Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

756D.5 MAP/10–1050: Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State

confidential   priority

Djakarta, October 10, 1950—2 p. m.

484. Received by RI Prime [Foreign] Minister Roem 11 a. m. October 9 my request. I told him Melby and Erskine¹ should be informed of any decision Indo Government had taken following our meetings with their military authorities and experts on Friday last re military aid.

Roem said Indo officials concerned therewith discussed problem among themselves thoroughly over weekend and confirmed position taken by their military representatives on Friday, namely that they did not desire work through MDAP, although they realized need for equipment which they hoped purchase in US. He saw no purpose in further technical bilateral discussions.

Roem took pains explain this meant no unfriendly attitude toward US. He sincerely hoped it would not be interpreted as either unfriendly or lacking in appreciation of our helpful offer. He said his government felt that to obtain arms from US in accordance with terms of agreement such as that which Hatta and I negotiated August 15 on police equipment would not be in harmony with foreign policy of independence and freedom of action as subsequently enunciated by Natsir Government. Indo authorities convinced that their acceptance of MDA relationship would be interpreted at once by Commie countries as Indo having taken sides. Furthermore Roem said domestic political difficulties would ensue just at time when Natsir Government is facing serious debate and possibly critical vote of confidence.

I told Roem I would inform the mission members as to position his government. I asked if I was correct in thinking that, if we pressed his government for a formal decision now on MDA participation, answer would be not of kind we would wish if Indos really seeking our help. He said this correct. He said if answers genuinely receptive to our, approach were given now it would seriously endanger life of Natsir Government. He said it would be difficult reverse later any decision announced now against accepting American aid under MDAP. He emphasized that if his government now permitted mission inspect Surabaya naval base and various installations for Army and Air Force, Commie press here and abroad would criticize this as breach of Indo independent policy and Chinese Commie Ambassador would be quick to follow US precedent and demand inspection rights. We agreed better call off negotiations now and explore further informally in more propitious or more urgent circumstances.

I told Roem it would be appropriate for him to give Melby and Erskine direct same explanation he had given me. An appointment was arranged for this purpose for 10 a. m. Tuesday tenth. I said I would recommend mission leave Djakarta two days later. Roem has invited Melby, Erskine and me dine with him Tuesday night. I said we would make any appropriate farewell calls on Sultan or other officials as Roem may indicate.

I definitely made reservation with Roem that I could not guarantee I could get delivery of military equipment to Indo at some later time if need and request therefor arose unless Indo Government willing work through MDAP. I said our supplies needed badly by ourselves and nations cooperating with US militarily in UN, in Korea, Europe and elsewhere. I said priority system was such that it might be impossible for Indos go on American market and procure any items independently of MDA. I questioned Roem as to whether his government wished to proceed with request for supplemental items which Sukanto has already drawn up to utilize balance, of approximately 2 million dollars out of 5 million dollars originally earmarked for police equipment. I said this already covered by Hatta agreement which still valid. Roem promised give me definite answer thereon.

Rome said he was convinced our two nations working in same direction and inspired by same ideals. He thought Indo could render most service toward, achieving those ideals through following independent policy and becoming strong. He reminded me that principal leaders in present government are men I have known and worked with and should be convinced are not sympathetic to Communism. He said they wanted US and Western Europe get Indo Products and thought we could keep them out of hands Commies by our own devices. He said let Indo develop its own national leadership and take responsibility solve its problems, always with feeling they could turn to us as friend with common ideals. I said I was convinced of Safe political philosophy of moderate leaders in present government but was not sure they were sufficiently sensitive to growing danger of Communism in Indo. I feared they might wait so long before taking action that it might be too late. I thought action they must take will require good equipment.

I was not at all sure political leadership of Nehru on international matters and particularly China and Korea was sound. I hoped Indos would depend upon their own political sagacity and realize US and other UN members have in their Korean policy done great service to free nations of world and must complete that service through unifying Korea. I said this meant crossing thirty-eighth parallel and eliminating any regrouping and reviving of North Korean Commie threat. I said UN already indicated readiness to help repair damage done to Korea by Commie policy and to insure establishment of free and sovereign Korean state. I said that through sacrifices US and other UN members are making in Korea they have checked threat of Commies moving southward through Indo China, Thailand and perhaps on to Indo and that this fact should be appreciated by free Asiatic nations in formulating their own foreign policies.

Conversations with President Sukarno and Minister Djuanda have contributed to my conviction that Simatupang and other military leaders want our help, realize need therefor and are not opposed on technical grounds to giving us all required data and letting mission see everything but political situation and Natsir Government policy simply make this impossible for present.

I have shown this message to Melby and Erskine who are agreeable to its despatch.²

Cochran

1. John Fremont Melby, Chairman of the Joint State–Defense Military Defense Assistance Program Surrey Mission, and Maj. Gen. G. B. Erskine, United States Marine Corps.

2. In telegram 494, October 11, from Djakarta, not printed, Melby filed his own report on his stay in Djakarta, stating inter alia:

   “There is little I can add to what Cochran has already reported concerning negative results our visit here. Insofar as Erskine and I are entitled to any judgment after such a brief stay we believe Cochran has taken an entirely correct attitude toward the Survey Mission and, furthermore, that he has most ably done everything that any one human being could do. It is apparent that our visit here was premature for a military arrangement such as we proposed and that anything further can be expected only when a more mature political basis and atmosphere have been developed. We did not find any evidence of a Communist predisposition though danger of its growth should not be overlooked.” (756D.5–MAP/10–1150)

   A copy of the official report on Indonesia of the Survey Mission (FMACC D–33/10), dated November 1, 1950, is in file 756D.5 MAP/11–150.