694.001/4–2450
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard)
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
| Participants: | Department of State—The Secretary, Mr. Rusk, FE, Mr. Butterworth, S/J, Mr. Howard, S. |
| Department of Defense—Secretary Johnson, Secretary Pace,1 Under Secretary Voorhees, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg, General Collins, General Burns.2 |
Secretary Acheson explained that he had suggested the meeting for the purpose of further exploring the problems connected with a Japanese peace treaty and of bringing the views of the State and Defense Departments into closer agreement so that he might be better prepared for the forthcoming discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman3 in early May. He recounted briefly the events beginning with his discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman in September 1949. Following these discussions a letter was sent by the Department of State requesting the views of the Defense Department concerning U.S. military requirements in the event a peace treaty with Japan were to be negotiated, and Secretary Johnson sent his reply of December 23 enclosing the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that they regarded a peace treaty as premature. The Secretary said that in view of the mutually exclusive character of the two requirements insisted upon by the Joint Chiefs for a peace treaty, viz., that U.S. forces remain in Japan and [Page 1176] that the USSR and the de facto government of China be parties to the peace treaty, he regarded the Joint Chiefs’ statement that a peace treaty was “premature” as a masterpiece of understatement, since these requirements would make the conclusion of a peace treaty impossible. He referred also to the subsequent conversations with Mr. Voorhees and Mr. Dorr and to the proposal which Mr. Voorhees had made on March 23 that negotiations be initiated with our friendly Allies looking toward a peace treaty covering political and economic matters but leaving unchanged the occupation regime of control and SCAP’s reserve powers for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of security with respect to Japan. The Department of State had considered Mr. Voorhees’ proposal and numerous other arrangements for protecting the security of the United States and its friendly Allies should a peace treaty be concluded. There were two aspects of the security problem. One is protection against the possible resurgence of Japanese aggression, which is of particular concern to Australia and the Philippines. The other aspect is protection against Soviet-Communist aggression against a disarmed Japan. The position of the Department of State is that a peace treaty, non-punitive in nature, should be concluded and that at the same time a security arrangement should be entered into with the FEC countries and Japan which would involve mutual commitments among the FEC powers to defend one another against aggression by Japan and to defend Japan against aggression from any source (we would of course mean the USSR or Communist China). Under this multilateral arrangement Japan would grant whatever bases and rights might be determined as necessary to defend Japan against aggression. The USSR and Communist China would undoubtedly not agree to participate in any such arrangement. The Secretary said that there were two points he wanted to make and then wished to open the subject for general discussion. The first point was that in his opinion the choice with which the United States was faced was not a choice between the situation we now have and an alternative, but rather a choice between a deteriorating situation and an alternative. The situation in Japan was not stationary. The Japanese had recovered from the shell shock of war and from their surprise at the entirely unexpected humanitarian and generous treatment which they had received at the hands of SCAP. As in Germany, there were increasing signs that the Japanese wished to regain their freedom from the controls of the military occupation and this feeling might well increase if the United States does nothing. Therefore, it does not solve the political problem simply to decide to do nothing. The second point was that in his opinion the proposal made by Mr. Voorhees placed undue emphasis on the legal aspects of the problem and on the possible legal arguments which the Soviets might seize upon should a peace treaty be concluded. In the Secretary’s view what the Soviets [Page 1177] might do would not be determined by what a fair-minded international lawyer would conclude concerning their legal rights. If they had no legal rights they would invent a situation or create a law which they would say gave them rights. Consequently the important problem was what are Soviet intentions, what will they do and what can we do to prevent or offset their action. The Secretary said that this was the stage at which the problem rested.
Secretary Johnson said that he had been gravely disturbed by the publicity concerning the Japanese peace treaty which had arisen from leaks that he attributed to the State Department. Before asking the Joint Chiefs to speak he wanted assurance that there would be no leaks from the State Department concerning this meeting and assured that there would be no leaks from the Defense Department. He said that what transpired at the meeting would be confined to the Defense Department officials present and asked that the same be true of the State Department officials present. Secretary Acheson assured him that this would be the case and Secretary Johnson asked General Bradley to proceed.
General Bradley briefly restated the JCS position of last December that a peace treaty was premature and said that in the light of recent developments and the uncertainties in the changing situation in the Far East his opinion and the reasons given for it still remained the same.
Admiral Sherman concurred in General Bradley’s statement and added that, in his opinion, the crux of the problem from the military standpoint was that a decision was required as to whether our power position should be based on the periphery of islands formed by Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines or whether the United States should abandon its position in Japan and Okinawa and draw back to Guam and the Philippines, the position held by us before the last war. He said that Formosa could probably be written off during the next six months and that if U.S. forces withdrew from Japan, Okinawa would be untenable. Accordingly he saw no middle position between the two alternatives he described.
General Vandenberg prefaced his remarks by stating that the problem appeared to be one of reconciling the political position of the United States, which was of course within the competence of the Department of State, and the military position, which was the responsibility of the military. With reference to the latter he said that it was his clear impression from the talks of the Joint Chiefs with General MacArthur in Tokyo that General MacArthur regarded a proposal for a peace conference as a propaganda move which would embarrass the USSR and improve U.S. relations with the Japanese, rather than as a move which was connected with military considerations; General MacArthur on questioning appeared not to desire the [Page 1178] actual implementation of a proposal for a peace conference but rather the mere proposal by the United States of a peace conference which would inevitably be refused by the USSR with consequent propaganda advantages to the United States.
General Collins confirmed General Vandenberg’s opinion as to the views of General MacArthur. He stated further that it was General MacArthur’s conception that should a peace treaty be concluded the size of U.S. forces in Japan would be reduced to a mere token force. This was disturbing to him because U.S. forces were even now so thin on Hokkaido that Soviet forces could easily land unopposed in many places and proceed inland a considerable distance before they would even make contact with U.S. forces.
Secretary Johnson said that he had been formerly of Secretary Acheson’s opinion concerning a peace treaty but that, after reading the recent cables and press comment, he was convinced that the only propaganda for a peace treaty was that which came out of the Department of State. He said that he supported the view of the JCS that there should be no peace treaty. He stated that because of the wide disparity between the views of General MacArthur as reported by the Joint Chiefs and other officials—which meant that someone was not reporting MacArthur’s views correctly—Secretary Johnson was planning to go himself to talk with General MacArthur, together with General Bradley, on June 12.
Secretary Acheson remarked that he had not known that Secretary Johnson was planning a trip to Tokyo. He said that there were a number of things which he wanted to make clear concerning the position of the State Department, relating to the remarks which the Joint Chiefs had made. He said that he was not for a peace treaty for the mere sake of having a peace treaty. The lack of a peace treaty would be acceptable if the present situation could be maintained indefinitely, but this simply was not the case. He said furthermore that the State Department was not proposing that U.S. forces in Japan be reduced in size, increased, or anything of the sort. The size of U.S. forces in Japan was up to the Defense Department to determine and the State Department looked to them for advice on this point. He emphasized that whatever military requirements were essential to U.S. security were for the U.S. military to determine. If, for example, bases were not enough and it was necessary to have the right to move about in Japan then an attempt would be made to obtain such rights. The State Department was interested however in making sure that the United States did not ask for more bases and rights than it would actually need in the long run because this would simply give rise to unnecessary difficulties in negotiations and unnecessarily adverse political consequences. With reference to General Collins’ comment the Secretary said that if the Soviets intended to occupy Japan they could do so [Page 1179] under present conditions and in fact would appear to have a better legal basis to do so now inasmuch as they could allege that they have the right to have their occupation forces in Japan as part of the occupation. The Secretary said that the position that a peace treaty is premature is not adequate to meet his needs. He referred to the reference in the recent Sino-Soviet treaty to the desire of the parties for an early Japanese peace treaty and said that a proposal by the Soviets for a peace conference would catch the United States flatfooted. He pointed out that if the Soviets proposed that a peace conference be held along the lines suggested by the United States in 1947, the United States could not possibly refuse and would be forced to attend the conference.
The Joint Chiefs and Secretary Johnson assented to this last point. General Vandenberg, referring again to the distinction between the political and military aspects of the problem, said that the position of the Joint Chiefs was that a peace treaty under present conditions was premature for at least the next six months and that at that time the situation should be looked at again. If, however, Secretary Acheson for political reasons should say that the situation was deteriorating so fast that the United States could not wait as long as six months, then the Joint Chiefs would have to reassess the situation at once in the light of this judgment. The Joint Chiefs and Secretary Johnson concurred in this as a fair statement. Secretary Johnson asked Secretary Acheson whether, because of his proposed trip to Tokyo, the problem could remain dormant until July 1.
Secretary Acheson said that if the situation in Japan could be maintained indefinitely the problem of a peace treaty would not be acute at all. He said that this was not the case, however, and no one can say at just what time the situation will have deteriorated to the extent indicated by General Vandenberg. Also the Soviets might propose a peace conference at any time. He said that a military occupation anywhere, however ably conducted, begins after a certain time to run downhill and a point is eventually reached where one has to peg one’s military requirements through the conclusion of a new arrangement and one must be willing to pay the price for this. The Joint Chiefs and Secretary Johnson assented to this proposition.
Secretary Pace restated the fact that the State Department was confronted by one set of problems and the military by another set of problems and that what Secretary Acheson needed to know was what to do if the need for action should arise. Secretary Acheson concurred and said that if the United States could assume an adequate public position it could keep the ball in the air for a considerable period of time. He doubted, even if negotiations were begun at once, that a peace treaty would actually be in effect until two years from now. He expressed doubt that the Soviets really wanted a peace treaty [Page 1180] with Japan. What they wanted was to get U.S. forces out of Japan and if they could force the United States into the position of opposing a peace treaty they would make tremendous capital out of it. He also referred to the fact that the United State did not want to be in a position of maintaining bases in a country with a hostile population and mentioned the discussions on this point in relation to the maintenance of bases in Arab countries.
General Collins said that he was concerned that the pulling down of U.S. forces as suggested by General MacArthur might well cause the Soviets to move into Hokkaido whereas they would not do so at present because of the sizable U.S. force now in Japan. He inquired whether it would be possible to check with leaders in the Japanese Government concerning the willingness of the Japanese to grant the United States base rights in Japan. Mr. Butterworth referred to evidence that there was a recent tendency in Japanese opinion away from the granting of military bases to the United States and that this tendency was likely to harden Japanese public opinion. Whereas Mr. Yoshida had cleverly avoided committing himself for or against bases—although he no doubt favored them—the leaders of the opposition have charged that Yoshida is preparing to grant bases and have publicly taken the position that bases should not be granted and the Communists were exploiting this situation. Secretary Johnson said that if this were the case his opinion would be even stronger that there should not be a peace treaty. Mr. Voorhees commented that in his opinon it was unnecessary to check with Japanese leaders in order to find out what Japanese opinion was. He was convinced that almost all Japanese would welcome U.S. forces and that they were concerned first about Japan’s security and only secondly about a peace treaty.
Secretary Pace said that he felt the State Department had not adequately explained its proposed political alternative to the existing situation so that the military might more readily determine whether it would meet with their requirements. He asked General Bradley if this were not the case and General Bradley after some hesitation commented, I suppose so.
Secretary Pace inquired whether Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman regarded the conclusion of a peace treaty as urgent. Secretary Acheson replied that Mr. Bevin did but that it was a matter of secondary interest to Mr. Schuman, whose primary concern in the Far East was Indochina. The Pacific members of the Commonwealth are all anxious for a peace treaty provided, however, that their security against the possible resurgence of Japanese aggression is adequately taken care of. They would welcome the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan and if some such security arrangement were not made they would insist upon a very punitive peace treaty. As for India’s position, [Page 1181] Mr. Nehru has expressed opposition to the continuance of the military occupation of Japan but has stated that he would not be opposed to U.S. forces remaining in Japan to protect Japan’s security under an arrangement voluntarily entered into by Japan.
General Bradley said that what he was against was a peace treaty for the sake of a peace treaty. He regarded this as dangerous and likely to lead to a situation in which not only U.S. security but the security of our Allies would be endangered.
Mr. Butterworth inquired whether bases in Japan were desired for Far Eastern defensive purposes or for the purpose of offensive operations against the Soviets in the event war should break out in Europe. Admiral Sherman replied that just as he could not separate Okinawa from Japan in their relation to the U.S. power position in the Far East, similarly he could not separate the U.S. position in Japan from possible hostilities in Europe. He said that both the USSR and the United States bordered on the Atlantic and Pacific and that hostilities in one area could not be separated from hostilities in the other, nor could the defensive and offensive aspects of military operations be easily separated. In the course of his comments Admiral Sherman remarked that a naval base on Japan was essential if the periphery of Pacific Islands was to be held and that Okinawa was insufficient and that the naval base must be accompanied by army and air force contingents. He said that the days of small military points such as Hong Kong were gone when the airplane appeared. General Vandenberg in reply to Mr. Butterworth’s question stated that when Japan was held by the Japanese it took an enormous operation for the United States to get anywhere in the Far East and this would also be the case if Japan were seized by the Soviets. Secretary Johnson inquired of Mr. Butterworth what difference the answer to his question might make. Mr. Butterworth pointed but that the Japanese would of course take an increasingly keen interest in the problem of bases and they could and would be influenced by whether or not U.S. bases in Japan would act as a magnet to draw upon them the consequences of any military operations between the United States and the USSR.
Secretary Johnson revealed that he had received a copy of a proposed letter from the Joint Chiefs which he believed would be helpful to Secretary Acheson in his meetings with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman in early May. He said that General Bradley would deliver the letter to Secretary Acheson. Secretary Acheson said that he would study the letter. He said that he would also get up a memorandum concerning the steps that the United States should take if the Soviets should ask for a peace conference and concerning the U.S. position which the Secretary should adopt in his discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman. Secretary Johnson asked General Burns to make a similar study in order that the Defense Department might be prepared to [Page 1182] discuss the matter. He said that the State Department memorandum should be sent to General Burns and that when Secretary Pace had his feet on the ground he would take over the responsibility for Japanese problems and Secretary Johnson would no longer have a special deputy for this purpose.