694.001/1–1050
The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
personal
Dear Dean: This is a brief personal note to you to mention the most interesting point which has come up in the course of the three conversations I have had with General MacArthur. I have sent full memoranda of the conversations personally to Walt Butterworth.1
Sebald and I spent about two hours with the General Sunday evening and discussed on a purely informal and personal basis some of the general problems of the Far East and particularly the question of the negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty. We both prefaced and [Page 1115] added to our remarks by Stressing the fact that on neither side were we speaking officially but purely on the basis of a personal exchange of views. General MacArthur is quite outraged by the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the postponement of arrangements for negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty. He spoke very strongly on this subject and feels that the view does not really reflect a military judgment but that General Bradley is merely speaking for Secretary Johnson. Again with appropriate caveats about his desire to avoid intruding or giving any implication of attempting to dictate or influence policy decisions, he said that he hoped that you would take the matter up with the President and have the Joint Chiefs overruled. As you know, he feels very strongly that we should go ahead with the negotiation of the Treaty. I fully agree with him. In this connection, he stressed a point which the Consultants also had in mind; namely, that the negotiation of the Peace Treaty would be one of the dramatic steps by which we could recapture from the Russians the initiative in terms of general Asiatic thinking. The General noted in this connection that the Joint Chiefs had been overruled on Formosa and he saw no reason why they should not be overruled on this question of the Peace Treaty. Of course on the Formosan issue he agreed with the Joint Chiefs.
On several different occasions, he stressed the excellent cooperation which he had received from the State Department and indicated that his difficulties had been due almost entirely to the Department of Defense. I think I am quite aware of the problems existing along this line in Washington, but I wonder whether on a matter so important as the negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty it would not be possible for the President to take the matter into his own hands and request General MacArthur to report directly to him his views on this question. In terms of American thinking, SCAP’s support on this would be of great importance and it would seem too bad if it were necessary to have his views remain secret. Naturally, it is of prime importance that what the General said to me in confidence should not leak out, but I hope you will consider whether without disclosing the General’s comments some way could be found to solicit an open expression of his views. I would stress again that I would venture to suggest such a procedure only in a matter of very great importance. I think the negotiation of the Peace Treaty is such a matter.2
[Page 1116]The trip so far is really very satisfactory, and I hope it will prove as a whole to be worthwhile.
Very sincerely yours,
- Mr. Jessup enclosed memoranda of his conversations held with General MacArthur January 5, 8, and 10 with his letter of January 10 to Mr. Butterworth. (694.001/1–1050) None printed, except the memorandum, supra.↩
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In a memorandum of February 10 to William J. McWilliams, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary, stated: “I have been holding the attached letter from Ambassador Jessup for some time. When the Secretary read it, he told me he saw no reason for circulating this to anyone. I assume that he felt it did not even require a reply.
“If you think it advisable, we might discuss the subject with one or two people who are working on the Japanese peace treaty. It would not even necessarily have to be phrased as a suggestion from Mr. Jessup. At any rate, the Secretary wanted this played very close.” (694.001/1–1050) No additional documentation regarding Mr. Jessup’s proposal has been found in State Department files.
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