces not be restricted within limited base areas, and that the individuals thereof enjoy the same rights of free passage in Japan, and bear the same responsibilities as to law and order there, as they do in the United States. In this connection, Japan in the post-treaty period should be fully responsible for its own internal affairs, and should not be expected to pay the costs of the garrison.

h. It must not disturb the United States strategic trusteeship over the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands; and,

i. Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan.

9. Specific comments addressed to the draft of the prospective articles of “International Peace and Security,” prepared in the Department of State and forwarded with your memorandum, are as follows:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the security interests of the United States are not adequately safeguarded therein. In this connection, the draft articles do not meet the minimum security requirements of a treaty as set forth in paragraph 8 above.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider unsound any formula which seeks to rest United States security interests on the United Nations alone. While recognizing the importance of the continued existence and the United States support of the United Nations, and while wholly supporting its aims and objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel strongly that the United Nations now and in the foreseeable future must, under no circumstances, be the sole instrumentality for any of the essential security interests of the United States.

For the above reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard as unacceptable the draft of prospective articles of “International Peace and Security,” which was prepared by the Department of State.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the Secretary of State of the substance of this memorandum as representing the minimum requirements to provide adequate security to the United States in a treaty with Japan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Presumably that of June 23, p. 1227.
2. Memorandum not printed. The mentioned draft security articles are those enclosed with Mr. Acheson’s letter of August 1 to Mr. Johnson, not printed; see footnote 1 to Mr. Dulles’ memorandum of August 3, p. 1264. (Information obtained from the Department of Defense.)
3. For the text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow February 14, 1950, see 226 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 12.
4. Omissions in the source text.