Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/1–1050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)²

top secret

Tokyo, January 9, 1950.

Mr. Sebald³ and I called on General MacArthur⁴ at his office in the Dai Ichi Building at 6:00 p. m. yesterday afternoon and had a two hours’ conversation with him. I told him that, if he had no objection, I should like to have a talk with him on a purely personal basis. I reminded him that the Secretary was always careful to take up matters officially only through the regular channels and that I was not authorized to consult General MacArthur officially on the general problems of Asia and the Far East but would welcome the opportunity on a reciprocally personal basis to get his views on a variety of questions. The General said that he would be glad to talk on this personal and informal basis, it being understood that his command did not extend outside of Japan and the islands and definitely did not include China and Formosa. He went on to say that it had been a terrific mistake in his opinion to separate the commands at the close of the war when the areas were divided between his command and Navy authority. It would have been much sounder had a unified command remained for the whole Far Eastern-Pacific area.

[Here follows a discussion of General MacArthur’s views on Japan before World War II, the Chinese civil war, and postwar Russian policy in Asia.]

I then said that following the lines which he had sketched I personally felt that one of the ways in which we could meet the communist menace in Asia was by the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which would prove that we were not imperalist but were ready to satisfy the legitimate desires of the people. General MacArthur immediately stated his emphatic and enthusiastic agreement with this proposition. He said that it was he Who had signed the surrender instrument⁵ on the Missouri and that he knew the terms and meaning of that, document. While the Japanese had made promises, they had fulfilled those promises to the letter; we had also made promises and we were committed absolutely to giving them their freedom now that they had accomplished the essential purposes laid down in the surrender documents and Potsdam Agreement.⁶ Nothing could so dramatize in the eyes of the world our intentions as the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. If we proceeded to a peace conference all of the attention of the East would be focused on this issue and so would the attention of the press of the world This was one way an which we could accomplish the enormously important result of getting the initiative back from the Russians. He felt personally that it would be much the best plan to hold the peace conference in Tokyo. He said that the historic practice of arranging a peace treaty in the Capital of the defeated power was not merely a show by the victor but as in this case had the essential purpose of getting the acquiescence of the defeated country in the terms of the peace. If the Peace Treaty were dictated in Washington remote from Asia, the Japanese would feel that any provisions of the treaty that they did not like had been imposed upon them from far away and they would resent and continue to oppose the implementation of these provisions. On the other hand, if the agreement were reached in Tokyo they would feel that they had a part in it and would accept the terms. Toyko represents an essentially neutral ground being as close to the Soviet Union as to the United States. This led: him to a consideration of the future status of Japan and the possibilities of its long-term neutralization. He said the Russians were just as much convinced that we had nefarious ulterior purposes as we knew they had. Many people in the United States and elsewhere also thought that we intended to build up Japan as a weapon to use against the Russians. The Japanese on the one hand realize and we should realize that in any war regardless of what happened their islands would be destroyed. Modern war no longer was a suitable means of settling international questions because of the total character of the involvement and destruction. Japan could, however, be a neutral spot to the advantage of the United States and of the Soviet Union as well. We should be able to convince the Russians that here at least their interests and ours were parallel. He felt sure that if a man like Jacob Malik⁷ represented the Soviet Union in such discussions that he would appreciate this view and could be convinced. He believed this was true of other Russians as well. He saw no reason why the Russians should not agree to the security provisions which we desire for the Peace Treaty. In any case he thought we should proceed actively to negotiate the treaty if necessary ending up with a treaty to which the Soviet Union and China would not be parties. I then mentioned the recent expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with which he was familiar and said that Mr. Sebald had with him certain recent documents received from the State Department with which I was not sure the General was familiar but which Mr. Sebald would be glad to read to him if he wished. General MacArthur replied first that the Joint Chiefs did not at all understand the problem here. He said that General Bradley⁸ had never been in this part of the world and had all his experience and made his reputation in the European Theatre and looked forward to being the Comamnder in the European Theatre in case there were another war. General Vandenberg⁹ had been a cadet at the Academy when MacArthur was Superintendent and stood at the bottom of his class. He would not have graduated except for MacArthur’s intervention. He was an extremely able air operations officer but had absolutely no general, broad knowledge of problems outside of his particular jurisdiction. Admiral Forrest Sherman¹⁰ is the one man in the group who knows the Pacific and the Far East and who is a man of the very first quality in all fields. He would be distinguished as a statesman or in any other capacity just as he is as a Naval officer. General MacArthur feels sure the decision of the Joint Chiefs could not represent his thinking. General Collins¹¹ has seen some service in Guadalcanal and had some familiarity with problems here but did not know them thoroughly. General MacArthur made it quite clear that he considered that Bradley was expressing the view of Secretary Johnson¹² and hinted rather broadly that this was a civilian rather than a military point of view which was expressed by the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Sebald then inquired whether the General had actually seen the statement¹³ which the Joint Chiefs had made about our security requirements under a Japanese Peace Treaty. When the General said that he had not seen these but was familiar with the conclusion, Mr. Sebald read them to him. In regard to the first four points, the General interposed comments to the effect that these were correct and could be secured. He said the Japanese would have no objection and he did not think the Russians would object. Particularly with regard to the Ryukyus including Okinawa, he said the Russians could be countered by their claims to the Kurils and Saghalin and would be unable to object to our proposals. (He had previously stated his estimate of our needs here in terms of bases including the naval base at Yokosuka and three air bases—General Stratemeyer had mentioned to me five. In connection with each one of the air bases, the General said we would need merely a battalion of ground troops and an anti-aircraft battalion at each base and that at the naval base we would station the Commanding General with one regiment. This would represent a total complement with the Air Force of about 30,000 men.)¹⁴ In regard to the JCS view about the participation of the Soviet Union and China and their conclusion that under present circumstances this could not be obtained and therefore the negotiation of a peace treaty was premature, the General stated quite explicitly his view that this was not a decision which should be left to the JCS, but that in any event, the JCS expected to be overruled. He repeated what he had said about their lack of familiarity with the problems and mentioned that his views had never been solicited. He said the JCS certainly did not express the views of SCAP. He went on to refer to the recent recommendation of the JCS for a mission to Formosa to look into the situation and make reports.¹⁵ He said that he had been advised in advance concerning this recommendation by the Chief of Staff and had made all of his arrangements. He regarded the matter as so important that he could not delegate such a mission to anyone else and he had intended to go personally and make the examination and then would have discussed it with his own staff. This recommendation had been overruled. If the JCS could be overruled on that point, there was no reason why they could not be overruled on the question of the negotiation of the Peace Treaty. Again being careful to indicate that he was speaking personally and did not propose to mix into matters which were not his affair, the General said that he thought the Secretary should take the matter up with the President and ask for definite authority to proceed with the negotiation of the Treaty, the terms and procedures to be left to his discretion. He remarked that he had tried to get the Secretary to make a trip to Japan when he had first taken office, but unfortunately it had not been possible to arrange this. He felt that, if the Secretary could have come at that time, it would have been enormously helpful. It was evident to me that he felt that he and the Secretary viewed matters in very much the same way and that the difficulty existed between SCAP and the Department of Defense. Tying in this discussion with his previous remarks, I told him that the Far Eastern Consultants had included the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty among the urgent items and that we had emphasized the need for dramatic steps which would capture the imagination. General MacArthur expressed full agreement with this and repeated his view that the negotiation of the Peace Treaty would be the most significant step which could be taken. The Russians are making considerable progress in their propaganda that it is the United States which is holding up the Treaty. We ought to press the negotiation and make it perfectly plain that it is the Russians and not we who would be holding up the Treaty. To illustrate this point, he recalled the banquet scene in “A Yankee at the Court of King Arthur” when the Yankee had described how he had told one of his choice stories without evoking a single smile. After he had told it for the 50th time, he noted that one man way down at the end of the table had smiled and the last time he told it that night, for the 500th time, he had them rolling under the table with laughter. The General said that this was the technique we should use in telling the people over and over again that we wanted a peace treaty with Japan and the Russians were blocking it. In regard to future developments concerning negotiation of the Treaty, I said that I had no information but that I personally felt sure that the matter should not be considered dead. I noted that the statement of the Joint Chiefs transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State had made it impossible for the Department to communicate to the British Commonwealth countries our views about the Treaty prior to their Ceylon Conference. I said it seemed to me likely that the British Commonwealth countries would discuss this matter and probably make some report to us concerning their views. The General thought the British were extremely anxious to have the Treaty in order to promote their commercial interests and thought it would be a great mistake to allow them to seem to have the initiative and to be prodding us into the negotiation of the Treaty rather than have us to take the lead. He indicated that if the State Department pressed ahead for a peace conference they would have the support of SCAP although he did not intimate that he wished to be called upon to express his views. In fact, as we concluded the conversation, he repeated that he expressed his opinion very freely and informally because they had been asked for; he did not wish to intrude his views and certainly did not wish to suggest that he felt he had any right to make decisions. He said when decisions were made by the Secretary of State they became the decisions of the United States and he would loyally carry them out. He stressed particularly his hope that what he had said to me in this personal and informal way would be guarded against the possibility of use to draw him into any controversies in Washington. He referred indirectly to his previous unfortunate experiences along this line. I assured him that I understood his position and would fully respect his wishes in the matter. (I think it is clear that none of the statements which he made should be allowed to get any wide circulation which might result in any leak to the press.)

Philip C. Jessup

2. From December 14, 1949, to March 15, 1950, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup conducted a 14-nation fact-finding tour of the Far East. Test of his public report is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 24, 1950, p. 627. Documentation on his talks in Tokyo with Japanese and American officials during the period January 5–10 is filed under number 611.94/1–550.
3. William J. Sebald, Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan and Chief, Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP.
4. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan and U.S. Commander in Chief, Far East.
5. For text of the instrument of surrender signed aboard U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 493, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1733.
6. For text of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, issued by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and Great Britain, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1474. The Head of Government of the Soviet Union adhered to the Proclamation on August 8.
7. Yakov A. Malik, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
8. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
9. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.
10. Chief of Naval Operations.
11. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
12. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson.
13. Apparently a reference to a memorandum of December 22, 1949, from the JCS to Mr. Johnson. Text forms the enclosure to a letter from Mr. Johnson to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, December 23, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 922. On December 27, the JCS memorandum was circulated as NSC 60.

14. In a letter of December 9, 1949, to W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Sebald had reported on his conversation that day with General MacArthur. He had stated in part:

    “With respect to the security provisions of the treaty draft, General Mac-Arthur said that he gave his views to Mr. Voorhees along the following lines: It is essential that Japan have security. He is first and foremost in favor of neutralization by all the Powers concerned, somewhat along the lines of the Monroe Doctrine. If, however, it is felt that a neutralization compact does not accord real security for Japan, then he would propose the granting of a limited number of bases in Japan to the United States, with a total force not exceeding, say, 35,000 men. The bases which he specifically recommended are Yokosuka (as a naval base), and three air bases located, respectively, in the north, center, and south. Even this grant on the part of Japan, however, must be voluntary and subject to cancellation upon notice by the Japanese. Troops maintained in Japan should be entirely self-supporting and would have no right of interference with the prerogatives of the Japanese Government. In any event, the granting of bases should be for a limited period.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–2349)

    Tracy S. Voorhees was Under Secretary of the Army and deputy to the Secretary of Defense for policy matters affecting occupied areas.

15. See Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, p. 461.