694.001/8–2150
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
Your memorandum of August 151 about the short form of the Japanese Peace Treaty which you had drawn up makes it necessary for me to put forward my views at somewhat greater length.
[Page 1277]1. I am not sure that I am full conversant with the framework of governmental decisions and assumption within which this draft was formulated. If the question is: whether in general I approve of this type of treaty, as part of a basic policy toward Far Eastern countries, there would be a great deal to say which I think would go far beyond what you had in mind wth your inquiry. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as accepted that we must have a treaty with Japan allowing for the continued presence in that country of American armed forces, coupled with their freedom to move anywhere in Japan and to make use of Japanese facilities at the will of the United States Commander, and that these obligations must be anchored in the peace treaty itself, then, while I have misgivings about the success of such a general policy, I think that the draft of the key provisions, namely those dealing with the stationing of forces in Japan, is as good as any I could devise, and I have no suggestions for improvement.
2. I would, however, even on this assumption, question paragraph 5. dealing with the future status of Formosa, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. As drafted, this paragraph seems to make it inevitable that within a year after entry into effect of the treaty the disposal of these territories must become a bone of contention in the Assembly of the United Nations, and one of such a nature that any agreement on it in that body, except by a majority averse to the Soviet Union, is hardly thinkable. Since I do not approve of the policy of trying to use the United Nations Assembly to alter power relationships in the world in present circumstances, I do not feel that this course would be really desirable. It seems to me that it would be better to restrict ourselves here to a formula under which Japan would simply reiterate, as part of the peace treaty, her agreement that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”
This would leave the Japanese with no responsibility for the disposal of these territories farther afield; and that would probably be desirable in more than one respect.
3. With respect to property rights, I am not informed as to the present status of allied property in Japan. However, on May 26, 1948, I made the following recommendation to the Secretary of State:
“SCAP should be advised to expedite the restoration or final disposal of property of United Nations members and their nationals in such a way that the process will be substantially completed by July 1, 1949. It should be the objective of United States policy to have all property matters straightened out as soon as possible and certainly well in advance of a treaty of peace in order that they may not hamper treaty negotiations.”2
I still consider that it would be preferable to instruct General Mac-Arthur to see to it that all property matters are liquidated by the time the peace treaty enters into effect and have the peace treaty clause merely register that completed fact.
4. Aside from these comments, I highly approve of this brief form of treaty, and consider it definitely preferable to the longer and more detailed type of draft.
- In it Mr. Dulles had said: “Referring to my memorandum of August 7, 1950 with reference to a short form Japanese Peace Treaty, I understand that such comments as you wish to make were expressed to me orally and that you are in general agreement.” (694.00/8–2150) With the memorandum of August 7, not printed, Mr. Dulles had enclosed a copy of the treaty draft of August 7, p. 1267.↩
- The quotation is of paragraph 7, section IV, P/PS 28/2, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 775.↩