694.001/7–2650
Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard)1 to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Japanese Security Clauses
Because I am responsible to you in my work on the Japanese security clauses, I feel that I should give you a frank statement of my views formed over the past several months.
Following your departure from the meeting in Mr. Dulles’ office yesterday afternoon, Mr. Dulles inquired whether the working group [Page 1258] present at the meeting regarded as latest draft of the security clauses as ready for presentation to the Secretary. I said that I was one of those who held the view that the security arrangement should be based on an agreement with Japan rather than on the unilateral determination by the United States of the assistance, facilities, and rights of passage which Japan should furnish. I added, however, that this point had been thoroughly discussed and there was no need to discuss it further since Mr. Dulles believed that any such modification of the present draft must await clearance of the first hurdle, the Pentagon. I also mentioned your suggestion that the security clauses be incorporated in a separate agreement in order that countries such as India might be enabled to sign the main treaty and be in a position not to have to express opposition to the separate security arrangement into which Japan would enter voluntarily. Mr. Dulles replied that he thought the security clauses should be an integral part of the treaty, that this suggestion would involve an important change, and that since this was a problem concerning Nehru we could defer consideration of it until after we had cleared the Pentagon hurdle.
Accordingly, if the Secretary approves the present draft,2 the security clauses will go to the Pentagon in a form which I regard as seriously deficient from the political standpoint. With due allowances for tactical considerations we do not wish to adopt a position on principle from which it may be embarrassing later to have to withdraw. The present draft appears to me to seek to achieve the military but not the political objectives of the United States in respect of Japan. It appears to favor the conclusion of a peace treaty per se regardless of the political consequences of the military blank cheek we ask of Japan as its price, notwithstanding the general consensus to the contrary that a peace treaty should be an integral part of our over-all political policy toward Japan and the Far East. Its outstanding virtue is said to be that it is a saleable product. Personally I have difficulty in making myself believe that it would be acceptable to General Mac-Arthur because it is so contrary to his previously expressed views regarding the necessity of continuing Japanese consent. However, I was not a party to the conversations with him.
I believe that the security arrangement should be squarely based on an agreement with Japan. Such an agreement might well include a provision to the effect that inasmuch as the United States is assuming a considerable responsibility in terms of American men and resources, Japan would accept the judgment of the United States as to what was necessary in time of emergency or in circumstances which the United States regarded as giving security considerations overriding importance. It is not sufficient to draw upon many fine principles [Page 1259] about international peace and security while constructing an unqualified freedom of decision for the United States.
The mutuality of the agreement underlying the security arrangement would be greatly reenforced by a request from Japan for such an arrangement. It is not sufficient merely to have the phrase “Japan requests” buried in the midst of a treaty. The request should be of a formal and unmistakable character. If conditions in Japan are such as to make such a request unsound from the domestic political standpoint then the time is not yet ripe for such a security arrangement. The mutuality of the agreement would be further reenforced if the arrangement were contained in a separate agreement in order that it would not appear to have been imposed upon Japan as a part of the treaty. This consideration far outweighs the illusion that by being ran integral part of the treaty the security arrangement achieves wider international backing.
Features such as these can make the difference between a successful and a heavy-handed diplomacy, between an agreement that will stick and one that will be a source of increasing irritation and an exposed target for hostile propaganda.
If the security arrangement cannot be based on agreement, then it seems to me that the political prerequisites for a political solution of the security problem are not yet present. Under such circumstances the preferable course of action is for the United States to obtain the agreement of friendly powers and Japan to the establishment through a formal international instrument or otherwise of the conditions of a de facto peace while continuing to maintain our forces in Japan.