694.001/4–2650

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)

secret

Subject: Background paper on Japan.

There is attached the first of several background papers on various aspects of United States policy toward Japan which this office has in preparation. It is believed that this particular paper will be of special interest to you in connection with your consideration of matters affecting a possible Japanese peace treaty.

[Attachment]

Japan’s Participation in International Relationships

1. FEC Policy

The FEC, in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, June 19, 1947, agreed: “To help the people of Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large to find means whereby they may develop within the framework of a democratic society an intercourse among themselves and with other countries along economic and cultural lines that will enable them to satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring them into permanently peaceful relationship with all nations.” The Commission also agreed in this policy decision that one of the ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform, was: “To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states and support the objectives of the United Nations.”1

2. U.S. Policy

The U.S. Government has taken the position that SCAP, as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan and in accordance with the principles set forth in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, has legal authority, as well as the obligation, to permit Japan to participate in international relationships. On a broad policy basis [Page 1183] it was believed when the position was developed in the spring of 1949, that the situation in Japan required more than emphasis on internal reform and economic stabilization; that through participation in international relationships the Japanese would acquire direct experience and knowledge of democratic institutions abroad; and that such participation would go far to restore to the Japanese a measure of self-confidence and a renewed sense of responsibility.

3. Development of This Policy

A number of the FEC member governments objected to this position and took the view that pending the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, the FEC, and not SCAP, was the authority to regulate Japan’s participation in international relationships. On April 21, 1949, the U.S.—without prejudice to its basic position that SCAP already has the authority to permit Japan to participate in international relationships, but with a view to obtaining the leadership of the other member governments of the FEC in encouraging such participation by Japan—introduced a proposal to the FEC which provided that “SCAP, subject to his discretion and continued control, should permit Japan to participate with other nations or groups of nations in such international relations, conventions, meetings, consular arrangements or other bilateral or multilateral accords as Japan may be invited to enter into, accede to, attend or participate in and as SCAP shall consider to be in the interests of the occupation.”2

In the course of the discussions on this subject in the FEC3 this proposal was broken down into two parts. One provided that SCAP, subject to his discretion and continued control, should permit Japan to participate with other nations or groups of nations in such international agreements, conventions and conferences of a technical character as Japan may be invited to enter into, accede to, or attend and as the Supreme Commander shall consider to be in the interests of the occupation. The other provided that the Japanese Government may, with the approval of SCAP, appoint agents in any country willing to receive them for the purpose of facilitating Japanese trade and/or handling matters affecting the civil status or property rights of Japanese nationals. The latter proposal was approved by a majority of the members of the FEC on January 12, 1950, but was defeated by virtue of Soviet non-concurrence. The Department, in accordance with its basic position that SCAP may authorize Japan to participate in international relationships, then issued an invitation4 through SCAP to the Japanese Government to set up five overseas agencies in the U.S. and Hawaii for performing trade promotion and certain consular-type activities. The U.S. invitation was accepted by the Japanese [Page 1184] Government on February 14. Except for Communist protests, reactions in Japan and the U.S. to this development were uniformly favorable. The Department and SCAP are now encouraging other countries (primarily Brazil, Argentina, India, Pakistan and Thailand) to follow the example of the U.S. Government in inviting the establishment of Japanese agencies in those countries.

The paper dealing with Japanese Participation in Technical Agreements and Conferences had been forwarded from the Steering Committee to the Commission by a majority vote. However, it soon became evident that due to the walkout of the Soviet representative from the Commission on January 29, 1950, the Commission would not be able to act favorably on the paper for some time because of the position of several governments that the FEC could not take action on substantive matters in the absence of the Soviet representative. The U.S. therefore, in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the FEC, issued an interim directive to SCAP, dated February 21, 1950, on Japanese Participation in Technical Agreements and Conferences5 based on the substance of the paper before the FEC. In view of the fact that the question of Japanese participation in technical agreements and conferences is a constantly recurring one, the U.S. Government was also motivated by the desire to establish some official sanction within the Terms of Reference of the FEC so that other governments might find it easier to support such participation by Japan. The issuance of the interim directive was approved by the French, Canadian, Pakistan and Burmese representatives in the FEC. The British and Australian representatives reserved the position of their governments on this matter.

It is important to note that the majority of the FEC support for both policy papers (technical conferences and overseas agencies) was obtained as a result of considerable U.S. diplomatic spadework.

commentary

Treaty negotiations, even if successful, may well involve many, many months. Since Japan has faithfully complied with its surrender obligations, the continuation of excessive restraints on Japan appears to have little justification either morally or from the point of view of political wisdom. One of the most effective ways to help offset already discernible Japanese resentment against the protracted occupation—which necessarily must continue for some time longer—would be along the lines of restoring to Japan greater international personality: that is better facilities for international trade, Japanese handling of consular-type affairs, Japanese adherence to international conventions, and Japan’s participation in international conferences and conventions. Aside from the obvious technical advantages of such [Page 1185] arrangements, they would permit the growing national awareness of the Japanese people to find expression in the dignity and prestige that go with international responsibilities rather than to engender hostility toward the U.S. occupation and its objectives.

India, Pakistan and Burma have been generally sympathetic to the policy, but other countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, have tended to interpret U.S. moves to bring occupied Japan back into the world community as part of a substitution program for a peace treaty. These latter countries have contended that a resumption by Japan of international functions and responsibilities in advance of a general peace settlement could only be justified if it could be clearly demonstrated that a peace settlement is impracticable.

The further success of U.S. measures to bring occupied Japan back into the world community, therefore, hinges largely on the treaty question. Either a treaty will restore to Japan normal international relations or general agreement among the powers that a treaty is impracticable will do so. The present situation, in which no decision has been reached on either course, is almost certain to block any further appreciable broadening of the scope of Japan’s international relations.

It would be a grave error in judgment to suppose that because the occupation in Japan is making apparent good headway and because the Japanese are well-disposed toward the United States that this situation will necessarily continue. Japanese willingness to cooperate with the occupation and the friendly disposition of Japan toward the U.S. will continue only under occupation policies which evolve with sufficient rapidity to accommodate themselves to Japanese attitudes and circumstances. The participation of Japan in international relations is an important way in which we can maintain U.S. initiative in Japan, keeping one step ahead of the developments there. But the further implementation of this policy is going to be difficult, perhaps impossible, without an early definitive decision on the peace treaty. As far as the participation of occupied Japan in international relations is concerned, we appear to have reached the point of diminishing returns.

  1. Full text, released to the press July 11, 1947, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 3, 1947, p. 216.
  2. For remainder of text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 713.
  3. Summaries of FEC meetings held during 1950 are in file 690.00 FEC.
  4. Not printed; a copy forms enclosure 1 to despatch No. 263 from Tokyo, February 25, 1950. (794.00/2–2550)
  5. For the Department’s press release of February 25, which includes full text of the directive, see Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1950, p. 414.