Subject: Background paper on Japan.
There is attached the first of several background papers on various
aspects of United States policy toward Japan which this office has in
preparation. It is believed that this particular paper will be of
special interest to you in connection with your consideration of matters
affecting a possible Japanese peace treaty.
[Attachment]
Japan’s Participation in International
Relationships
1.
FEC Policy
The FEC, in the Basic Post-Surrender
Policy for Japan, June 19, 1947, agreed: “To help the people of
Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large to
find means whereby they may develop within the framework of a
democratic society an intercourse among themselves and with other
countries along economic and cultural lines that will enable them to
satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring
them into permanently peaceful relationship with all nations.” The
Commission also agreed in this policy decision that one of the
ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the
post-surrender period for Japan should conform, was: “To bring about
the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful
government which will carry out its international responsibilities,
respect the rights of other states and support the objectives of the
United Nations.”1
2. U.S. Policy
The U.S. Government has taken the position that SCAP, as the sole executive authority
for the Allied Powers in Japan and in accordance with the principles
set forth in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, has legal
authority, as well as the obligation, to permit Japan to participate
in international relationships. On a broad policy basis [Page 1183] it was believed when the position
was developed in the spring of 1949, that the situation in Japan
required more than emphasis on internal reform and economic
stabilization; that through participation in international
relationships the Japanese would acquire direct experience and
knowledge of democratic institutions abroad; and that such
participation would go far to restore to the Japanese a measure of
self-confidence and a renewed sense of responsibility.
3. Development of This Policy
A number of the FEC member
governments objected to this position and took the view that pending
the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, the FEC, and not SCAP, was the authority to regulate Japan’s
participation in international relationships. On April 21, 1949, the
U.S.—without prejudice to its basic position that SCAP already has the authority to
permit Japan to participate in international relationships, but with
a view to obtaining the leadership of the other member governments
of the FEC in encouraging such
participation by Japan—introduced a proposal to the FEC which provided that “SCAP, subject to his discretion and
continued control, should permit Japan to participate with other
nations or groups of nations in such international relations,
conventions, meetings, consular arrangements or other bilateral or
multilateral accords as Japan may be invited to enter into, accede
to, attend or participate in and as SCAP shall consider to be in the interests of the
occupation.”2
In the course of the discussions on this subject in the FEC3 this proposal was broken down into two
parts. One provided that SCAP,
subject to his discretion and continued control, should permit Japan
to participate with other nations or groups of nations in such
international agreements, conventions and conferences of a technical
character as Japan may be invited to enter into, accede to, or
attend and as the Supreme Commander shall consider to be in the
interests of the occupation. The other provided that the Japanese
Government may, with the approval of SCAP, appoint agents in any country willing to receive
them for the purpose of facilitating Japanese trade and/or handling
matters affecting the civil status or property rights of Japanese
nationals. The latter proposal was approved by a majority of the
members of the FEC on January 12,
1950, but was defeated by virtue of Soviet non-concurrence. The
Department, in accordance with its basic position that SCAP may authorize Japan to
participate in international relationships, then issued an
invitation4 through SCAP to the Japanese Government to set up five overseas
agencies in the U.S. and Hawaii for performing trade promotion and
certain consular-type activities. The U.S. invitation was accepted
by the Japanese [Page 1184]
Government on February 14. Except for Communist protests, reactions
in Japan and the U.S. to this development were uniformly favorable.
The Department and SCAP are now
encouraging other countries (primarily Brazil, Argentina, India,
Pakistan and Thailand) to follow the example of the U.S. Government
in inviting the establishment of Japanese agencies in those
countries.
The paper dealing with Japanese Participation in Technical Agreements
and Conferences had been forwarded from the Steering Committee to
the Commission by a majority vote. However, it soon became evident
that due to the walkout of the Soviet representative from the
Commission on January 29, 1950, the Commission would not be able to
act favorably on the paper for some time because of the position of
several governments that the FEC
could not take action on substantive matters in the absence of the
Soviet representative. The U.S. therefore, in accordance with the
Terms of Reference of the FEC,
issued an interim directive to SCAP, dated February 21, 1950, on Japanese Participation in
Technical Agreements and Conferences5
based on the substance of the paper before the FEC. In view of the fact that the
question of Japanese participation in technical agreements and
conferences is a constantly recurring one, the U.S. Government was
also motivated by the desire to establish some official sanction
within the Terms of Reference of the FEC so that other governments might find it easier to
support such participation by Japan. The issuance of the interim
directive was approved by the French, Canadian, Pakistan and Burmese
representatives in the FEC. The
British and Australian representatives reserved the position of
their governments on this matter.
It is important to note that the majority of the FEC support for both policy papers
(technical conferences and overseas agencies) was obtained as a
result of considerable U.S. diplomatic spadework.
commentary
Treaty negotiations, even if successful, may well involve many, many
months. Since Japan has faithfully complied with its surrender
obligations, the continuation of excessive restraints on Japan
appears to have little justification either morally or from the
point of view of political wisdom. One of the most effective ways to
help offset already discernible Japanese resentment against the
protracted occupation—which necessarily must continue for some time
longer—would be along the lines of restoring to Japan greater
international personality: that is better facilities for
international trade, Japanese handling of consular-type affairs,
Japanese adherence to international conventions, and Japan’s
participation in international conferences and conventions. Aside
from the obvious technical advantages of such [Page 1185] arrangements, they would permit
the growing national awareness of the Japanese people to find
expression in the dignity and prestige that go with international
responsibilities rather than to engender hostility toward the U.S.
occupation and its objectives.
India, Pakistan and Burma have been generally sympathetic to the
policy, but other countries, including the United Kingdom and
Australia, have tended to interpret U.S. moves to bring occupied
Japan back into the world community as part of a substitution
program for a peace treaty. These latter countries have contended
that a resumption by Japan of international functions and
responsibilities in advance of a general peace settlement could only
be justified if it could be clearly demonstrated that a peace
settlement is impracticable.
The further success of U.S. measures to bring occupied Japan back
into the world community, therefore, hinges largely on the treaty
question. Either a treaty will restore to Japan normal international
relations or general agreement among the powers that a treaty is
impracticable will do so. The present situation, in which no
decision has been reached on either course, is almost certain to
block any further appreciable broadening of the scope of Japan’s
international relations.
It would be a grave error in judgment to suppose that because the
occupation in Japan is making apparent good headway and because the
Japanese are well-disposed toward the United States that this
situation will necessarily continue. Japanese willingness to
cooperate with the occupation and the friendly disposition of Japan
toward the U.S. will continue only under occupation policies which
evolve with sufficient rapidity to accommodate themselves to
Japanese attitudes and circumstances. The participation of Japan in
international relations is an important way in which we can maintain
U.S. initiative in Japan, keeping one step ahead of the developments
there. But the further implementation of this policy is going to be
difficult, perhaps impossible, without an early definitive decision
on the peace treaty. As far as the participation of occupied Japan
in international relations is concerned, we appear to have reached
the point of diminishing returns.